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Only limited research has been undertaken regarding the effects of extra-
legal variables on the verdicts of lower courts. Bennett and Feldman (1981) 
have demonstrated that the well-formedness of the semantic structure of 
testimony determines its credibility. It has been shown that the 
comprehensibility of narrative discourse (testimony) is a reliable indicator 
of its well-:-formedness (Thorndyke, 1977). This study aims to explore the 
relationships between comprehensibility (well-formedness) as a dependent 
variable, and magistrates' credibility judgements, the ethnicity of 
witnesses and their court roles as independent variables. Simple three 
way Anovas constituted the bulk of the statistical analyses. 
Verbatim transcripts of 36 court cases (105 testimonies) comprise the total 
sample. The first 36 cases that included undefended accused who had pleaded 
,r 
not guilty and who had led evidence, were chosen. An equal number of 
testimonies judged by magistrates to be credible and incredible, and an 
equal number presented by 'coloured' and 'white' witnesses and by complainants 
and accused, were included. During the common user; analysis in the pilot 
phase, 3 'ltdl.ite' common users assessed the credibility of 4 cases (16 
testimoni.es), in random order. They defined 9 types of encoding problems 
(incomprehensibilities) - i:rrelevant ~nd delayed information, direct and 
empirical contr~dictions, e~ectation conflicts, ambiguous wording, missing 
and inadequate justifications, and other problems. A qualitative analysis 
-
showed th~t encoding problems were caused by 'defects' in the semantic 
structure of testimonies ie, that comprehensibility was 'determined' by 
well-fonp~d~ess. I.t was noted that each type of encoding problem was 
e~ected to affect credibility differently. The common users concluded 
that they had used incompreh,ensibilities (encoding problems) as indicators 
of c;leceptiqn, i.e, that low COJWr.-ehe~.sibi.U.ty (low well-f:Qpned~.ess) hac;l· 
caused low· credibi Hty. 
During the first phase of the main study 3 different common users noted 
incomprehensible propositions in the remaining 32 cases in random order. 
These measur-es were operationalizec;l· as percentages of the total number of 
propositions, i.e, as dependent -variable measures of the overall 
comprehensibility (well-formedness) of testimonies. The second phase, 
a content analysis of the 620 incomprehensibilities (encoding problems) 
was conducted by 3, different 'analysts'. The incomprehensibilities were 
classified i~to the 9 encoding problem categories. The number of each 
type of encoding problem was operationaliz.ed as a percentage of the total 
number of problems in each testimony, ie, as dependent variable measures 
of the relative occurrence of each type. 
It was found that testitnoni.es judged by magistrates to be incredible and 
those pr.esentec;l by 'coloured.' witnesses, were perceived by COTJ111lOn users 
l.V 
to be less comprehensible (well-formed) th<m those that magistrates had 
judged to be credible and thqSe presented by 1whi tes' (p~ 0. 01). Accuseds' 
and COJWlainants' test~oni.es were ~ot perceived as differing in their 
comprehensibility. The relative proportions of each type of encoding 
problem c:lid not differ according to whether the testimonies were credible 
or incredible. Nor did it differ according to whether they were 'coloured' 
or 'white', accused qr complainants. .. 
It is argued that magistrates behav.e similarly to common users. It is 
inferred that magistrates' credibility judgements and -verdicts are influenced 
by the comprehensibilit~ (welt-fo'PJledness) of testimonies. The deduction is 
that 'coloured' witnesses tnay be disad-vantaged relative to their 'white' 
counterparts in interracial cases, 
so~ial life is founded on symbols and the 
human existence as we know it is grounded in 
the creation and interpretation of the meanings 
which are attached to these symbols. Collectively, 
we have hardly begun to realize the immense control 
over consciousness and practice which language 
exerts. 
(Esland, 1973: 7) 
PREFACE 
The general objective of this research is to i:~;rvestigate lirt.guistic 
interactions as they manifest themselv:es in a juridical context. More 
specifically the focus is upon te.stimony presented 1n criminal trials 
in South African magistrates' courts. 
The method of dispute processing used in. the legal systems of most 
'developed' countries is the criminal trial. In the accusitorial system 
the criminal trial is a forl.liJl in which competing claims to 'the trutll' 
are put forward and. ev:alua.ted (Miller and Boster, 1977). The competing 
claims are made by witnesses participating in a criminal trial and take 
the form. of testimonies. Testimony is thus the form of communication 
available to witnesses. Tt is seman.tic discourse that is structured so 
as to persuade the presiding magistrate of the superior credibility of 
a particular witness's claim. The relative credibility of testimonies 1s 
the central factor determining th.e final verdict of guilty or not guilty 
(Bennett & Feldman, 1981). In this study the comprehensibility (well-
v 
formedness) of testimony is proposed as the most important factor affecting 
magistrates' perceptions of credibility and, more significantly their 
final judgements. 
In South Africa the social structure is such that the varwus otficially 
classified 'non-white' race groups have long been afforded minority 
group status. Minority groups possess less of the political, economic 
and social power in a society. Numerous theoretical accounts, many 
supported by empirical findings, have concluded that persons labelled 
as belonging to minority status groups, are more likely to be treated 
in. a mapner that operates to their disadvantage within legal processes 
(D.;tne and. W.rightsmap, 1.982). Giv.el;l the South African social milieu 
and the view of testimony as persuasive, semantic discourse, this study 
explores sources of d'is.;t.d:'o{a:nta,ging that may be experienced by persons of 
!Jlinori.ty group status. The persons chosen are the 'coloured' people and 
th.e source of disadvantaging is th.;t.t Qf co~unicative perfonn.anc.e within 
cr:imina.l trials. Testimonies differ 1n their comprehensibility. It is 
hypothesiz.ed that the ease with which magistrates comprehend testimony 
is dependent upon the well-formed~ess of its semantic structure. 
Magistrates t_nay perc.eive the testimonies of witnesses of a minority 
group status as being l.ess comprehensible than the testit_nonies of 
witnesses of a majority group s.tatus. In. turn, this lowered 
comprehensibility may cause lowered credibility,which means that accused 
of a minority group status ma.y run a higher risk of bei~ disbelieved 
a:nd therefore comdcted ;_ and cot_nplainants of a minority group status may 
have a greater c:hanc.e of 'loosing' a case. In. precis form then, this 
vi 
project h.as two central aims 1e, to investigate whether the comprehensibility 
of testimony plays a role in the evaluation of its credibility, in an 
extra-court context. Contingert: upon this finding, is the exploration 
of Q.ifferences in the comprehensibility of testimony as a potential 
source of disadvantaging for persons of a minority group status. 
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This research is the first of its kind, since no previous study has been 
made of language processes in criminal trials in a South African context. 
This empirical 'breakthrough• has been facilitated by access to court 
transcripts that had not been previously available, not only ~n South 
Africa but ~n most other countries. Th,e research constituting the 
f'Oundation of this thesis like any r·esearch, has not developed in isolation 
of· previous ideas. · The conceptuaJ ~pproach taken and the procedure used, 
is rela.tively novel within. the inter.n~tiond par~meters of' research into 
the c.rimin.al trial. Th.e roots of such ideas r·est in work first conducted 
as recently as 1981 (Bennett and. FeldiJl.;;ill.., 1981). 
Th,e concepts and hypotheses central in. this study are derived from four, 
recen.tly emerged fields of' i1,1ter<;l:isciplinary investigation ie, cognitive 
science, the SCilciology of· law, pysf:!hology a1,1d the law, and language and the 
law, Since this thesis fo~s a ne~ point of confluence of previously 
disp~r~te concepts and findings, it i.s essential that the origins be 
trace<;! clea.rly. 
~~ th.e mos.t general level, the cp't;l,cerp ~ith the i't;l.vestig~tion of human 
behaviour il;l.. legal conte~.ts, ~nd i1,1. p~rticula.r ltiithin the courtroom itself, 
has been. prompted 1Jy work in the field of psychology a.nd the law. Chapter 
one i.s a general overview of the areas. that have been itlvestigated. within 
this f'ield. This should. provide re~Q.ers with a framework in which to 
situate the present study. Th.e c.en:tral ai.tn of this chapter is to 
demonstrate the need for research into language~processes thaJ link 
decision-makers to wi.tnesses. The focus upon language behaviour and the 
well-formedness (comprehensibility) of discourse has its direct roots in 
the fields of language and the law, and more specifically, in 
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transformational semantics. This is a pew subarea of cognitive sClence 
which is rising to prominence in. psychology, linguistics and artificial 
intelligence. Since this thesis is written for readers with little 
linguistic or legal training, chapters two to six have been assigned to 
a comprehensive discussion of the major c.oncepts and findings constituting 
the theoretical foundation of' this study. These chapters should provide 
rea.ders with the working knowled:ge required to understand this researc_h. 
Tn Chapter two the trial is presented as a process of COI!ltDUn.ication to 
attain particular legal ends. In ch.apter three readers are introduced 
to the field of linguistics with its. major conceptual controversy 
regarding meaning. Chapter four is a mqre detailed analysis. }lere the 
relevant theoretical models are evaluated critically. In chapter five 
there is a detailed <;tiscussion of the pertinent theoretical 
concepts. The focus is thep returped tQ the legal conte~t in chapter six. 
There is a col,'lsideration of the li1;1k betwee{>l. linguistic processing and the 
legal task of the evaluation of credibility. To conclude this comprehensive 
introduction, the role played_ by social group characteristics in generating 
discrimiJ;latory practices ip. the crilni.niil justice system, is discussed. 
This has formed a controversy fundCJl!leptal to the fields of the sociology 
of law at;td social psychology. It is the author's hope, that readers will 
c;tt this point have suf'fic.ient information. to develop a wholistic 
understanding of what·is by definition a complex, but highly significant 
field of investigation. 
1. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEA.RCI{ INTO LEGAL PROCESSES 
1.1. Historical introduction 
Until approximately fifteen years ago there had been a pervasive 
scepticism among legal professionals as well as social scientists, 
regarding the utility of social scienc.e research pertaining to the 
criminal justice system. This scepticism ha.s limited research 
in this field. Psychology it seems, has been the social science that 
has fuelled this general scepticism. Lt is probable that the overly 
enthusiastic cla.im made by M'unsterburg at the turn of the century, 
that psychology could function as a for:.ensic science by providing 
methods for the reliable detection of deception in the courtroom, 
initiated this doubt (Lloyd-Bostock, 1981). The claim that psychological 
methods could be applied. to the prediction of deceptive testimony, was 
based securely on the assumption that witnesses' memori.es .mirrored 
past events accurately. The school of experimental cognitive 
psychology started by' Wundt in the early nineteen hundreds 
produced empirical findings that rocked this pivotal assumption. 
Research shqwed. consistently that memory f'or past events was unreliable. 
Lt could be altered by factors that were beyond the purposeful c.ontrol 
of the individual. This challenge to the field of psychology as a 
· forensi.c science led to the gradual withdrawal of some researchers to 
the more academic field of experimental cognitive psychology. This 
began the partial demise of systematic social science research into 
legal processes (Lloyd-Bostock, 1981). 
The growth of public criticism :regarding the legitimacy of power 
structures 1n society that characterized the sixties, provided an 
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impetus for the rapprochement of social science and. the law. ~ch 
of the earlier scepticism ha.s remained among legal professionals. 
Since the early seventies psychology, s.ociology and linguistics in 
particular, have provided signifi.c.ant inputs to the interdisciplinary 
study of the law and legal processes. This trend has been most relevant 
in North America and Britain and has begun to counteract the long-
standing paucity of systewtic. research i:o the legal context. Th.e aims 
of this research are of a Ul.Ore humble n.a.ture than those proposed so 
vehemently by M'unsterburg and his colleagues. Research and theory aim to 
prom.ote the understanding of various legal processes,with an eye to 
improving their functioning as well as the competence ·of lay-people 
participating in such processes. 
1. 2. Central trends 
Th.e redeveloping in.terest of psychol.ogists in studying legal processes 
has f'oU.owed three ])lain. tren.ds sin.ce the early seventies. Those 
disillusioned by the very early in:vestigations of the reliability of 
testimony in court have turned instea.d to a study of alternate, 
'extra-court' ph<;1ses of the legal process. In a. recent critical rev1ew 
of research and prac.tice in th,e fie~.d. of psychology and the law, Lloyd-
Bostock has delin.eated four phases of the legal process that are beyond 
the conf.'ines of the courtroom. ie, the pre.,...trial phase, substantive and 
procedural law-making, the trea.tmen.t and disposal of offenders, and 
finally the broad arena of societal attitudes and responses to the 
legal system (Lloyd-Bostock, 198],). 
Those motiva..ted by the 'failure' of' earlier courtroom studies have persisted 
with the investigation of 'in-court' processes. Interest in courtroom 
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processes has generated. a prolifer~tion of research second. only to 
work in the field of the treatment and. disposal of offenders. The 
majority of this work with the exception of very recent research, has 
attempted to gain an understanding of behaviour in court by studying 
behaviour out of court. Thus th.e second trend has been the use of 
simulation in which 'court-like' con.texts are constructed to serve as 
experimental situa.tions. The final trend has been followed mainly by 
social psychologists. I.t is the study of social behaviour ~n non-legal 
settings and. the theoretical extrapolation of the findings to behaviour 
in court. 
There ha.s been a great interest in the role of extra-legal factors ~n 
decision-making. This has developed out of a fundamental shift in the 
premises of cogniti'{e psychology, Psychologically speaking, the 
process of reaching a ·'l'erdict m.us.t inxol'fe comprehension, memory and 
decision:-making of many kinds. It ~s a set of interrelated cognitive 
processes (Kaplan, 1982). :tfem.ory is no longer viewed as fulfilling a 
mere automatic, copying-function such as that of a camera, Cognition 
is now described as an a.c.tive, constructi'l'e an.d re-constructive set 
of proc.esses, More significantly, malry' aspects of cognition are 
believed to be shaped by the perceiver's personal attitudes, beliefs, 
goals, expectations, past experiences, social group characteristics, 
as well as situational fa.ctors and other people's responses to the 
perceiver (~derson, Sta.ats and Bostrom, 1969), 
This perspective has fanned the foundation of the constructivist approach 
~n cognitive science. It is fro'Ql this perspective that the impartiality 
of legal judgement h.as been chal.l.enged, The view of the judgeme.at as 
a set of interrelated cognitive processes that are influenced by a 
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multitude of extra-legal factors, has genera.ted. increasing concern 
with the possible bias in.troduced. by the personal characteristics 
of court participants. Sin.ce the legal ideal is to reach a just 
verdict by the consideration of legally relevant factors only, any 
verdict tha.t is affected by legally irrelevant, personally-related 
characteristics may be criticised as being unjust, Research on this 
topic is by its \[ery n.ature a. cha.Uenge to one of the fundamental 
axioms of criminal justice, It has therefore generated a continuing 
controversy which explains the proiifer;1tion of work in this area, 
The extra-legiil factors of ethnicity and soc.io-economic status have been 
central to the controversy in. countri.es that have ethnically diverse 
populations and economic syste~ that rest upon a distinct socio-economic 
struc.ture, such a.s Britain. and N.orth AJ,nerica. . I 
The research under discussion in. this thesis, is concerned with the 
e;f·fects ef extra:-legal factors on the outcomes of criminal 
trials. lienee, only those c.ourtroom studies that have dealt. specifically 
with the relationship of extra-legal factors to the verdict have been 
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selected for this c.t:itical. overview. Even if the area is restricted in this 
manner there is still an. abundance of research into a large range of 
extra-legal f:;t.ctors, "£igure 1-1. is a simple framework in which to 
situate th.e subsequent information. Lt emphasiz:es the paucity of 
work considering the str>uctur>e of spoken language as an extra.-legal 
factor of importance in influencing the verdict. 

At the most general. level, the extra-legal factors affecting the verdict 
may be divided into decision-maker factors and witness factors, Decision.,.. 
maker factors are characteristic of the personlpeop'Le who decide the 
verdict ie, the judge, magistrate and/or jury. Witness factors 
are those variables affecting what is being eva'Luated to d.ec.ide 
the verdict ie, the characteristics of the witness and/or their 
behaviour, and c.haracteristi.cs of the messages that they communicate 1.n 
court. 
1.3. Decision~maker £:actors 
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The majority of this research has f·oc.used on juror and jury characteristics. 
Such research has been particularly dominant in North America, as juries 
are still widely used in the v.arious jurisdiction.s in the U.S.A. and 
Canada. l:lowever the criticism has bee:p. leveUed even in North America, 
that a disproportionately large percentage of research attention has 
been focused in this area to the e~clusion of other relevant topics 
(Lloyd-Bostock, 1981). Some of the juror characteristics which have 
been investiga.ted are; the ethnici ty, socio-econot;nic status, sex and age of 
jurors (Kerr and Bray, 1982). The jury ha.s been viewed as a small 
group. Resea.rch adopting this view has arisen from social psychology's 
concern with sm.all group decision:'"'l):laking processes in general. Some 
such variables are; the comprehensibility of instructions to jurors 
(Sales et aL 1977) ;_ the siz..e of juries (Ziesel, 1971); the type of 
evidence presented to juries (Sealy and McKew, 1981) ;_ the effect of 
ruling evidence inadmissible (Sealy and Cornish, 1973); the effect of 
different questioning techniques used by attorneys (O'Barr and Lind, 
1981); and the effects of requiring unanimous as opposed to majority 
verdicts (Ostrom et aZ, 1978). 
The personal characteristics of judges have been investigated to a far 
lesser extent than those of jurors. For example, variables such as the 
personality attributes of judges (Gofman, 1977) ;_ their political party 
membership (Goldman, 1975); their attitudes and beliefs and their 
penal philosophies, have been considered (Champagne and Nagel, 1982). 
In conclusion, the most relevant question 1.s, what findings do such a 
multitude of studies offer? The a.nswer is unfortunately, very 
little! Jury research that is based on simulation and the extrapolation 
of findings from non-legal contexts has been criticised severely. The 
findings cannot be directly generalised to predict courtroom behaviour. 
A study by Konecni and Ebbesen has concluded that different factors 
affect judgement behaviour in and out of the courtroom context (Konecni 
and Ebbesen, 1979). Jury research has also been dismissed as of little 
relevance to the understanding of the majority of criminal trials, since 
juries are rarely used except in the most serious cases. Lloyd-Bostock 
eloquently summarizes the gen.eral feeling regarding past research on 
extra-legal jury factors. It appears that this conclusion may be 
accurately applied to research into the extra-legal characteristics 
of judges:. 
While one or two consistent findings have emerged, such 
as that older juries are less lenient (Sealy and Cornish, 
1973), in general attempts to predict jury verdicts from 
juror characteristics have confirmed the general finding 
in psychology that personality, attitudes and other 
individual characteristics alone are poor predictors of 
behaviour. 
(Lloyd-Bostock, 1981: 3) 
1.4. Witness factors 
1.4.1. Source credibility factors 
It is necessary at the outset to state the obvious: In the context 
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of an accusitorial cdmi~al t~i.aJ, the Q.:eci.sion..,.!Ilake~'-s perceptio~ of 
the :relative credibility of testimonies directly determines the final 
verdict of guilty or not guilty. Should the case for the defence be 
deemed more credible than that of the prosecution, the outcome would be 
a verdict of' not guilty and the consequent acquittal of the accused. The 
complainant under such circumstances could be said to have 'lost' the 
case. This pe~tains only to cases in which the accused pleads not guilty. 
In the case of· a plea of guilty the accused seldom presents testimony. 
However, should the case for the prosecution be deemed more credible than 
tpat of· the defence, the out cone would generally be a verdict of guilty as 
charged and the conviction apd sentencing of the accused would follow. 
The complainant could be said to have 'won the case. Hence, the 
considera.tion of what variables influence the credibility of both the 
witnesses anci their testimot;ties is of central importance in the prediction 
of the verdict. In cases where there is no complainant ie, victimless 
crimes, the State calls witnesses for the prosecution. Should these 
witnesses be found more credible than those of the defence, the State 
may be said to have 'won' the case. An example of a victimless cr~me is 
a traffic offence. 
This explanation implies the sta1;1dard Qf proof known as the civil standard 
ie, that magistrates consider the relative probabilities of the two sides 
of a case, believe the more probable and accord it 'success'. Lawyers 
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may take issue, pointing out that in criminal cases the burden of proof 
generally rests with the prosecuti.on and a second standard of proof is 
applied ie, the criminal standard in whi.ch proof must be beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In applying the criminal standard, magistrates should acquit 
accus.ed ~n cases where they find the prosecution case more credible and 
the def·ence case less credible, because they are not certain beyond a 
reasqnable doubt that the <;let:e1;1~e case is 'un:true'. Another eiQ~ple:is 
when wagistr.ates state a.n equal belief in both the defence and prosecution 
cases. Since the burden of proof lies with the prosecution magistrates 
should th.en acquit the accused. However, there are instances in which the 
onus of pr()of f'alls on the defence ie, when the legislature enacts this 
(Hoffman and Zeffert, 1981). 
Tn the same judgements in this study, the magistrates made no r.eference 
to the operation of the criminal standard of proof. However, their 
fonnulations seemed to indicate that once they had made credibility 
findings their verdic.ts followed almost automatically (without reference 
to tne standard. of proof). 
Two groups of variables affect whether people believe what they are told 
or not ie, the perceived reliability of the informant - the witness in 
question; and the perceived reliability of the message connnunicated - the 
testimony delhered. factors that are associated with witnesses per se 
ie, who is communicating; have been tenned source credibility factors. 
Characteristics of the infonnation communicated have been labelled message 
credibility factors (Russel, 1984). The study of source credibility 
factors has been a popular topic i.n social psychology. Once again, the 
findings are from research conducted in non-legal settings and hence fall 
prey to the criticism of not being directly generalizable to courtroom 
behaviour, The dominant conclusion reached is that the credibility of 
a speaker is determined. by the hearer's perceptions of the speaker's 
trustworthiness and competence. In other words, can the speaker be 
trusted tq speak the truth; and is the speaker sufficiently 'qualified' 
to give a valid op1n1on upon certa,in factors? (Cronkhite and Liska, 1976). 
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Oth~r work on source credibility using 'in:-court' data h~s been concerned 
with accused characteristics and to a lesser extent with complainant 
chara.cteristics (Dane and Wr-ightstnan, 1982). Some examples are;_ the 
ethni.city of· the accused and complainant (Landy and Aronson, 1969); th.e 
attrac.tiven~ss. of the accused (Sigall and Ostri.)ve, 1975) • their socio-
econom~c status (Nagel, 1969);_ a.nd their sex (Nagel, 1969). However, 
there is a general paucity of work relatip.g accused character_istics to 
verdicts hand.ed down by single d:ecision-I)lakers ie, judges and magistrates 
(Champagne and Nagel, 1982). 
In conclusion then, exten.sive e{'for.ts ha:v.:e been ma.de to identify the 
extra-legal vari.ables that determine th.e verdict especially in Britain 
and. North Al:!le:dca. The diver.se characteristics that have doi)linated 
investigations have been overt, static, indiv.id.ua.listic variables such 
as the ethnicity, socio-econoiJlic cla.ss, age and sex of accused, judges 
and jur.ors. A.lternativ.ely, vaguely defined, catch-all notions such as 
th,e attitudes and penal philosopnies of judges and jurors have been 
considered. The list r·uns on almost to the direction in which judges 
stir th,eir teaJ Howe"'--er, the inv.estig{:l_tion Qf such a multitude of 
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v:ar.i.ables has culminated in inco1;1.sistent an<.l therefore inconclusive results. 
!.ow correlations have become the rule rather than the e:xception (Bennett 
and Feldman, 1981). 
1.4.2. Message credibility factors 
The limited range and num.ber of studies of factors affecting the credibility 
of messa_ges in the legal context, stands in stark contrast to the abun.d.ance 
of research 1n the allied field of source credibility. It is this relative 
scarcity of systematic work that prompted the focus on message credibility 
factors in this study. Findings which have a.dded indirect impetus to the 
-
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study of tp~ssage credibility have origin~ted in social psychology, largely 
from research into social behaviour in non-legal contexts. Of direct 
relevan.ce are the set of findings concerning the detection of deceptive 
communications. It has been shown consistently, that there are marked 
differences in people's ability· to deceive (Hockingi, et (ll, 1979). People 
are not well skilled at distinguishing accurately between deceptive and 
'truthful' communications, especially when these are presented by strangers 
(Littlepage and Pinneault, 1979). People express considerable confidence 
in their judgements of the veracity of information communica.ted, even when. 
such judge~ents are incorrect (Hocking, 1976). These findings are of 
central relevance within the context of the cri~inal trial. It is 1.n this 
situation that one would expect the probability of. deception and th.e n~ed 
to detec.t deceptive communicatiol;l.s in. a relL;t.ble ~armer, to be highest. 
The significance of these results in relatioJ;l to the crim.ina.l trial. is 
that the verdict reached. m.ay r;.ot be a reflec.tiol;l of the a.ctuc;tl 'truth,' of 
the c.ase for the defence or case for the prosecution. Rc;tther, it ma.y be 
the result of differences in the skill of witt;1.esses at effectively deceiving 
the decision-~aker. Alb~rna.tively, it could. be due to differences in the 
credulity, of decision-makers relative to l!)itnesses fr~ different socia.l 
groups. 
It is not surprising that studies of the factors ch,aracterizing deceptive 
testimol;ly in aourt, and in particular th;zt 4eceptive testimony that is 
effective, have not been undertaken. The impossible task of asc~rtaining 
which testimony is deceptive and which is not has prevented such 
undertakings. In fact this is what prevents the verdict from. being completely 
reliable. aowever, it 1s surprising that there are few findings of this 
specific nature generated 1n non--legal situations. It is social 
psychologists who have once again headed the research concerning the 
i_ 
characteristics of arguments that are effectively persuasive in non-legal 
settings. Unfortunately thes.e findings are particularly inconclusive 
(Miller and Burgoon, 1982). 
It wa.s following an unsuccessful 'hand-search' of the literature that a 
computer search was conducted. The i~terJ;l!'!tional psychological, socio-
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logfc.aJ, laJ;lguage and legal abstracts were searched from 19I5 onwards. The 
aim. ~as to locate any work that had focused upon message factors affecting 
th.e credibility of Coiil!Ilunicatiol;lS in the legal context. The search revealed 
disappointingly little in thi.s field. Besides the study by Ben.nett and 
Feldman to be mentioned, other topics tha,t have beelil investigated have 
shown. a move away from the study of the direct relationship between the 
outcome and the structural characteristics of messc;1ges. The trend has 
beep to expl.ore those para-linguistic and. v.:erbaJ factors that improve or 
degrc;1de the credibility of th.e source c;1pd the argument. It should be noted 
that messages are not merely linguistic ip nature. The total tpeaning lS 
conveyed by the entire communication system 1e, the uttera.n.ce which consists 
of lexical, syntactical, phonetic and semanti.c featuresJ_ its para..-linguistic 
features of tone, pitch, loudness, ewphasis, rythmp, til)lbre, pc;1cei the 
facial exp:ressions and hea<;l JPovemep:ts of the sender; and the body movements 
and posture of the sender (Tayl.or, 1979). Variables such as the fluency and 
speed of the language flow, the number sf paus.es and the pitch of the speaker's 
voice; and the kind of dialect used, have been found to influence credibility 
(Ad<;lington, 1971; Apple et al, l919i 0 'Barr, 1982). Some work has been. done 
on the techniques that may be used by prosecutors and attorneys to improve 
their arguments (Colman, 1970). 
Of particular relevance to this resea.rch however, is a study conducted by 
Bennett and Feldman in a non-legal context (Bennett and Feldman, 1981). They 
have reported that communications that are perceived as being credible 
are not necessarily those that are in fact 'truthful' accounts of 
past events. Instead it is the well-fonnedness of the semantic 
structure of communications that determines their perceived credibility. 
It is noteworthy that factors such as, the length of the account, the 
number of actions it contains and. the style in which the information 
is presented, do not appear to influence the judged credibility of the 
information to any significant degree (Loftus and Greene, 1983). This 
finding supports the decision to exclude such factors from 
the study at hand. Thus the only legally-oriented finding 1.n. this 
specific area~ is that testimony tha.t is effectively credible is that 
which is semantically well-structured. By implication, effectively 
deceptive testimony must be well-structured. 
l. 5. Summary conclusions 
This chapter has .demonstrated the paucity of systemati.c research in 
certain key a.reas of psychology and. the law. This prevents a wholistic 
understanding of legal processes. This study was designed to enter a 
number of these key areas of neglect:. 
the factors affec.ting credibility judgements made by 
sin.g~e decision-makers; 
a consideration of tbe social group characteristics 
of socio-economic status and ethnicity, as influencing 
the perceptions that decision-makers form of the 
credibility of communications; 
a focus upon message credibility factors ie, the well-
formedness of the semantic structure and comprehensibility 
of information; 
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an examination of the specific, dynamic cognitive 
processes that are involved in making judgements of 
credibility. These may be contrasted to the static~ 
overt characteristics and. the vaguely defined, catch-all 
variables that have been of interest in the past. 
To conclude then, the originality and necessity of the research 
endeavour under discussion i.s thus clearly supported. 
2. TH£ CRIMINAI..-4.IU .. AL AS A LANGUAGE PROCESS 
Argumentative discourse is the structural mode of 
actualization of law in the dispute settlement context. 
Rhetoric is argumentative discourse aimed at seeking 
adherence on the basis of persuasion. The backbone of 
such discourse-is language , used both as a means of 
argumentation and as a magical form of action. 
(Santos, 1977~ 4) 
2.1. Historical introduction 
Historically speaking, there has been a con.cern with the use of language 
in the bureaucratic institutions of medicine, in particular psychiatry, 
and law. This con.cern originated out of the public criticism of the 
'professional' language used in these institutions. During. the seven.ties 
this criti.cism gained momen.tum in. North America, eventually earning the 
title of the Plain English Movemen.t in English speaking countries (Danet, 
1980). The critical thrust of this movement was that the language used 
by bureaucratic professionals, especially in the legal sphere, was 
incomprehensible to the layperson. This incomprehensibility was said to 
serve the ideological function of mystifying and legitimating legal 
processes, thus creating an imbala.nce of power to the disadvantage of 
the layperson. The advantage of legal professionals was maintained by 
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placing an understanding of the formal fun.c.tionings of. legal processes 
solely within their realm. 
Tn research the ma~n response to this challenge was the investigation 
of what linguistic aspects of written legal language were responsible 
for its incomprehensible nature. Studies focused mainly upon hire 
purchase agreements (Crystal and Davey, 1969)i insurance policies 
(Shuy and Larkin, 1978); and instructions to juries (Charrow and 
Charrow, 1979). The general aim was to modify legal 'language in written 
documents so as to make it clearly comprehensible to laypeople. In 
order to achieve this aim it was necessary to investigate how legal 
language, or what has been termed 'legalese•, differed from ordinary, 
everyday language and to understand in what ways 'legalese' was 
functional and dysfunctional (Danet, 1980). 
I.t may appear trite to state that spoken language is the medium of legal 
processes. l:lowever the .ironic. fact rem!'lins, that it is only in the last 
decade that systematic research concerning the interrelations between 
spoken language and the law has emerged (O'Barr, 1982). The past 
concern with written legal language has begged the question of how 
spoken language opera.tes in. legal processes. Additionally, by definition 
the term 'legalese' has supported the assumption that all language used 
in legal proc:esses is specializ.ed and therefar·e different, in a 
fundamental sense, from ordinary, spoken ~anguage. It is this assumption 
that has developed recently as a contro~rsial point. One argument is 
that the language spoken by witnesses testifying during a trial is 
ordinary, eueryday discourse. The fact that discourse is m.odi.J;ied ~n the 
legal context has not been negated. Instead, the normative rules that 
constrain 'ordinary' communication in the courtroom, such as the 
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questioning of witn.esses by the prosecutor and defence attorney in 
cross examination, are taken to be significant variables in recent 
research endeavours (Bennett and Feldman, 1981; O'Barr, 1982). 
Chapter one has illustrated that studies have neglected the investigation 
of dynamic., interaction.al processes that occur among court participants. 
In particular the relationship between interactional communication 
processes and the verdict has not received systematic attention (Danet, 
1980). This criticism may also be applied accurately to the majority 
of work on factors that affect sentencing behaviour in trials (Bennett 
and Feldman, 1981). It has been. suggested that this neglec.t of 
interactional processes is a product of the positivist methodology 
that has been used in such work. Research informed by such an 
epistemology may succeed in exposing the fact that some parts of a 
criminal justice system function in a manner that differs from the 
legal explanation of its functioning. li.owever, it does not prompt the 
explanation of h.o'W legal processes operate at an informal, inter-
personal level; nor why legal proc.esses continue to function in the 
face'of differences between the 'law in. books' and the 'law in action'. 
One response to this challenge has been an urgent call for a change 
in the epistemological foundation of criminal justice research in South 
Africa (Van Zyl Smit, 1983), The hermeneuti"c approach of interactionism 
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h~s been proposed as one alternate epistemology. The basic premises of '. 
interactionism include:. 
a focus on language and communication; 
a concern with ordinary language; 
an emphasis on processes as opposed to static variables; 
an acknowledgement of the primacy of everyday under-
standings and interpretations of social processes as a 
supplement to, if not as a replac.em_ent for, those 
offered by social scientists (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). 
This call for a change in epistemology does not necessitate the complete 
rejection of the positivist approach to empirical research. 
In.stea.d Bern.stein has proposed that empirical data from 
both positivist and interactionist perspectives be combined (Bernstein, 
1976). The research under discussion here has been designed to 
incorporate some of the premises and methodological 'tools', that have 
originated within both the interactionist and positivist schools of 
thought. The four basic premises of interactionism mentioned above, 
have been adopted in conjunction with a positivist-type methodology 
of rigorous hypothesis testing, the quantification of behavioural 
responses and the statistical analysis of the data generated. 
Chapter one has highlighted the dearth of eT!ll?irieal studies concerning 
the eff'ects of structur;:ll. aspects of COIIllllunication on the final verdict. 
This weakness in the empirical knowledge.-base is mirrored ~n the entire 
field of language and the law (Uanet, 1980). This is due to the very 
recent d.evelopment of the field as a forum for research. The fact that in. 
South Africa even such a limited knowl,edge-foundation is non-existent, 
should be recognised. Not only is there a general paucity of empirical 
research. into the South African criminal justice system, but more 
significantly, South African researchers have neglected to investigate 
communication in the legal context. Olmesdahl and Steytler have 
discussed the range of research conducted into the criminal justice system 
in South Africa. Studies of communication do not appear in this 
discussion (Olmesdahl and Steytter, 1983). The existence of this 'vacU\m' 
in research into South African criminal justice more than 
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justifies the study of the nature, ··functions and effects of the use of 
everyday language in the negotiation of this aspect of the social order. 
Work conducted in other countries has provided researchers 
with conceptual tools. In the subsequent sections of this chapter a 
number of relevant theoretical models have been selected for discussion. 
These models promote an understanding of the presentation of testimony 
and of the process of judgement as interrelated parts of a general and 
dynamic communication process,that is aimed at the settlement of legal 
disputes. 
2.2. The trial as a speech situation 
2. 2 .1. Introd.uction 
Every setting in which verbal, coiiiiJlunication is the predominant behaviour 
may be termed a speech situation. This conc.ept has been developed in 
socio-linguistic models of cotmnunication {Hymes, 1971; Grice, 1975). 
Behaviour it is generally acc.epted, is situationally influenced. When 
communi.cation is viewed as a behaviour, it is seen to be influenced by 
the interaction. of a variety o~ factors that are spec.ific to any 
particular speech situation. Thus, at least nine sets of features may 
be expected. to shape the final meaning interpreted by receivers ie, 
the setting, roles, act sequences, tone, channel, genr~? goals, norms 
of production and norms of interpretation (Hymes, 1971). This reinforces 
the fact that se>cial reality is manifested in highly complex processes 
particularly in the legal arena. Empirical research by its very nature 
must deal with a reduced number of variables at any one time (Keppel and 
Saufley, 1980). In this study, there has been a necessary narrowing of 
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the focus to the last three of these n.~ne sets of critic.al features. 
2. 2. 2. -Dispute processing goal 
A criminal trial in which accusitorial proceedings are utihzed, has 
been described as a coiJliilllnic.a_tion event for the processing of legal 
disputes (Bohannan, 1957). The role of language in the conc.eptualization, 
proces.sing and resolution of disputes is a topic which has attracted 
the majority of theorists' atten_tion in the field of language and the 
law (Danet, 1.980). In the South African criminal justice sy-stem the 
method of dispute processing used is 'fact ... oriented' talk that is aimed 
at the 'just' settlement of disputes. In such 'fact-oriented' genres 
of disputing:. 
••• the highest metamessage is that through talking 
about 'evidence' in a dispute we 'find facts', and 
'do truth and justice'. At a somewha_t lower level 
is the metamessage that the cla.i.tns made while 
determining 'facts' are them_selves subject- to 
challenge, negotiation and argument. 
(P.~n.et ~ 1980:. 498) 
Disputes arise from competing claims to a resource, such as would occur 
1.n an alimony case and/or conflicting explanations of past behaviour 
that allegedly breaches some social norm, such as would occur in a 
common assault case. It is often meaningless to attempt the clear 
separation of these two types of disputes ~e, conflicts of interest from 
normative arguments. Competing claims to a resource generally rely upon 
normative justifications and arguments regarding norm violation are 
largely motivated by self interest (Roberts, 1979). It is for this 
reason that no attempt has been made to distinguish between the two in 
this sample. 
Legal disputes comprise the following three broad stages: the claim, 
the counteraction and the outcome (Bohannan, 1957). The detailed 
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desc.ription of each of these stages has been included to serve as a 
background for the reader who 'has no legal knowledge. The claim takes 
two basic forms: It begins with the char·ge that is laid by the State 
or the complainant against the accused. Each charge is actually a claim 
made by one party against another tha.t tf;le second party has performed: 
some behaviour that breaches .a. social· norm. and is punishable by law. 
The dispute may also hinge upon some behaviour that was not performed 
eg~ negligent driving. As ha.s been mention.ed~ disputes may also occur 
over the o.wp.ership of, or right to, some resource. To simplify the 
discussion such alterna.tive ca.ses have p.Qt been referred. to directly. 
Additionally, the discussion refers to cases having a single complainant 
and a single accused ~o has breached a. single social norm. Once again 
f'or the sake of brevity, mention ha.s not been. made of the .alternatives 
1.e, cases involving many accusec;l an.d the breaching of more than a. single 
social norm. 
Ideally, in order for any behaviour to be punishable by law, that 
behaviour must match the legal definitiQn of a particular qffence. Every 
legal offence is defined in l,aw· by a set of criteria. In the act of 
laying a charge the compla.i~ant 1.s in. fact alleging that the accused 
has performed a behaviour· that c.orrespctnds 'With an of the 'criteria 
comprising the le(p.Z definition of a. particular offence. For example, 
the offen.ce 0f connn.on assault is d.efined by the ;followin.g criteria.:. 
it is an act of· force applied to a person a.nd}or their dothip.g, 
and}or the inspiration of fear in a person; 
the act must be intentional; and 
the act must be unlawful. 
The act is considered to be unlawful when it is not connnitted:. 
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in order to carry out a lawful court judgement eg, 
the whipping of a convicted accused; 
whilst attempting or effecting an arrest; 
by a school principal, parent and/or guardian upon 
the child(ren) in their care; 
1.n defence of oneself or another, or one's property 
or the property of another; 
when consent has been given eg, 1.n sporting contests, 
religious, customary or superstitious practices that 
involve only minor injury; 
for the purposes of medical operation or treatment; 
due to everyday bodily contact; and 
if the injury sustain,ed is triv.ial (Hunt, 1970). 
In some instances the complainant is not aware of the criteria that have 
to be met for the charge to be applicable to the behaviour which i.s under 
dispute. In such cases the 'inc.orrect' charge is laid and this may 
'weaken' the case for the prosecution. 
At a later stage the charge is followed by the case for the prosecution 
that is presented during the trial itself. This case consists of 
testimonies delivered by the complainant and in some cases by witness(es) 
for the prosecution. Ideally, these testimonies function to support the 
charge that has been laid. In some cases, aspects of the case for the 
prosecution may ironically it seems, stand in support of the case for 
the defence. The testimonies on behalf of the prosecution are structured 
in the following manner: The prosecutor questions the first witness. 
Then, the ac.cused may cross examine the witness. This applies to 
undefended accused only. Finally, in some instances the magistrate may 
l.. 
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also question the witness. The magistrate ~ay questioJ;l any witness at 
any time during a trial. Bef·ore the witness is allowed to stand d·own, 
the prosecutor may re-exami-ne the witness with the permission of the 
presiding magistrate. This process is applied to all the witnesses for 
the prosecution. The magistrate concludes the case for the pr-osecution 
once th,is \las been accomplished. 
Th.e coJ;}teraction 1.s the response that i.s tnade by the accused·. It also 
takes two forms:_ Initially the accused m:ust enter a plea of guilty or 
not guilt¥ to th.e charge. This may take p1ace at the beginning of the 
actual trial or during a pre-trial hearing. Should a plea of guilty be 
entered,, evidence is seldom led on behalf of the prosecutiQJ;l or the 
defence. In such instances, the second phases of both the claim and 
counteraction do not take place. The accused may lead evidence in 
mitigation of sentence. This will be followed by the handing down of 
the sentence. The outcome stage will be reached. The second phase of 
the counteraction only occurs when a plea of not guiZty is entered by 
the accused. The case for the defence is then presented following the 
case for the prosecution. It consists of testimonies deliv~red by the 
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accused and in some cases by witness(es) for the defence. Ideally, these 
testimonies operate to refute the various elements of the charge. The· 
accused may choose not to lead evidence at all and/or not to call witness(es) 
for the def·ence case. This occurs frequently when the case for the 
prosecution is dee~d to be 'weak' ie, based on circumstantial evidence 
alone. In undefended cases the testimonies for the defence have the 
following structure: Initially the fi.rst witness is prompted by the 
magistrate to present his/her argument in response to the case for the 
prosecution. During this presentation the magistrate may question the 
witness intermittently. On. conclusion the prosecutor may then cross 
exam~ne the witness. Onc.e again the magistrate may· choose to re-examine 
the witness in order to c.1arify SOIJle point(s) or gain added information 
before the witness is askec;l to stand down. The same procedure is 
follqwec;l: in the presentation of ea.ch of the testimonies for the defence 
unti.l the magistrate closes the defence case. (See Fig. 2-i. p 25). 
The outcome stage of a trial consists of three phases: First, the 
judgement is handed down by the presiding magistrate regarding his]her 
perc.eptions of the credibility of each of the witnesses and the reasons 
fo:r these credibility judgements. In sunnnary, the magistrate will 
provide a conclusion regarding the credibility of the case for the 
prosecution as a whole relative to the case for the defence as a whole, 
or vice-versa. The judgement includes references to the ways 1n which 
the c.ase for the prosecution hasprovided, or has failed to provide, 
testimonial evidence in suppo:rt of the various elements comprising the 
charge. Additionp.lly, there 1s ~ consider~tion of the ways in which 
the case for the defence has provided, or f~iled to provide, testimonial 
evidence that :refutes the various criteria of the charge. The judgement 
culminates in the pronounceiilent of the verdict of guilty or not guilty. 
The phase which follows the verdict is on.e in which the accused. who has 
been ac.qui.ttec;l is 'set free'. In the event of a conviction., the next 
phase is one which allows the c.onvicted accused the chance to lead 
evidence in mitigation of sentence. The criminal trial is concluded 
with the handing down of the sentence and the removal of the sentenced 
accused from the courtroom to police custody. 
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Figure 2-1. Ideal Structure of a Case 
The entire court case. 
The case for the prosecution. 
1.1 Testimony delivered 2. Testimony delivered 
by the complainant. by witness(es) for 
the prosecution. 
The I The The The 
Partici- Cross Partici- Cross 
pant Exam ina- pant Examina- ' 
Initiated tion Initiated tion 
Section. Section. Section. Section. 
The case for the defence. 
3. Testimony delivered 








4. Testimony delivered 










2.2.3. Connnunicator roles 
The various stages in the processing of a legal dispute have been 
described. This study is concerned with the information generated 1n 
the second phases of both the claim and counteraction ie, the 
presentation of testimonial evidenc:e by both the prosection and the 
defence. More significantly, there is a consideration of how the 
information communicated during these phases is used in making the 
judgement and how it may affect the verdict reached 1n the outcome 
stage. This section is a discussion of the a'lternating roles that each 
of the court participants takes in order to communicate during these 
phases of dispute process1ng. 
Traditional models have been oversimplistic 1n their descriptions of 
communication as a m.ore or less static, two-sided occurrence. For 
example, Goyer maintains tha.t communic.ation is any event that includes~ 
•.. the four sequential ingredients of (i) a generator 
of (ii) a sign-symbol system (iii) which is projected 
to (iv) at least one r·eceiver who -assigns meaning to 
the system. 
(Goyer, 1967~ 15) 
Figure ~-2. Communication Model 
Generator Message Receiver 
encodes to decodes { 
(A) (X) (B) 
Message 
(X) 
This type of model has been replaced by the view of communication as a 
continuous process in which aLL parties to a communication event 
function in the alternative roles of generator and receiver. For 
example, a message (X) from generator (A) will be received by receiver 
(B). This message (X) will create some response in receiver (B) who 
-26 
may then become a ge~erator (B) of anoth.er wessage (Y), This message (Y) 
may in turn be received by generator (A) who then takes the role of 
receiver (A) and so on (Anderson, Staats and Bostrom, 1969). This 
model has been applied to the process of communication in the claim and 
counteraction phases of the trial. Figure 2..-3. is a diagranrrnatic 
representati.on of this applied model (See Fig. 2-3. p 28). During 
the case for the prosecution the witnesses function as the primary 
generators· (An) of large amounts of information ie, messages (Xn). 
This information is projected to the defence witnesses, the prosecutor 
and the magistrate, who primarily fulfil the role of receivers (Bn). 
However, these receivers (Bn) also take the role of generators (Bn) of 
smaller amounts of information (Yn) that are projected to the generators 
(An) as questions. The generators CAn) may in turn take the alternate 
role of receivers (An). The question-type messages (Yn) serve to 
prompt responses in the receivers (An) which starts the process once 
again. Alternatively in the case for the defence, the witnesses function 
as th.e primary generators of large amounts of information and the 
prosecutor, magistrate and witnesses for the prosecution, fulfil the 
rol.e of receivers. However, they also.operate as generators of question-
tYI>e messages. This dynamic process of role swapping during communication 
continues throughout the presentation of testimony. No court 
participant i.s a static: receiver or generator of information. 
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Figure 2-3. Communication During a Trial 
Witness (A) of Message (Xn) in the form 






Witness (A) Message (Yn) generally 
in the form of questions 




















At a more micro-level are the roles taken by court participants during 
the two phases of the presentation of a single testimony. Figure 2-4. 
is a diagrammatic representation of these roles (See Fig. 2-4. 
p 31). For the purposes of this research, the information presented 
prior to and after the cross examination phase has been termed the 
paPticipant initiated section of testimony. During the subsequent 
discussion the participant initiated section has been abbreviated as 
P I S and the cross examination section as C E S . Information 
constituting the PIS is generated mainly by the witness themselves. 
There is relatively little 'prompting' from other court participants. 
Peculiar to the South African context is the statement of 'vertel 
vir my jou storie' which is frequently used by the presiding magistrate 
as a prompt to initiate the P I S of the accused's testimony. The 
P I S 's of testimonies may therefore be described as having a narrative 
form. In contrast, the cPoss examination section of testimonies comprises ,., 
information that is a response to the questioning of the witness by 
other court participants. It is distinguisable as a question-type mode 
of communication. Relatively little is known about questioning as a 
basic mode of communication .. However, research that has been conducted 
within the realm of socio-linguistics has addressed the social 
functions of questioning in various situations (Danet and Kermish, 1978; 
Phillips, 197.9; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). The general conclusion reached 
is that questions serve three fundamental functions in the trial context: 
First, they prompt witnesses to provide additional information when 
receivers deem it to be necessary. Second, questions serve to test the 
reliability of testimonial evidence. The aim of testing evidence is to 
determine the credibility of both the witness and their testimony. Third, 
questions may be used as an in.strument of control to constrain the 
amount and quality of the information communicated ie, questioning 
alters the semantic structure of the message. 
Ideally, the first function of questioning is fulfilled during the 
presentation of the P I S 's of testimonies. The second occurs during 
the presentation of the C E S 's of testimonies. It l.S ironic 
to note that this may not be the case. In a number of studies of 
eyewitness testimony, Loftus has found that questioning provides more 
information than results from a narrative style of testifying. The 
first function is fulfilled. More significantly though, questioning 
leads to less accurate information being presented (Loftus, 1975, 
1977, 1979). This tentative finding challenges the very foundation 
of the accusitorial system of proceedings. It tends to caste doubt 
upon the view of the prosecutor as a mere 'tester' of the reliability 
of testimony during cross examination. 
The magistrate functions to a limited extent as a generator of 
information in his/her role as 'questioner' up to this point in the 
trial. It is largely the role of the receiver and processor of 
information that the magistrate must fulfil in reaching a final verdict. 
The process of making a judgement does not only begin once the 
c:ounteraction. stage has been completed. It is an on-going process 
throughout the trial, beginning when the indictment is read out 
and culminating in the handing down of the verdict. The judgement 
becomes overt only when the magistrate verbalises his/her reas-oning 
for the verdict following the close of the case for the defence. 
The magistrate then becomes the primary generator of information 
in the courtroom. Along with the other court participants the 
magistrate is an active participant in the interactions that constitute 
commur-ications during the trial. 
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Figure 2-4. CoiDl.llunication in P I. S 's and C. E. S. 's 
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2.3. Summary conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the dynamic roles played by court participants 
as communicators during the criminal trial. It is now clear that witnesses 
actively and purposefully construct messages that are the vehicles of 
certain meanings. These meanings are transmitted linguistically to other 
courtparticipants .and in particular to the magistrate. The aim of any 
witness is to persuade the magistrate as ultimate decision-~aker, of 
the superior credibility of that witness's explanation of some past 
event. The success of any message thus lies in the impact it creates 
upon the magistrate. The efficacy of the message is determined by the 
degree to which it is believed by the magistrate. However, in order 
for the magistrate to believe what the speaker intends the intended· 
meaning must also be the meaning which the magistrate interprets from 
the message he/she receives. Immediately that any variable alters the 
meaning conveyed from the meaning intended, a change in the impact of 
the message must be expected. This change of impact may be an improvement 
or a degradation of the magistrate's credibility regarding the message. 
U is the magistrate's task to decide which of the competing explanations 
he]she believes. This task supersedes the final task of comparing the 
most credible explanation to the legal definition of the offence to decide 
whether the accused's behaviour does in fact match the criteria of a 
punishable offence. It is rare that these two tasks are independent of 
each other. Generally, when the plea is not guilty and the accused's 
testimony is believed, it contradicts some of the criteria of the legal 
definition. The verdict to follow will be one of not guilty. Should 
the complainant's version be accepted, it generally matches the criteria 
of the legal definition and results in a conviction. 
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There is a wide range of· variables which tnay alter the intended· meaning 
of testimony·. In the pilot study, the connnon users examined aspects of 
the semantic structure of testimony. They explored the relationship 
between the meanings they interpreted and their perceptions of 
credibility. Hypotheses were then developed regarding the processes 
that could alter witnesses' intended meanings to those interpreted by 
common users]r;nagistrates ie, processes that could influence the perceived 
credibility of testimony. Two major processes are postulated:: First, 
'defects' in the semantic structure of testimonies that recei~ers 
perceive as altering the interpreted meaning (credibility) of testimony. 
Second, the effect of questioning on the interpretation of receivers. 
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The general shaping-effect which questioning has upon the semantic structure 
of testimony is the process con.sid.ered in. this chapter. The point bas 
been made that the way in which a testimony ~s structured does not depend 
upon the linguistic performance of a witness per se. It is shaped to a 
substantial extent by the process of questioning utilized by other court 
participants and in particular the prosecutor. Testimony ~s the end 
product of interaction. 
In the li.ght of these cqmments a cotnprehensive theoretical analysis of the 
alteration of intended meaning w0uld be one which dealt with semantic 
aspects qf testimony that are generated by the witnesses themselves ~n 
structuring their testimonies; those that are produced by processes of 
questioning and;. those that are the result of the receiver's per-ceptions 
of the meaning of testimony. The former two may be termed 'structural 
aspects' and the latter, 'interpretative aspects' of testimony. The 
focus in this r·esearch is upon the interpretative aspects of testimony. 
The process by which questioning alters the intended meaning has not been 
investigated directly ie, structural aspect The notion of 
questioning as a generator of interpretations that induce 
I· 
incredulity on the part of rece1vers, has been discussed 1n a speculative 
manner. 
3. TESTIMONY : STRUCTURED, SEMANTIC DISCOURSE 
..• the evidence per se may sway the jurors less 
than does the interpretation that jurors place 
on that evidence. 
(Loftus and Greene, 1983: 326) 
3.1. Introduction 
At this point the lay reader should be situated mentally within the 
context of the trial and be developing a sense of the 'everyday, human 
aspects' of the trial process. However, the image of the magistrate 
which may have been generated in the previous descriptive sketch of 
dispute processing is one of an 1cbjective, automatic information 
processor'. This is a typically lega}· image which IDDSt often dominates 
perceptions of the judgement process. It is also one which is 
challenged, both explicitly and implicitly, throughout the subsequent 
discussion. This study focuses directly upon the cognitive functioning 
of receivers of information rather than upon generators of information. 
Thus, the following section turns attention to the 'humanization' of 
conceptions of the magistrate, a receiver, in reaching the judgement 
ie, in fulfilling the tasks of processing linguistic information, 
interpreting meaning and of deciding the relative credibility of 
competing explanations of past events. 
3.2. Rationale 
The rationale for the focus upon the receivers of information is 
tripartite, At the most general level it is the magistrate, a 
receiver, who wields the ultimate power to decide the verdict. 
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This study bas been designed with an eye to exploring factors which may 
influence the verdict. This means that the cognitive processes which 
inunediately preceed and determine the final decision reached, are of 
concern. The criminal trial is imbued with an aura of truth and justice 
(Danet~ 1980). The polariz.ed constructs of truth as opposed to deception 
are funda.tllental to both legal and lay conceptions of justice. The 
magistrate must ideally accomplish the accurate discernment of 'factual' 
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or 'true' information from that which is purposefully deceptive or 'untrue'. 
In order to be certain that any statement about an event is 'factual' a 
receiver of that statement would have to be present during the occurrence. 
This would facilitate the verification of the event by direct sensory 
experience (Anderson, Staats and Bostrom, 1969). Testimonial evidence 
comprises statements about past events to which the magistrate was not 
party. Hence, almost none of the information can be termed 'factual 
proof'. The exception to this would be concrete evidence such as 
photographs which may be termed 'factual evidence'. Additionally, the 
probability of information being distorted in order to support any 
particular claim,is increased due to the fact that both the complainant 
and th~ accused are motivated to 'win' the c.ase thereby avoiding the 
negative conse~uences of 'defeat'. It is the magistrate who is imbued 
with the authority to decide what he}she accepts as being the 'facts of 
the case' or 'the truth' (Danet, 1980). The central question then arises 
as to what criteria the magistrate uses to assess the 'truth value' of 
the testimonial evidence ie, credibility. As has been q~monstrated clearly 
in chapter one, there does not appear to be a conclusive, empirically supported 
answer to this question. 'The truth' appears to be defined 1.n terms of 
its effec.t. Any information that induces a state of belief 1.n those who 
receive it is taken as being 'fa.ctua.l evidence'. The 'tr·uth' is that 
which the magistrate decides is credible (:M:iller, 1966). The extent of 
the power vested in the magistrate is exposed when one considers that 
the 'facts' of a case do not pre-exist, but are determined by the 
magistrate. He/she must decide what will count as the 'facts' (Scheff, 
1968). Objectivity is the totality of received opinion on what is 
acceptable and not acceptable; desirable and not desirable; and good and 
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not good (Esland, 1973). It then appears trite to emphasize further the 
necessity of exploring the actual criteria that are used by rec:eivers/ 
mf~.gistrates,to assess the credibility or 'incredibility' of the information 
that they receive~ It has been demonstrated that there are certain aspects 
of the structure of a message that act as cues for receivers that the 
message is deceptive, or rather not credible (Bennett and Feldman, 1981). 
This proposition may engender a misconception that such cues accurately 
reflect the existence of deceptive attempts by a sender. Ra.ther, let it 
be emphasized that such cues are peraeived and used by receivers as if 
these were a.ccurate indicators of 'untrue' information. Sinc.e there is 
no certain way of assessing the pctual veracity of testimonial evidence, 
no statement may be made as to whether such cues are accurate indicators 
of deception or not. This research endeavours to identify and d.etail 
::.uch cues. 
Finally, since testitaonia.l evidence cannot be viewed as consisting of 
statements that are discernably true or untrue, it may be d.escribed in 
a more realistic fashion. It is pragmatic to adopt the 'neutral' view-
point that testimonial evidence is structured, semantic discourse. The 
ma.gistrate may then be characterized as a human, cognitive processor of 
linguistic information. ie' a receiver} common user. 
In the sense that the magistrate is human, he}she is subject to the same 
cognitive limitations of capacity and quality in processing and storing 
linguistic information, as 'ordinary' receivers are. This is certainly not 
a novel perspective within the field of psychology and legal processes. 
Kaplan has been one psychologist who has strongly supported the 
investigation of the pragmatics of the judgement process,as an opposition 
to traditional legal explanations (Kaplan, 1982). The glut of empirical 
research concerning the role played by extra-legal factors illustrates 
social scientists' concern with the disadvantages of utilizing human, 
cognitive processors to perform the tasks of judgement and sentencing 
(Kerr and Bray, 1982). This emphasis upon the 'human nature' of 
magistrates demonstrates the fact that laypersons and legal personnel 
do share common cognitive processes. This is not to negate that 
following long-term experience in the courtroom, magistrates may 
develop cognitive strategies which are modifications of the 'ordinary' 
cognitive processes. However, since there is such a paucity of both 
theory and research findings on the topic of the cognitive assessment 
of credibili.ty, it is necessary to investigate the basic, unmodifi.ed 
cognitive processes that facilitate credibility judgements made by 
'everyday' laypeople. Later studies are planned for the investigation 
of the cognitive strategies that are particular to magistrates. The 
following three chapters are a detailed consideration of the general 
eognitive strategie~:~at are involved in receivers' processing of 
semantic discourse. In the remainder of this chapter the discussion 
is turned to the concept of meaning that forms the foundation of the 
linguistic theory and research fundamental to this thesis. 
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3.3. The taeaning - controversy 
3.3.1. Introduction 
It has been stated that testimony may be conceived of as structured, 
semantic discourse. This term may _not convey a clear meaning to 
readers who have little linguistic training. A general definition 
should thus introduce the discussion. Semantic discourse 
refers to sets of sentences, both spoken and written, that are connected 
to form a coherent, meaningful whole (Danet, 1980). In order that a 
receiver form a meaningful and wholistic interpretation of a piece of 
discourse, that receiver must comprehend the meaning that 1s conveyed 
by the discourse. When this statement is related back to language use 
Ln the courtroom, the implication is that the magistrate must comprehend 
the meaning that is conveyed by a testimony as a prerequisite to making 
any assessment of the credibility of a testimony. Hence, prior to a 
discussion of how the credibility of information is evaluated, it is 
necessary to detail how the message received is interpreted and thence 
represented in the memory of a receiver as meaningful information. 
Once one enter·s the realm. of meaning one enters the field of linguistics. 
Within linguistics meaning is a tangled, conceptual mass. Since 
Aristotle, the debates of the philosophy of language have continued to 
rage, unpbated. A detailed consideration of the full range of these 
issues is not within the ambit of this thesis. However, certain issues 
which are fundamental to an understanding of this research have been 
selected for discussion. 
Linguistics is the formal study of l-anguage. Language is not synonymous 
with communication. Communication is a broader concept than that of 
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language. It refers to the entire range of 'tools' available to any 
language user to conv~y meaning to other language users. Such •tools' 
include para-linguistic, non-verbal as well as linguistic devices. 
Alternatively, language is the verbal and written vehicle of communication. 
This study has been designed to exclude_ all communication fact-ors other than 
the semantic structure of the language used in testimony. This focus on 
language necessitates: the inclusion of linguistic concepts. as a theoretical· 
base. Linguistics is concerned with the comm1.1nication of meaning through 
sound and: the investigation of the rules for the· production and 
.interpretation ·of meapingful units of language. The urii ts of language 
that have been def~ned are those of sounds, words, phrases, propositions, 
sentences and paragraphs. Rules have been derived as to how such units 
are grouped into· forms that are meaningful to a11 users of ·a cominon 
language (Noordman, 1979). The traditional school of linguistics 
comprises two central; fields of interest. In the field of semantics the 
f'ocus is on the relations between language· signs and the 'real' objects 
to which such signs refer. The main topic in the fie~d of syntactics 
is the formal relations among language signs. One theoretical issue 
which distinguishes the traditional school of linguistics from the more 
contemporary schoo1 of pragmaticsi is the debate as to where meaning 
resides in language. 
3.3.2. Meaning as object 
The concept of.meaning that has dominated the traditional school is that 
of meaning as-object.· 'fhis concept is derived from the. epistemological. 
base of logical posi.tivism (Panet, 1980). I.t holds that language units 
convey stati.c meanings that a.re consistent acr-oss all situations. 
Language users learn. the circumscribed set of sign-meaning combinations 
·• 
that characterize their mother tongue. This results in the language 
user acquiring something akin to a dictionary in memory. Additionally, 
the language user learns the circumscribed set of grammatical and 
syntactical rules for combining the language signs in order to convey 
meaning. Once a language user has acquired the 'semantic dictionary' 
and the rules of combination, he/she may be regarded as being 
communicatively competent (Chomsky, 1965). One implication of this 
statement i.s that if the rules are applied correctly, the language 
user is equiped to characterize reality objectively (Russel, 1956). A 
second implication is that people who share a common language system 
and who are communicatively competent, will derive the same meaning 
when using a particular set of language signs (Freedle and Carroll, 1972). 
The most significant corollary to this notion of meaning is that the 
total meaning of any piece of discourse resides within the discourse 
itself. The total message conveyed is equivalent to the meaning that 1.s 
contained in the language of the message. The analogy may be drawn of 
words that function as goods-trucks convey1.ng particular meanings as 
finite goods to a receiver. The receiver merely decodes the sounds 
comprising the words and matches the words to the cognitive 'dictionary' 
to gain the mea1;ung thereof. The summation of these meanings provides 
the overall me.;tning of the discourse. 
3.3.3. Mean.ing as act 
The concept of meaning as object and its implied premises have triggered 
criticism ?t many levels (Filmer, et al, 1973; Wooton, 1975). The 
alternative concept of meaning as act has developed as the major opposition 
to the concept of meaning as object. The concept of meaning as act 
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characterizes the contemporary school of thought known as pragmatics. 
In pragmatics there is a concern with the relation of language signs 
to the interpreters of the signs (Danet, 1980). This study has been 
derived from the basic assumptions about mean1ng that distinguish the' 
field of pragmatics. The critical thrust that is central to the concept 
of meaning as act is that the meaning conveyed by any utterance is not 
limited to the circumscribed meanings of the sounds, words and sentences 
that comprise it. Utterances convey meanings that go beyond the literal 
or direct meaning contained-in the language units (Gazdar, 1979). 
Human cognitive processors are viewed as having capacity limitations 
that constrain the quantity and quality of information that can be 
processed and understood at any one point in time (Norman, 1976). 
Therefore,linguistic messages are a reduced set of cues rather than 
a complete, self-contained set of meaningful information (Noordman, 
1979). Language signs are mere cues. They function to restrict the 
meaning that is conveyed by a message to a range of potential meanings. 
The receiver must infer what the sender could conceivably have meant by 
selecting a particular message from among an infinite set of possibilities 
(Black and Bower, 1980). For the receiver to hone down the range of 
possible meanings to a specific interpretation of a message, the receiver 
makes use of situational cues and inferences. These are derived from 
expectations of more probable meanings that constitute receivers' general 
knowledge of the world (Freedle and Carroll, 1972). People don't •unpack' 
the meaning of lexicalities. They use cues to expand the meaning as 
much as is necessary to comprehend a given message, in a given context, 
for a given purpose (Frederiksen, 1975 ). This notion derives from 
the premise that the total is greater than the sum of the constituent 
parts. This is the premise long standing in the Gestalt school of 
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thought. As ~ criticistn. 0-f th,e con.cept of t:neaning as object, it may be 
tra.ced to an awareness tha.t both language producers and receivers show 
marked empirical variations, in their application of grammatical and 
syntactical rules in language use. The polemic that "every phrase out 
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of context is plurisemantic" illustrates this point (Cicourel, 1973: 40). 
The idea of c.ontext-free processing supported by traditional linguistics, 
does not appear to operate in reality (Frederikson, 1975 ). The 
differences in the meanings attributed to any message across situations, 
are d:etermined by con"textual factors. For example, should a person make 
the utterance of 'Fire!' in the context of a smoke-filled room, the meaning 
of the utterance would lie in its function ie, that of a warn1ng. Should 
the s~e utterance be made by a soldier standing alongside a canon, the 
tneaning of the utterance would certainly change to one of a command or 
instruction. 
Th.ree sets of contextual factors are identified~ First, the context of the 
disc~urse itself. The meaning of any word or sentence derives from its 
relation to the other words and sentences comprising the discourse (Ortony, 
1979). Previously, traditional linguists have been concerned with the study 
of isolated sounds, words and sentences. Such research has been criticised 
as artificial in nature (Fodor et al, 1974). In reality, language receivers 
are faced with the task of comprehending sets of combined sentences ie, 
discourse. It is rare, except in social science research, that we are 
required to understand separate sounds, words and sentences. Testimony 
consi.sts of many sentences1 Second, the extra-linguistic 
context of the time, place, people and the goal to be accomplished by 
the -conveyance of the message. For example, witnesses present testimony 
to persuade the magistrate of the superior credibility of their explanation 
for some past event. Thi:rd., the co~ceptual context of the receiver. This 
refers to th.e cognitive knowlec;l,ge of the receiver that is brought to bear 
duri~g the comprehension of meaning (Frederiksen, 1975 ). 
Understanding ~ay be regarded as a process whereby a 
liste~er or reader attempts to infer the knowledge 
structure of a speaker/writer by using the available 
linguistic message, contextual information, and his 
own knowledge store as 'data structures' from which 
th.e inference is to be made. 
(Frederiksen, 1975 : 371) 
This claim lies at the heart of the constructivist approach to cognition. 
Language prod:ucers and receivers are not passive, automatic encoders and 
decoders of a sign-meaning system. They are active and flexible in their 
use of language. Language comprehension and production is reconstructive 
nQt reprod·ucti:ve! 
This concern with variables that are external to the contents of the 
message itself, has ghren rise to two fields of research. During the 
fifties and sixties interest was awakened in the cognitive processes 
underlying the construction and comprehension of language. This interest 
has generated the field of psycho-linguistics (Slobin, 1971). In the 
later sixties and seventies the field of socio-linguistics began to 
develop. In this field there is a consideration of the interrelations 
among pa-tteros of language use and social and situational factors 
(Gumperz. and l:lymes, 1972). It is the influence of these fields which 
has led to a general acceptance of the notion of cormrunieative perfoT'mC1nce 
as the complement to communicative competence (Chomsky, 1965). It 
embodies the idea that language users not only master the ideal rules of 
language production and interpretation. In addition, they must acqu1.re 
knowled:ge of how to modify their language use and understanding to fit 
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the constraints of differell.t s.itua.tiona~. gQ?,ls eg. ~tta.iJ;ling credibility 
in court. Thi.s study cop.siders receivers' perceptions of witnesses' 
connnunicative perf·ormance in presenting testimony. 
3.4. Summary conclusions 
This study falls within the ambi.t of pragmatics as it considers the 
influence of the contextual factors of the task, the receiver's conceptual 
context and the context of the discourse, upon the final meaning that 
receivers derive from messages. Figure 3-1. below is a summary of 
factors that affect the final meaning imputed to testimony by a rece1ver. 
A discussion of these factors and their roles in the cognitive processing 
of testimony forms the topic of the following three chapters. 
Figure 3-1. Contextual Factors 1n Meaning 
Pi.scourse Context + Conceptual Context + Situational Context 
,Factors Factors Factors 
l i ' 1 
What cognitive What world knowledge How does the task 
strategies are used in the receiver, is of assessing the 
by receivers to + used to supplement + credibility of 
organise and the discourse cues testimonial 
integrate the ~any to derive the whole information shape 
pieces of semantic ~eaning of testimony? the final meaning 
information imputed to testimony, 
comprising by the receiver? 
testimony? 
l ~ ~ J The overall meaning of testimony I I 
~ 
I The final verdict reached by the receiver /magistrate. 1 
The study bears both a. psycho...,.·liJ;tguLsti.c a.1;1c:l s9ci9-li:p.guistic fla~ou:r. 
It is psycho-linguistically orie:p._ted in. its concer:p. with the cognitive 
processes used to accomplish the central task of comprehending the 
mea.mng, and assessing the credibility of semantic discourse in the 
c.rimi:p.al trial. The study fits the tre:p.d of socio-linguistics in its 
focus upo:p. now variations in the language of speakers from different 
social group~ influence the interpretations that receivers make of 
their messages. In this study, it is postulated that variations in 
the structure of language cause differences in the comprehensibility 
of testimony a:p.d therefore i11 receivers' perceptions of its credibility. 
4. THE DISCOURSE CONTEXT 
A discourse is coherent if its respective (sentences 
and) propositions are connected. 
(Kintsch and Van Dijk, 1978~ 365) 
4.1. IJ;ttroduction 
In this chapter there ~s a consideration of how the many and varied pieces 
of information comprising testimo:p.y, are organized by receivers into a 
framework of ~eaningfully related concepts. This framework forms the 
context of the discourse (Black and Bower, 1980). This study deals with 
the way rece~vers perceive semantic structure as affecting the 
comprehensibility of testimony. Thus, it is imperative that readers 
understand. what semantic structure receivers place upon testimonial 
infonnation. This requires an examinatio:p. of how receivers organ~ze 
info:nnation to form representations of testimony in memory. It is the 
memory representation of testimony that is evaluated when the credibility 
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of the information is ~ssessed .• 
For the purposes of the study, s.chematic devices have been used to model 
the organization of the memory representations for testimony. The concept 
of a sch.ema.ta as cognitive devices that organize information in memory, 
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has a long history. As far back as 1932, the cognitive psychologist Bartlett 
contended that the comprehension, storage and recall of stories is facilitated 
bt the use of a set of socially-determined, cognitive processing-conventions 
(Bartlett, 1932). This notion was shelved during the reign of behaviourism. 
The use of schema 1n the processing of semantic discourse could not be 
explained wi·thin the confines of the stimulus-response paradigm {Van Dijk, 
1980). Since the early seventies there has been a rediscovery of schema 
as heuristic and theoretical devices. · 
4.2. Schema 
Althpugh there are a variety of theories that utilize a schematic base, the 
majority do share a common conceptualization of the criteria characterizing 
schema (Thorndyke and Hayes Roth, 1979). The schema is a prototypical 
abstra.ction of the complex concept which it represents. It is a framework 
that serves to relate concepts. The framework consists of 'slots' into 
which unique stimulus evet;tts are fitted eg, different pieces of information. 
Schema are developed from past experience within a particular culture. Persons 
of that culture draw out the common elements in input information. Such 
common elements serve to define the 'slots' in the schema-framework. Since 
the schema is a cognitive abstraction, it is independent of the particular 
occurrences that it is used to organize. However, there is the risk of 
separating fo:rm froTJl aonteTJ.t in an artificial manner. The premise is that 
certain types of knowledge do take consistent forms in memory ie, testimonial 
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information is organized into 'hiera.rchica.l ca.usal chains by story..,..schema. 
Receivers' perceptions of the schematic content of any piece of testimonial 
information, dictate the level of the hierarchy at which it is represented 
1n memory. Receivers' perceptions of semantic content differ (Schank and 
Abelson, 197.7). Therefore, it is possible for two receivers to place the 
same piece of information at a different level in each of their memory 
structures ie, content changes may produce structural changes. 
The question may arise as to why schema are necessary in comprehension, 
storage and recall? Schema enable the reduction of the receiver's 
information processing load. Each 'slot' in the schema subsumes a large 
amount of information by grouping related pieces of information according 
to some theme. Schema integrate diverse pieces of information by facilitating 
the identification of a central theme that binds the many pieces of 
information into a single, meaningful whole. For example, a story schema 
will aid. the receiver of a story in identifying the point or gist of the 
story. In an assault case the point of the complainant's testimony is 
generally that some person or people, purposefully injured the physical being 
of the complainant. Ideally, all of the infionnation presented in the 
testimony should relate to this theme. Schema thus enable the summarization 
of vast amoun.ts of information into a few concepts. This reduces the 
infQ:il)lation processing load on the receiver, as well as the storage 'burden'. 
The schema also fulfils the important function of signalling to the receiver 
when inconsistencies exist in the input and when the input is incomplete. 
Each slot in a schema allows the processor to predict both the order and 
the type of i.pformation that is most likely to occur at any point in a 
piece of discourse (Charniak, 1977). Of even greater significance to the 
subsequent discussion, is the generation of expectations from schematic 
bases. !~stead of rec.ei~ers h,av.i:p.g tQ Seii'(Ch the VaSt ~pu:p.~S of 
i~fo~.;l.tion stored ~P lo~g tef!Jl. mewory to interpret a.nd: understand 
incoming information; they need only make a match between the e~pected 
a:p.d the i!lcom.ing informati.on (Den Uyl and Van Oostendorp, 1980). The 
development of expectations regarding the kind of information that is 
likely to follow other kinds of inforwation, is an additional aid in 
recall. Once a particular piece of information instantiates the use 
of an organizing schema, the schema 'slot' into which the piece of 
information has been fitted, will have to be invoked prior to the 
recall of that information (Thorndyke and Hayes Roth, 1979). The 
person who is attempting to recall a particular section of-discourse, 
· has only to utili.z.e the schema to know what kind of information they 
are wanting to recall. Thus the recall of the gist of information is 
facilitated (Mandler and Johnson, 1977). An expectation which proves 
to be true alters the proc.ess of understanding from one of construction, 
to one of elementary recognition. Understanding becomes predictive 
(Schank and Lebowitz, 1980). 
A schema-based theory of the representation of discourse in memory forms 
·the base for this study i.e, Schank ;;md Abelson's hierarchical macro-
schema comprising four lev.:els:. Ciiusal chains, scripts, goals/plans and 
themes (Schank and Abelson, 1977). The choice of a schematic-type theory 
wa.s made, because macro-schema are psychologically valid phenomena in 
the cogni.tive processing of let;1gthy and complex story discourse (Charniak, 
1977; Freedle and Carroll, 1972). Since testimonial evidence is both 
complex and lengthy story discourse, the logic of this choice is obvious. 
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4.3. Cdticis~s 
Although a scheJP.a.,...·theory provides the JP.ost relevant and comprehensive 
theoretical basis for this study, readers whould be made aware of the 
limitations of schematic models. Thorndyke and Yekovich have provided 
a thorough evaluation of schema-based theories (Thorndyke and Yekovich, 
1980). They have used four criteria derived from the philosophy of 
science {Kuhn, 1962i Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1959, 1963). 
In order for a 'scientific' theory to be deemed adequate it must be 
plausible, it must have descriptive and predictive power, and it must be 
testable (Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980). The authors propose that 
schema-theory is plausible. The concept has been in use for well over 
200 years and its use in everyday behaviour may be identified with ease. 
For example, the person who sits down to watch a television detective 
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s~ow after the show has started, may deduce the missing information from 
t~eir story-schema without much effort. Schema-theory also appears to have 
adequate descriptive potential. It facilitates the explanation of 
findings in a l!lore comprehensible and parsimonious fashion than previous 
theories, such as sentence grammars. (Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980). 
However, schema-theory falls prey to criticism at the last two levels of 
predictive-potential and testibility. The assumptions defining schema-
theory have been criticised as being over-generalized. This has encouraged 
the use of schema-theory to explain a vast number of findings in a post 
hoc fashion. The result is that schema-theory has not been tested 
adequately as a predictive theory. A more objective test of the adequacy 
of the theory would be its use in developing hypotheses to be tested 
in a predictive manner. Post hoc analyses do not often generate 
in.consistent data. Adequate ~scientific' theories should be sufficiently 
specific to be vulnerable to disconfirmation ie, they should be testible 
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(Lakatos, l910). Schema-theQr:y a.ppears impe-rv.ious to contradictory data. 
This lack of specificity has led to particular deficiencies in the theory. 
There is little information as to how input is represented when it does 
not correspond with the expectations derived from the schema. The 
examination of this topic is central to the study at hand. In addition, 
there is no detailed account of the processes that instantiate, maintain 
and discontinue schema during processing. Finally, there· is no statement 
a$ to the range of knowledge that may be organized schematically. For 
example, there is no empirical data to answer the question of whether 
or not we hav:e schema for representing the event of scratching one's ear 
on the sidewalk; or whether schema exist only for the processing of less 
detailed events. The conclusion drawn is in agreement with that made by 
Thorndyke and Yekovich:. 
Our v:1.ew is that the shortcomings of schema-theory 
lie in its incompleteness, not in its inaccuracy. 
(Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980: 42) 
4.4. Macro and micro-structures 
Resear·cher·s generally agree that any adequate mod.el of the cognitive 
organization of linguistic information must explain the following processes: 
First, there is the process by which the linguistic cues in discourse are 
mapped on.to the corresponding semantic concepts 1.n memory. The semantic 
concepts include those that are cued explicitly by the linguistic content 
of the discourse ie, those forming the discourse context (see Figure 3-1., 
p 44). This is the process of micro-structural development. The semantic 
concepts that comprise this micro-structure are the micro-propositions. 
Second, the micro-propositions are used to infer information from receivers' 
world knowledge ie, their conceptual contexts. This facilitates causal 
connections among the micro-propositions, and their combination by 
generalization, summation and deletion to develop a reduced set of causally 
connected macro-propositions. Together, these macro-propositions represent 
the gist of the. discourse. They comprise the macro-structure of the memory 
representation, or the narrative global form of discourse. The macro-
structure is the hierarchical framework of 'slots' that constitutes the 
schema. The macro-propositions are the actual content that fills the 
macro-structural 'slots' (Van Dijk, 1980). 
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4.5.1. Conceptual dependency theory 
Of concern here,is an answer to the question of how people transform 
strings of linguistic cues into meaningful thoughts, ideas or concepts, 
1n order to understand natural language. This process characterizes 
the transformation of the linguistic surface structure of discourse 
into a set of micro-propositions,or the micro-structure of the memory 
representation. This<is the first 'cognitive step' taken by receivers 
of discourse in reconstructing the meanings that underly utterances. 
Micro-propositions are the lowest level knowledge structures considered 
in this theoretical discussion. The theory of conceptual dependency has 
been chosen to explain the nature of the micro-propositions comprising 
the micro-structure of discourse. It is a theory of natural language. 
It also forms the foundation of the macro-structural model used in this 
~tudy ie, Schank and Abelsons a977) model of causal chains, scripts, goals/ 
plans and themes. Hence, it is imperative that readers understand the 
basic axioms that define conceptual dependency theory. Conceptual 
dependency theory was first proposed by Schank in 1972. It has since 
undergone a number of transformations (Schank, 1972; Schank, 1974; Schank, 
1975; Schank and Abelson, 1977). It is the '1977 version' of the theory 
that is discussed here. 
The first principle of conceptual dependency theory is that all 
natural languages have a structured conceptual basis in human 
cognition. 
This conceptual basis is interlingual. Regardless of the language 
used, if any two utterances have an identical meaning, these will 
be represented identically in memory. 
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All ~onerete nouns in a. natural language are represented in memory 
as stative eonceptuaZi?;ations,. but they have two additional 
elements: First, they comprise primitive acts. Concrete nouns are 
also represented in memory as functional definitions of the objects 
they refer to ie, as active conceptualizations. The language user 
generates such functional definitions by extracting the common aspects 
of the function to which the object is put, across many situations. 
Fqr example, the concrete noun of a spoon usually generates a 
functional definition of; an object that is used to PTRANS mushy 
liquid to the mouth to INGEST it. Second, the stative memory 
conceptualization includes lists of other functions of the concrete 
noun that contradict the general functional definition. For example, 
the spoon used a a digging utensil. 
Micro-propositions are connected due to their occurrence 1n the same 
goal-related event or time span. This is the notion of episodic 
memory which forms the basis of conceptual dependency theory. For 
example, the micro-propositions comprising th¢ sentence, John packed 
his car and then went to the petrol station, would be stored in the 
memory 'chunk' consisting of all the other micro-propositions 
constituting the holiday trip that John was embarking upon. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977) 
4.5.2. Criticisms 
The criticism may be lev.elled that conceptual dependency theory does not 
detail pow complex, abstract nouns are represented 1n memory ie, memory 
structures for abstract states like peace, justice etc. The concept of 
primitive actions has been criticised consistently in theory. However, it 
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is the concept tl\~t continues tq l:ec.ej.v..e t:P,e w.~j ori ty o~· eiPl?iric.a.l sup-por·t 
(J~ckei;lq;Qf.f:~ 1.976;. ~op;nan ax1d ~umelh.?rt ~ 1975). Additionally, it is claimed 
that receivers do not only form memory representations of a detailed kind 
ie, micro-propositions. Memory representations must include higher level 
cQnceptualizations ie, macro-propositions of varying abstraction. For 
example, scripts, plans/goals and themes. Since this research is exploratory 
in nature, the level at which testimonial information is organized was not 
known. This, io addition to the conceptual dependency micro-structural 
model, it was necessary to include a model of macro-schematic levels of 
representation ie, the model proposed by Schank and Abelson (1977). 
Since conceptual dependency theory ascribes to a model of episodic memory, 
it receives c.riticism from those who aspire to other models of memory. The 
major opposition derives from the lexically-based model of memory. This 
model describes semantic memory as a hierarchy of words that are connected 
by their membership to a class. For example, a canary is a bird, which 
is a d·omestic animal. The view is, that propositions are stored by relating 
the propositions at various levels of abstraction. The majority of recent, 
systematic, empirical data supports the episodic memory model but negates 
other models (Black and Bower, 1979; Busche and Schaier, 1979; Haberlandt, 
1980; Thorndyke, 1977). Yekovich and Thorndyke (1981), have conducted a 
comparative evaluation of the various models used to represent memory for 
discourse. They conclude that the episodic model is most effective. The 
episodic model has been adopted here as the best available. 
Finally at the most general level, the theory of conceptual dependency 
is party to the controversy of linguistic relativity. The assumption that 
the conceptual basis of language is interlingual, places the theory in 
Nez.wors.ki., l97.8; Thorndyke anQ. Yekq~ich, ~980). This does not negate the 
receivers~ ability to recall detailed, micro--propositional data. There 
is empirical support for the short term retention of detailed information 
froi!l the surface structure of discourse (Baker, 1978; Hayes-Roth and 
Thorn!;lyke, 1979; McKoon, 1917). These studies showed that receivers' 
were a.ble to distinguish between those statements that actually appeared 
in a piece of discourse, and those statements that were paraphrases of 
the actual information ie, micro-structural processing. However, this 
notion is a point of controversy in the field of schema-theory. Following 
a comprehensive review of the findings to date, it has been ascertained 
that micro-propositions are retrievable (Yekovich and Thorndyke, 1981). 
This demonstrates the importance of micro and macro-structural components 
in the cognitive processing of discourse. 
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When the task is to Peeall an entiPe story, recall protocols are summaries 
of the story. The detailed surface form of the story is retained in the 
micro-structure (Pratt et al, 1982). However, macro-propositions are 
produced by summing and deleting micro-propositions ie, they do not reflect 
the detailed form in which information was originally presented. When 
receivers recall a story, the memory search is termed a top-down, bPeadth-
fipst process (Schank, 1974). The memory representation is hierarchical 
and is searched, beginning at the topmost level of the maepo-structure. 
This facilitates the retrieval of the maepo-propositions comprising the 
gist of a story (Walker and Meyer, 1980). Receivers' processing resources 
are directed to retrieving the macro-propositions by using the macro-
schema (Graesser, 1978; Waters, 1978). Thi.s leaves few resources for 
the retrieval of the specific structure of micro-propositions (Thorndyke, 
1977). Direct ·access to each micro-proposition is limited. 
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When th.e aitp changes to on.e of rec:ogn.isitL:g t"tte detailed micro-propositions, 
the process becomes one of a bQttom-up search of the hierarchical memory 
structure ie, a search that begins at the micro-structural level of the 
micro-propositions. In the case of a recognition task, the processing 
resources are assigned to finding a match between the details of the surface 
structure and the micro-propqsitions that are stored in memory. Receivers 
gain direct access to the detailed micro-propositions in memory. 
It is clear, that the task determines the relative use of macro and 
micro~structures in processing discourse. There is no difference between 
the probability of micro and macro-propositions being stored in memory. 
Rather, there are differences in the amounts of processing that these 
propositions trigger during encoding. The strength of the memory traces 
differ (Britton and Meyer, 1979). Macro-propositions fulfil central roles 
in a story. Thus, they activate a larger quantity of knowledge from the 
long term memory store during comprehension ie, the conceptual context. 
This causes macro-propositions to be repeatedly encoded. Macro-propositional 
information deteriorates at a slower pace than micro-propositional 
information (Cirilo and Foss, 1980). Comprehension itself, requires the 
recall of the gist of stories. It is thus logical, that it 1s the macro-
structure that dominates in speech situations where receivers, like the 
magistrates and common users in this study, must understand large amounts 
of complex information (Caccamine and Kintisch, 1978; McKoon, 1977). This 
discussion thus includes a model of a macro-structural schema. 
4.6.2. Story-schema 
Different types of discourse require different organizing macro-schema in 
memory. The schema selected for use in this analysis is the story-schema. 
Story-schema are models of the macro-structure of memory representations for 
story-discourse. Since the early seventies, efforts to investigate the 
schema used to organize stQry i~formation, have multiplied. 
This seemingly sudden development of interest in the topic of story-
schema has its roots in the work of the Russian forma1ists. Linguists 
like Tomaslevsky and Skolovskij were working on the formal structural 
analysis of discourse during the 1920's. The specific focus on stories 
is often traced to, the work of Propp (Propp, 1928). Due to the Russian 
Revolution the findings from this research were not published until the 
seventies (Van Dijk, 1980). Today, this field has developed into one 
of the rare research areas that is characterized by interdisciplinary 
collaboration (Kintsch and Van Dijk, 1978). Artificial intelligence 
programmers, psycho-linguists, transformational linguists, as well as 
cognitive psychologists have amalgamated in their attempts to expand 
the field. Such research c.onstitutes the first systematic investigation 
of the cognitive-linguistic structure of stories (Van Dijk, 1980). The 
relevance of the focus on the cognitive structuring of story information, 
lies in the fact that stories are the most corrunon form of discourse used 
in. accounts of everyday, social behaviour and human events. Within any 
one culture, storytellers seem to engage the same cognitive schema in 
receivers of stories (Mandler and Johnson, 1977). This idea has support 
in. the empirical realm. It has been found that stories regarding human 
behaviour that have a serious topic, are structured in a .narrative 
~anner (Gentner, 1976; Labov and Waletsky, 1967). Story•schema are a 
subclass of narrative schema. Narrative discourse merely relates the 
temporal order of events,whereas story discourse relates the causal 
sequences of goal-oriented events ·that are pursued by one or more 
protagonists (Black and Bower, 1980). 
Following an intensive analysis of sixty court cases, ranging from petty 
offences to murder trials, it has been proposed that testimonies delivered 
during criminal trials are presented and understood as stories (Bennett 
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and Feldman, 1981). Storytelling has been. identified as the 
cotmnunic.ational practice used to organize and derive understandings in 
the courtroom context (Bennett, 1978). The significance of conceiving 
the trial process as communication via storytelling, is great. As a 
general conception it facilitates the explanation of how the diverse, 
and previously isolated extra-legal variables, are interrelated (Bennett 
and Feldman, 1981; Loftus and Greene, 1983) • 
.•• The story itself is a powerful mechanism .that 
d.etermines the relevance, if any, of the(se) other 
factors to the particular case at the bar. The 
story provides a basis for transforming the 
statistical variables into a theoretical framework. 
(Loftus and Greene, 1983: 316) 
-60 
Extra-legal factors such as the socio-economic status, etbnicity, sex, age and 
political affiliations of all court participants may be viewed as secondary 
variables. The cognitive processes by which testimony 1s structured, both 
in its production and in its interpretation, now stand as the independent 
variables that affect the dependent variable of the final verdict. Extra-
legal factors have a secondary effect. They influence the process of 
storytelling and thus the semantic structure of testimony which in turn 
determines the final verdict. 
Further support for the conception of testimony as story discourse 
derives from subjective impressions gained by the researcher. There is 
the magistrate's comment of 'Vertel v1r my nou jou storie', that 
characterizes cases 1n the South African magistrates' courts. This 
appears to be a social acknowledgement of the form of communication that 
is expected by magistrates in a criminal trial. Finally, the criteria 
that are used to define a story correspond with the characteristics of 
testimonial discourse. Stories are said to relate sequences of causally 
connected events that are goal-oriented. More specifically, the central 
go.;!.l, or point Qf the sto~:y, is. the go~.l pursued by o~e or l;llor-e 
protagonists. This. cet;1.tral aim provides the theme that integrates the 
I!lapy pieces of diverse and apparently disjointed information (Black and 
Bower, 1980). Take for example the complainant's testimony in a case 
of theft. The complainant is the central protagonist who constructs 
a story that has a central goal. The story tells how the accused took 
some object that belonged to the complainant, without the permission 
of the complainant. Such a story includes details of the causally 
related events that led up to the act of theft. Even such a subjective 
and superficial analysis of testimony does illustrate its story-like 
characteristics. 
4.6.3. Bennett and Feldman 
The work of Bennett and Feld~n is seminal in the storytelling context 
of the courtroom (Bennett and Feldman, 1981). This study focuses on 
testimonies produced within the selfsame context. It may appear unexpected 
that this model has not been. adopted as the macro-structural basis for 
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this research endeavour. There are two reasons for this choice: First, 
although the'model is clearly based upon schema-theory, it does not include 
a detailed macro-structural model to explain the representation of and use 
of story information in comprehension, memory and recall. Some attention is 
paid to the kinds of cognitive functions performed by the use of schema. 
However, once again the actual cognitive processes that are disrupted 
by changes in the semantic structure of testimony, and the ways in which 
such cogni.tive processes are disrupted, are not specified. 
Second, these researchers have proposed certain general criteria for the 
assessme~t of prable:tps in t~e structure qf testl',Ilonies. The use of these 
criteria as heuristic devices in. research is problematic. Prior to 
beginning the pilot phase of this research, an attempt was made to use 
the criteria set up by Bennett and Feldman (1981). It was found that 
inter-scorer reliability levels were exceedingly low. This indicates that 
the criteria required the utilization of subjective interpretation to an 
unsatisfactory extent. This study aimed to identify the detailed criteria 
that receivers use to assess the comprehensibility (well-formedness) of 
testil',Ilony 1e, the specific structural violations underlying encoding 
problems. 
However, Bennett and Feldman's work has had a significant impact upon this 
research. Three of the central premises of their model have been 
utilized. First, the conception of the trial process as communication 
through storytelling. Second, the use of the concept of storytelling 
to integrate previously disparate findings regarding the role of extra-
legal factors in shaping the verdict. Finally, the aentral importance 
of the well-formedness of the semantic structure of testimony in 
determining credibility and therefore the verdict, has been accepted. 
-62 
4.6.4. Story grammars 
Two approaches have dominated the field of story-schema ie, story grammars 
and causal chain analyses (Van Dijk, 1980). Story grammars consist of 
sets of rewrite rules defining the type of information filling the 'slots' 
in the story schema. Additionally, the grammars dictate the order in 
which the •slotted' information may occur (Mandler and Johnson, 1977). 
Story grammars have their roots ~n generative transformational linguistics. 
Hence, to evaluate the adequacy of these grammars the criteria for the 
assessment of formal grammars must be used. Since there is an added claim 
that story grammars are accurate theories of the memory representations 
of discourse, their efficacy in this realm should also be evaluated 
(Black and Bower, 1980). Black and Bower have conducted a comprehensive 
assessment of this nature. They compare the relative adequacy of the 
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two main types of story grammars available. The first type is the context 
free phrase structure grammar - C F G - (Mandler and Johnson, 1977; 
Rumelhart, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977). The second type is the finite state 
grammar- F S G- (Stein and Glen~l978). The central factor distinguishing 
C F G~s from F S G's,is that C F G's have a self-embedding property and 
F S G's do not (Black and Bower, 1980). Stories that illustrate the self-
ei!lbedding property contain 'successive, dependent sub-goals' (Black and 
Bower, 1980~ 229). To demonstrate this point, let us consider the story 
of the Old Farmer that has been used in numerous story grammar experiments. 
In this story. a farmer has the central goal of wanting to get his donkey 
into a shed. In order to achieve this macro-level goal, the farmer 
develops numerous sub-goals. These sub-goals are attempts to overcome 
conditions that prevent the attainment of the macro-level goal. For 
example, he asks his dog to bark at the donkey. When the dog refuses, 
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he asks the cat to scratch the dog, thereby getting the dog to bark at 
the donkey, and so on. Each of these sub-goals is derived from the 
failure of an attempt to achieve another sub-goal or the main goal. 
Therefore, the goals are embedded or conditionally related to one another. 
Since a large majority of stories are of this kind, the conclusion drawn 
by the two authors at this point, is that story grammars must be of the 
C F G - type ie, they must include rules for embedded goals. By 
implication.all story grammars that are F S G's are inadequate formal 
grammars (Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977). 
The disturbing fact ~s then raised, that C F G's are also not adequate 
formal grammars for representing stories (Chomsky, 1965). The use of 
C F G's prevents the representation of discontinuous story constituents 
~e, the case when a set of goal related events are presented that are 
interrupted by the occurrence of some unrelated event(s), but later the 
story returns to the first set of events (Black and Bower, 1980). For 
example, the story fragment of: 
(i) Mary was at the laundromat; 
(ii) there she met Clara, who asked Mary to go and fetch Clara's 
children from the play-school; 
(iii) when Mary returned she completed her laundry. 
The fragment denoted as (ii) is a discontinuous story constituent. (i) and 
(iiDare continuous constituents. C F G's should contain separate rules 
for dealing with interruptions that are related and those that are unrelated 
to the existing flow of story co~stituents, at any one time: 
In other words, the rules should be sensitive to the 
context. But if they are, the grammar cannot be context 
free. 
(Black and Bower, 1980: 230) 
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Hence, existing story gr:8Jlltllars ~re 1,1ot ~dequate as formal, theoretical 
grammars (Black and Bower, 1980). 
At the second level of evaluation, the question to be answered is whether 
existing story grammars are empirically adequate theories of memory for 
story information. The answer is once again a disappointing negative. 
Story grammars are overgeneralizeQ models that do not serve to differentiate 
the memory structure for stories, from the memory structures for other 
forms of discourse, like procedural expositions (Graesser, 1978). Story 
grammars have failed another test of empirical efficacy (Black, 1977). 
This latter study included a comparison of the predictive power of four of 
the main story grammars ie, Mandler and Johnson (1977), Rumelhart (1977), 
Stein and Glenn (1978), Thorndyke (1977), and a causal chain theory 1e, 
Schank (1975). 
Story grammars predict that the macro-propositions most frequently recalled 
are those of the Setting, Episodes and Resolutions (Mandler and Johnson, 
1971; Thorndyke, 1977). The hypothesis from causal chain theory is that those 
events and states having multiple causal connections to other events and 
states in a story, are best recalled (Schank and Abelson, 1977) ie, those 
events and states that form a causal chain in a story. Black and Bower 
used stepwise regression to assess the relative efficacy of the story 
grammar - macro-structures as compared to the causal chain macro-structure 
(Black and Bower, 1980). The finding was that: 
•.• the Schank causal chain was still the best predictor 
but it was always improved if it was combined with some 
'hierarchy' variable. 
(Black and Bower, 1980: 235) 
The model of memory for stories chosen for this thesis combines 
a causal chain analysis with a hierarchical representation ie, the 
hierarchical model comprising the four levels of causal chains, scripts, 
plans/goals and themes (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
It is proposed that the protagonist in a story is a goal-oriented, problem 
solver (Newell and Simon, 1972). The memory representation is a hierarchy 
of states that are changed by aotions or events. All of these constituent 
states and actions are related to the solving of some high level problem 
ie, to the protagonist attaining some overall goal which involves a state 
change. This central goal is represented at the highest macro-structural 
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level of the memory hierarchy, as a single state change ie, STATE (A) ACTION 
(1) STATE (B). The protagonists' central goal is determined by their 
interpersonal role and/or life themes eg, the role theme of Robber predicts 
the central goal of gaining control of another's property. The corresponding 
highest level state change is the change of the protagonists' state from 
that of not having control of another's property, to that of having control 
of another's property. The highest level event 'causing' this state change, 
is the PTRANS of another's property to the protagonist. The next level 
of representation comprises the plans and suhgoals that facilitate this 
highest level state change 1e, the actions that lead up to the PTRANS of 
another's property to the protagonist (see Appendices I- III). For example, the 
ordered sets of actions (plans) that attain the subgoals of threatening and 
overpowering another, and stealing their property. The next level of the 
hierarchy, consists of those actions that frequently occur in fixed 
sequences to attain certain plans and subgoals ie, scripted activities eg, 
the actions comprising a 'stick-up'. The lowest level is that of the 
detai.led primitive acts that constitute the scripted and non-scripted 
plans and goals eg, the PTRANS of the protagonist to the victim, the 
PTRANS of the protagonists' club to the victims' head, etc. The prediction 
is that when the task is to recall entire stories, the macro-propositions 
best retrieved are those higher in the macro-schema ie, at the thematic 
and intentional levels (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
4.6.5. Criticisms 
The hierarchical macro-schematic model proposed by Schank and Abelson 
(1977) may be evaluated using the criteria of plausibility, descriptive 
potential, predictive efficacy and testibility. Since the critical 
evaluation of schema-theory in general is accurately applicable to 
this particular model, the assessment will not be repeated here. (Readers 
are referred to section 4.3. on pages 49 and 50). The conclusion drawn 
is the same ie, that Schank and Abelson's model is incomplete rather 
than inaccurate. Empirical research is necessary to test the hypotheses 
which it generates. In this study the general hypotheses that macro-
schematic violations produce incomprehensibility was tested. In 
addition the secondary postulate that the higher level macro-propositions, 
ie, themes and goals/plans, play a more central role in comprehension, 
was also evaluated. 
5. THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
No matter how precisely a norm is written, nor how 
carefully a legal concept is defined, there is always 
a background of uncertainty and probability which 
cannot be removed by any deductive or apodictic 
method. The only solution is to employ the inventive 
art of finding points of view or 'common places' which 
being widely accepted, will help to fill the gaps, 
thus rendering the reasoning convincing and the 
conclusion acceptable. 
(Santos, 1977: 15) 
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5.1. Introduction 
Discourse is an incomplete set of semantic cues. It is abbreviated to 
prevent redundancy and proJ~#ty (Black et al, · 1978; Kintsch and Van 
Dijk, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977). The question is, how do receivers elaborate 
the 'skeleton' of semantic cues to derive a complete, semantic 
representation of discourse? To understand the full meaning of events 
in discourse, receivers must have general and specific knowledge of 
similar events (Charniak, 1977). The knowledge originates from direct 
and vicarious experiences and is stored in long term memory. This 1s 
the conceptual aontext. R~ceivers use this data store to infer 
additional information. They reconstruct a wholistic meaning from 
discourse cues (Schank and Lebowitz, 1980). Understanding is knowledge-
based (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
5.2. Inference 
The reader should reconsider that for any story to be coherent its 
propositions must be connected. Many of the interconnections are not 
explicated in the surface structure. Receivers infer the interconnections 
to pro~ote coherency in understanding. The following two propositions 
are apparently disconnected: 
(i) John burnt his hand; and 
(ii) he forgot that the stove was on. 
To connect (i) and (ii) readers infer (iii), that John placed his hand 
upon the stove (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Inferences are integrating 
mechanisms. To link macro-propositions into the macro-causal chain, 
receivers assess whether the pre-conditions for any event have been 
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explicated. If not, they form semantic bridges between incoming 
information and information that has already been received. This is 
backward inferencing ~chank, 1975; Thorndyke, 1976). Backward inferences 
provide information that is missing from the 'conceptualization holders' 
in the causal chain-schema (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Receivers cannot 
understand discourse when the reparative function of inferencing is not 





John went to the park; 
there he met a midget, 
he asked the midget for a mouse; and 
John picked up the hat and walked away. 
Few receivers could connect these four segments into a meaningful causal 
chain (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
It may seem that receivers generate a single inference to connect 
disjointed information. In fact, receivers develop a range of possible 
inferential bridges. For example~ 
(i) The teacher swung her metal ruler at Mary; 
(ii) the teacher missed Mary; and 
(iv) Mary's hand began to bleed. 
Segments (ii) and iv) are disjointed. To connect these receivers may 
infer, (iiia) Mary got a fright and fell onto the floor, cutting her 
hand on the desk; or (iiib) Mary was so angry that she clenched her fist 
tightly and her fingernails bit into her palm; and so on. The inference 
chosen as a connector is the most probable one. Receivers are not 
concerned with how events could conceivably have happened, but with how 
events usua71yoccur (Schank and Abelson, 1977). To decide what inference 
is most probable in any given situation, receivers use their world 
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knowledge about how things generally happen (Spiro, 1980). People 
function as 'naive psychologists' and 'naive physicists'. They 
follow general rules about people's motives, goals and the pre-
conditions and consequences of goals. They are guided by rules 
regarding the dynamics of states and objects in reality (Heider, 1958). 
Inferences fulfil a second, important function. They are used 
predictively. This is termed foYward inferencing. Information received 
is used to predict the kind of information that receivers expect to 
fdlZow. This reduces receivers' processing loads considerably. It is 
not necessary for receivers to conduct trial and error searches of 
general knowledge to find information that may proceed from the given 
data. Instead, inferences reduce the information predicted to that 
which is most probabZe. 
The actual inferences generated from specific pieces of discourse, 
have not been predicted accurately (Kintsch and Van Dijk, 1978). The 
most recent theory is by Thorndyke (1976). It has a macro-structural 
base which complements the approach in this thesis. This model has 
been combined with the ideas of Schank and Abelson (1977) in Figure 5-l. 
(See Figure 5-l. p ·71). In this study the problem of predicting 
inferences accurately was overcome~ The common users reported their 
inferences. This data may be used to generate future hypotheses. 
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Figure 5-l. Inference Production 
Start: Any point in the 
discourse after the first~~.-------------------------~ -piece of info·rmation. 
New Information is 
presented 
Is there a schema 
activated by past 
information, that 




for a schema that 
will link the new 
information with the 
old. 
Is a schema 
found? 
No 




Use the schema to 
develop forwaro 
inferences predicting 
information to follow 
Store the new 
information: create a 
pointer to the schema 
and store any novel 
information not in the 
schema. 
Activate the schema to 
generate backwaPd 
inferences to link 
the new and old 
information. 
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5.3 Script schema 
5.3.1 Description 
A script is a structure that describes the appropriate 
sequence of events in a particular context. A script 
is made up of slots and requirements about what can fi 11 
these slots. The structure is an interconnected whole, 
and what is in one slot affects what can be in another. 
Scripts handle styaliz.ed everyday situations. They are 
not subject to much-change, nor do they provide the 
apparatus for handling totally novel situations. Thus, 
a script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of 
actions that defines a well known situation. Scripts 
allow for new references to objects within them just as 
if these objects had been previously mentioned, objects 
within a script may take 'the' without explicit 
introduction because the script itself has already 
implicitly introduced them. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977: 41) 
People acquire knowledge about their social environments. Gradually 
they extract those causally related events, roles, objects, pre-conditions, 
and consequences, that are common across a number of social events. These 
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common features are the propositions that fill the script-schema 'slot'. Receivers 
have large numbers of scripts for understanding social events that are 
encountered frequently. Consider the well-used example of the social 
event of eating in a restaurant. In addition, receivers have specialized 
tracks within general scripts. For example, there are the tracks of the 
French Restaurant, the Hamburger Stand and the Chinese Take Away within 
the more general $ RESTAURANT. Each track shares the majority of 
characterstics of the $ RESTAURANT as well as some distinguishing 
characteristics (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Figure 5-2. is a 
representation of the propositions that fill the 'slots' of the 
restaurant script-schema. A script title 1s denoted as $ RESTAURANT. 
-(See Figure S-2. p 73 and Appendix I). 











Entry fJonditions: S is hungry. 
S has money. 
Scene 1: Entering 
S PTRANS S into restuarant 
S ATTEND eyes to tables 
S MBUILD where to sit 
S PTRANS S to table 
S MOVE S to sitting position 
Scene 2: Or-dering 
(menu on table) (W brings menu) 
S PTRANS menu to S 
W PTRANS W to table 
W ATRANS menu to S 
S MTRANS food list to CP(S) 
*S MBUILD choice of F 
S MTRANS signal to w 
W PTRANS W to table 
S MTRANS 'I want F' to w 






Results: S has less money 
0 has more money 
S is not hungry 
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S is pleased (optional) · 
(S asks for menu) 
S MTRANS signal to W 
W PTRANS W to table 
S MTRANS 'need menu' toW 
W PTRANS W to menu 
W MTRANS (ATRANS F) to C 
C MTRANS 'no F' to W 
W PTRANS W to S 
W MTRANS 'no F' to S 
(go back to*) or (go to Scene 4 at no pay path) 
C DO (prepare F script) 
to Scene 3 
Fi.g\.n::e 5-2. $ RESTAURANT (continued) 
Scene 3: Eating 
W ATRANS F to W 
W ATRANS F to S 
S INGEST F 
(Optionally return to Scene 2 to order more; 
otherwise go to Scene 4) 
Scene 4: Exitting 
S MTRANS to W 
W MOVE (write check) 
W PTR,ANS W .to S 
W ATRANS check to S 
S ATRANS tip to W 
S PTRANS S to M 
S ATRANS money to M 
(W ATRANS check to S) 
(no pay p~th): S PTRANS S to out of restuarant 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977: 43/44) 
Black et at, (1979) have added that the characteristics of the props 
and roles are not static. Some are obligatory, some are bounded in range 
and some are optional. Consider for example the characteristics of the 
person who fulfills the scripted role of server. One obligatory 
characteristic is that the sewer be human. One characteristic that is 
bounded in range is that the server fall within the age limits of 15 to 
45 years. An optimal variable is that the server may or may not be 
wearing a unif'Orm. 
Each of the four scenes consists of a separate causal chain. However, 
these event sequences are joined to form the central causal chain 
connecting the events of the entire script. Each scene is dominated by 
L 
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a central mainaon. This is the primitive act that must be performed to 
achieve the .goal of each scene eg, the goal in the scene 2 is to order 
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food from the server. The maincon is the primitive act of the MTRANS of 
the choice of food by the customer to the server. When receivers identify 
these maincons in discourse, they predict that a scripted activity may be 
occurring. A maincon in discourse functions as a script header. Receivers 
then match subsequent linguistic cues to the scripted information signalled 
by the script header. Should any of these linguistic cues correspond with 
the scripted data, they will also function as script headers eg, a prop, 
role, entry-condition or result. The relevant script is then activated as 
the source of knowledge for understanding. When two or more script headers 
are present, receivers use the script with confidence ie, as a non-fZeeting 
script. When discourse contains only_ one script header receivers activate 
the script, but use it with little confidence. It is termed a fZeeting 
saript (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Receivers of discourse containing 
all of the maincons from the $ RESTAURANT, would be confident that the 
$ RESTAURANT would facilitate their understanding of the discourse (see 
Appendix I~ for the range of script headers). 
For example:. 
(i) The driver of a bakery van entered the restaurant; and 
(iia) he had come to deliver cakes. 
Cue (i) is the maincon for scene 1 of the $ RESTAURANT ie, the PTRANS 
of a potential customer into the restaurant. This cue would act as a 
script header. The $ RESTAURANT would be instantiated as a fleeting 
script, because cue (iia) does not match the other information in the 
$RESTAURANT. Were (iia) replaced with (iib)~He sat down and ordered a 
hamburger; the $ RESTAURANT would be activated as a non-fleeting script. 
(iib) matches the maincon of scene 2 of the $ RESTAURANT ie, the MTRANS 
of the customer's choice of food to the serv.er. 
Scripts are economically efficient, knowledge stores. It is well 
established empirically.that if information can be derived from existing 
knowledge, it will not be re-stored (Spiro and Esposito, 1977; Spiro et al, 
1981). The memory representation resulting from the use of a script is 
merely a pointer to the script. Scripted information 1s understood as a 
single, conceptual unit. Only information that is not predicted by the 
script is stored explicitly. This is unexpected or novel data (Schank 
and Abelson, 1977). This improves the speed of comprehension by reducing 
th1~ cognitive effort expended by receivers. 
5.3.2 Rationale 
Scripts characterize some of the information presented in testimonies. 
Testimonial information concerns everyday, social events, many of which 
are stereotypical in nature but have some novel content eg, a testimony 
concerned two accuseds taking a train ride. During this journey, they 
allegedly stole one of the passenger's watches. Receivers attempting to 
understand this sequence of events used the $ TRAIN RIDE. The memory 
representation included a pointer to the $ TRAIN RIDE, plus the novel 
information regarding the theft. In this study, scripts appea·r to be 
plausible and descriptive concepts. Additionally, the use of scripts 
in comprehension has been validated empirically, particularly when the 
task is evaluative in nature (Spiro, 1980). This investigation considered 
the task of evaluating the comprehensibility and credibility of testimony. 
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Hence it may be postulated, that in this study both the common users and 
the magistrates utilized scripted information in comprehending testimony. 
Of greater significance is the controversial finding, that receivers do 
not distinguish the information they infer from scripts, from the 
information that is explicated in discourse (Brewer, 1977; Graesser et al, 
1980). When magistrates/common users assess the credibility/comprehensibility 
of a testimony, it is their memory representations of the testimony that 
they rely upon. These representations include inferred information. 
Therefore, it is necessary to use the concept of scripts to predict the 
kinds of inferences that receivers may develop, in comprehending and 
assessing testimony. 
5.3.3 Criticisms 
The theory of scripts is incomplete (Black et al, 1979). There is little 
written,explaining how receivers generate new scripts, how scripts are 
used in combination, and how long an activated script continues to influence 
comprehension (Spiro, 1980). Den Uyl and Van Oostendorp (1980) question 
the assumption that scripts are used in the same way across situations. 
Task differences cause differences in the use of scripted information 
during comprehension (Freedle and Carroll, 1972). Schank and Abelson 
propose that inferences are made immediately following the activation of 
a script. These inferences are used to predict the nature and order of 
the information to follow (Schank and Abelson, 1977). There is an alternate 
explanation ie, that receivers delay their inferencing until a script is 
de-activated, to prevent an 'inferential overload'. Additionally, scripts 
may be used to predict the actual syntax of subsequent information rather 
than the mere order and kind of data (Den Uyl and Van Oostendorp, 1980). 
A more significant criticism. is ·tha.t the 4.trospective procedure used to 
detail the contents of scripts is inadequate. Introspection does not 
-78 
access tacit and}or unconscious information. For example, the introspective 
technique would not yield the scripted information of how far away the 
waiter is expected to stand when taking an order in a restuarant (Black 
et al, 1979). 
5.4 Intentional schema 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Scripts are proposed as the source of knowledge that receivers use to 
understand common-place events. Since receivers live in a dynamic, social 
environment,it is most improbable that every situation encountered is a 
stereotypical, scripted event. Thus, there is a need for rece1vers to 
possess sources of more general knowledge that enable them to comprehend 
novel or unexpected sets of events ie, activities which they may not have 
experienced frequently. This general knowledge consists of rules regarding the 
goals and plans that shape human behaviour. The behaviourist approach to 
human behaviour assumes that the people comprising a societ~ are influenced 
by the particular set of rewards and punishments that characterize that 
society, at any given point in time. People's behaviour exhibits common 
patterns, because it is directed to achieving the same set of rewards 
and to avoiding the same set of punishments (Skinner, 1938). Receivers 
attempting to understand behaviour.utilize knowledge of the plans that 
people construct tq .attain goals ie, to gain rewards and avoid punishments 
(Schank and. Abelsqn, 1977). Such knowledge allows receivers to infer 
causal c.o_nn_ections among otherwise unrelated objects, states and actions 
(Black and Bower, 1980). 
A pl.an explains how any givep. s.tate or event was 
prerequisite for, or de:dv.~tive from, another state 
or event. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977: 70) 
At the fourth and fifth levels of comprehension, receivers' first task 
is to recognize the goals of characters in a story. They then deduc~ which 
method, out of the many possible methods, characters pursued to achieve 
their goals. 
5.4.2 Plans and goals 
Receivers~knowledge of plans and goals has a schematic structure in memory 
ie, it is an intentional-schema. It includes general rules about plans 
(see Appendix V). Many taxonomies of goals have been developed, but few 
are comprehensive or systematic (Schank and Abelson, 1977). The taxonomy 
of Schank and Abelson (l977) is limited,but heuristically valuable. It 
LS necessary to include such a taxonomy in a theory of discourse 
comprehension, because goals are seldom explicated in discourse. Receivers 
must impute goals. The taxonomy includes five high-order goals ie, 
satisfaction, enjoyment, achievement, preservation and coping with crises. 
Each of these main goals has a high level plan to achieve the goal (see 
Appendix VI). Each is sub-divided into a set of lower order sub~goals 
of two kinds ie, instrumental goals or !-goals, and delta goals or D-goals. 
!-goals may be pursued without active planning. This is because the plans 
to achieve !-goals are fixed sequences of familiar activities. !-goals are 
attained by scr-ipted activities. Instead of constructing a specific plan 
to achieve an !-goal, a scripted activity may be used (Schank and Abelson, 
1977). For example, the !-goal of making food appetizing is a sub-goal of 
the main-goal, the satisfaction of hunger. This !-goal may be achieved by 
using stereotyped cooking activities. 
-79 
-80 
However, there are goals for which no sc.ripted activity exists as a 
plan to achieve the goals. These are.the five D-goals. First, the 
goal of changing one's state of proximity, or D-PROX. Second, the 
changing of the physical control of something or D-CONT. Third, the 
' 
acquisition of knowledge, or D-KNOW. Fourth, the gaining of social 
control over somethin& or D-SOCCONT. Fifth and finally, the goal which 
involves gaining another person's co-operation in order to pursue a 
goal, or D-AGENCY. A set of plan boxes is associated with each D-goal. 
The plan boxes are a set of actions to achieve the D-goals. All of the 
D-goaffishare the same seven plan boxes. The plan box that is most 
suitable for achieving any particular D-goal in a given situation, is 
chosen from this range. They are collectively termed the persuade-plan 
boxes (see Appendix VII). The ASK-plan box involves attaining a desired 
object or action by asking a person to give one the object or to perform 
the action. 'The INVOKE THEME-plan box involves making a person aware 
of some interpersonal relationship that will make them more likely to 
give one a desired object, or perform. a desired action. The INFORM 
REASON-plan box involves informing a person of the positive consequences 
that they will experience if they provide the desired object, or perform 
the desired action; and the negative consequences to the asker of it not 
being provided. The BARGAIN OBJECT-plan box involves the asker offering 
the askee some object in exchange for some act and/or object. The BARGAIN 
FAVOUR-plan box involves the asker offering some favour to the askee in 
exchange for a reeiprocal favour. The THREATEN-plan box involves the asker 
threatening the askee with some consequence that is negative for the askee. 
The OVERPOWER-plan box involves the asker taking the desired object or 
getting the askee to perform the desired behaviour, by the application of 
physical force to the askee. Should the first plan box fail to achieve 
the D-goal, planners tnove to the next one in the sequence. They are 
not expected to avoid using plan boxes (Schank and Abelson, 1977). A 
final set of rules is proposed ie, the expectancy rules (Hemphill, 1973; 
Schank and Abelson, 1977). These detail the actions that characters 
will perform to obtain goals when in particular emotional and/or 
physical states (see Appendix VIII). 
In conclusion D-goals, !-goals and expectancy rules facilitate 
predictions. Receivers consider the primitive acts, emotional and physical 
states ip giscourse, and infer the !-goals, D-goals, pre-conditions and 
plans that shape characters' behaviours. For example, receivers of a 
piece of discourse containing the primitive act of the MTRANS of 
information,would infer the D-goal of D-KNOW and the plan box of ASK. 
When an ASK plan box occurs in discourse, receivers. may infer that at 
least two pre-conditions were present ie, that persons (A) and (B) were 
in close proximity during the activity, and that person (B) knew the 
topic (X) that person (A) was asking about. 
5.4.3 Themes 
At the fifth and final level of comprehension, data structures called 
themes organize highly generalized knowledge. 
Themes, ••• contain the background information upon 
which we base our predictions that an individual will 
have a certain goal. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977: 132) 
Themes consist of groups of goals that any one individual may be more 
likely to pursue than another. This is due to some characteristic of the 
individual or their relationship to another individual. Themes are used 
to comprehend goals that are extremely implicit. There are. three kinds 
of themes, role themes, interpersonal themes and life themes. People's 
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behaviour is shaped by the societal, roles thq.t they assume eg, the roles 
of garbage collector, doctor and parent. Receivers possess knowledge 
regarding the kinds of behaviours and the goals associated with 
particular social roles. For example, a garbage collector is expected 
to pursue the D-goal of D-PROX garbage (see Appendix IX). 
Interpersonal relationships are characterized by sets of goals. For 
example, should there be an interpersonal theme between characters of a 
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love relationship; receivers would understand the characters' behaviour ~n the 
light of the goals that they expect lovers to have. Thus, if one of the 
characters in the relationship were to be threatened by another character, 
the receiver would predict that the character who was not threatened, 
would try to prevent the threatened-character from the threat. 
Finally, the third type of theme is the life theme. Life themes provide 
information about individuals' overall aims in life. People's life goals 
are expected to shape all of their behaviour to some extent. Take for 
example, a character who has the life theme of becoming rich. Discourse 
information regarding this character's attempts to build a good career, 
would be understood in the light of_ his/her higher, general life theme. Any 
single life tpeme may generate an almost infinite number of possible sub-goals 
and actions to attain such goals. In addition, the macro-level nature 
of life themes is illustrated by the 'fact' that any character may operate 
under a combination of life themes. Life themes include a range of 
personal qualities like loyalty and honesty; ambitions; life styles, like 
the hippie style and the luxury style; political attitudes; desires for 
social approval and for physical sensation. Only those receivers who have 
an in-depth knowledge of a sender, may use life themes to understand the 
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senders' behaviour accurately (Schank and Abelson, 1977). The receivers in 
this study could not be expected to have detailed knowledge of the characters 
in the testimonies that they comprehended. It was postulated, that they 
would not use life themes in understanding testimonies. 
5.5 Summary conclusion 
To conclude, macro-propositions are constructed from the explicit linguistic 
cues present in discourse, in combination with the implicit inferences 
generated from knowledge stored in the long term memory of receivers. The 
macro-structure that forms the overall framework into which the macro-
propositions are 'slotted', is that proposed by Schank and Abelson (1977). 
It is a hierarchy of state changes that begins at the highest level of 
generality and culminates in the highest level of specificity. The state 
changes characterize the various goals and sub-goals of the protagonist 
in a story. At the highest level of the macro-structure the state changes 
are understood by reference to thematic data. As one descends the levels 
of the macro-structure, the macro-propositions are formed by reference 
to intentional data structures, then scripta! data structures, and finally 
causal semantic data structures. The micro-propositions are constructed 
from knowledge of primitive actions. The particular level at which receivers 
understand a piece of discourse depends on their general knowledge {Schank 
and Lebowitz, 1980). The processing of discourse that begins at the 
highest level of generality ie, at the level of thematic plans and goals; 
is termed 'top-down' processing. This is possible when the highest level 
goals and plans are recognized by a receiver, at an early point in 
understanding discourse. The use of such data structures at an early 
point in processing shapes the entire memory representation that a 
receiver constructs, to comprehend the rest of a piece of discourse. In 
contrast, there is 'bottom-up' processing. This occurs when the plans 
and goals of discourse characters are difficult for a receiver to predict. 
Generally, this occurs in stories having unexpected deviations in the 
plans, obstacles to goal attainment and highly implicit or ambiguous 
goals and plans. Hence, receivers process discourse using lower levels 
of the macro-structure. 'Bottom-up' processing involves greater cognitive 
effort and an increased time for comprehension. In addition, the 
resultant memory representation may have a lower level of overall causal 
coherence (Black and Bower, 1980). Ultimately a quote captures the 
gist of this chapter: 
••• understandibility is a function of the place of a 
piece of information in context. A script is under-
standable as a particular realization of a plan. A 
plan is sensible only if it leads to some desired goal. 
And, a goal is understandable if it is a part of a 
large theme. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977: 132) 
6. THE DISCOURSE, CONCEPTUAL AND SITUATIONAL CONTEXTS 
The goodness of certain texts is determined by their 
fit with common sense experience and general knowledge 
of the world. 
(Spiro, 1980: 323) 
6.1. Introduction 
Readers have been introduced to the discourse and conceptual factors that 
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shape the meaning of testimony. This is the process of general comprehension. 
The meaning interpreted also depends upon the task to be performed by 
receivers following comprehension (Graesser et al, 1980). This is a 
situational factor. In this study, the situation is the courtroom and 
the task is the assessment of comprehensibility and credibility. The 
discussion is now turned to considering the process of comprehension that 
facilitates comprehensibility and credibility judgements. 
6.2. ~a~ of interpretation 
6. 2. l. Whose norms? 
Ideally, the ~eaning that receivers reconstruct from testimony is the 
meaning that was intended by the sender of the message. In 'real' speech 
situations. like the courtroom, the attainment of this ideal match between 
the intend.ed and interpreted meanings is not certain. Discrepancies 
arise because receivers understand the inferred meaning and .not merely 
the literal meaning of testimony (Bennett and Feldman, 1981). The 
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central premise here is that similarity between the intended and interpreted 
meanings is determined by the well-formedness of testimony. Incoherency 
and incomprehensibility result from poorly structured testimony (Bower, 
1976). In fact, the criterion distinguishing meaningful discourse from 
'nonsense', is coherency of structure. It is necessary to detail the 
characteristics of well-formedness. Few systematic rules are available 
.for assessing structural well-formedness (Kerelson, 1980). The criteria 
used in this study are the receivers' norms of well-formedness.ie, the 
rules constituting the schema used in discourse processing. 
An. ass~ption fundamental to schema theory is that the norms shaping the 
production of discourse by senders, are the same norms used by receivers 
to interpret the meaning of discourse ie, the norms of production and the 
norms of interpretation are identical. The actual validity of this 
assumption is controversial (Van Dijk, 1980). The actual validity is not 
relevant here. The postulate that receivers interpret discourse as if 
it has been constructed according to the ideal norms of production is of 
primary significance (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). In practice the norms of 
production and the norms of interpretation are inextricably interrelated. 
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A corollary to this assumption is that poorly structured discourse 
violates the norms of interpretation. S.uch violations impede receivers 
in developing coherent memory representations. Thus, receivers perceive 
discourse as violating the norms of production. A second corollary 1s 
postulated for the courtroom ie, that receivers perceive structural 
violations to be implausible ~e, volations act as cues to rece1vers 
that senders are deceptive. Thus, the degree to which testimony is ill-
formed (comprehe~ble) is inversely related to its perceived credibility 
(.Bennett and Feldman, 1981). It is the relative credibility of testimonies that 
determines the final verdict. Magistrates' perceptions of the structural 
well.,..formedness (comprehensibility) of testimonies shapes the outcomes 
of criminal trials. 
6.2.2. What norms? 
The field of the ethnography of speaking has contributed to our understanding 
of how variations in speech are produced by differences in the goals to 
be attained in particular situations (Hymes, 1971; Johnson, 1970). This 
approach embodies the notion of communicative performance ie, that language 
users modify the rules they use to produce and interpret language, to 
achieve the goals of particular speech situations. It is unfortunate 
that much of the research is not relevant to this investigation. The 
cognitive rules receivers apply to the specific task of assessing credibility, 
have not been examined. However, Grice (1975) has formulated four general 
rules. These have been modified to analyse communication in the courtroom. 
They are social norms governing the content of messages. A social norm 
is a stable, shared conception of the behaviour appropriate to a given 
context. The norms dictate the behaviour people expect of themselves and 
others. Norms are imperative for maintaining 'cognitive control' over 
the e~~i+o~ent because they organize experiences of reality (Giles et al, 
1979). Caxwersation is a quasi~coJ;ltractual. matter (Danet, 1980). 
Langua.ge produc.ers must ad'here to the norms to communicate effectively 
(Grice, 1975). Should they violate the norms, receivers experience 
difficulties understanding conversation. The general norms are: 
QUantity: witnesses should construct testimony that includes 
only those linguistic cues necessary for re-ceivers 
Manner: 
to derive a single, coherent interpretation of 
meaning. When there is insufficient information, the 
meaning interpreted is incomplete. When there is 
superfluous information, the meaning interpreted 
becomes overly complex. 
the linguistic cues constituting testimony should 
enable receivers to derive a single, wholistic 
meanLng that is unambiguous. There should be 
consistency in the meaning cued by a message. 
Relation: witnesses should provide a set of linguistic cues 
that are clearly and unambiguously related to a 
central theme ie, the point to be made by a 
testimony. Information that is not related to 
the central gist of the message should not be 
included. It is irrelevant and thus inconsistent. 
(lua.Zity: witnesses should 'tell the truth'. Receivers 
should be able to believe witnesses ie, witnesses 
should refrain from purposefully distorting the 
information transmitted. 
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It l..S proposed -that magistrates evaluate the well-formedness (comprehensibility) 
of testimony whilst comprehending, by using the first three criteria ie, quantity, 
~ss 
manner ~d relation. This evaluatiop. enables their assessment of the 
fourth criterion of credibility:. 
Figure 6-1. Process Proposed 
Poorly Many encoding Comprehended Perceived as 
structured problems with r less 
testimony difficulty credible 
6.3. Norm violation 
The question foremost is why and how structural 'defects' cause 
incomprehensibility? In comprehending each case, receivers form 
CQherent me~o:ry representations of the meaning eonveyed by testimonies. 
The develo:pl;!l,.ent of cqherent representations requires receivers to 
connect the ~ny propositiops into giant, causal chains. The schema 
used to understand testimonies predict the most likely causal 
connectiot;ts among propositions. Structural 'defects' are those parts 
of testimonies that conform imperfectly with the schematic predictions. 
Structu:ral ambiguities are 'liol.ati.ons of the norms of completeness and 
consistency. Violations of completeness occur when testimony fails to 
pr-ovide suffieierz.t informati.on for the development of a single causal chain. 
This is Grice~s first norm of quantity (Grice, 1975). Receivers use 
activated schemas.to assess when discourse is incomplete. Schemas 
dictate the quantity and quality of the missing information that 
prevents th.e formation of a coherent, causally-connected memory 
represeptation (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Receivers do not tolerate 
ip.c..om.pletness in comprehension. They use the activated schema to 
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generate the missing in.form.a.tion. When completeness violations are ... 
left 'unrepaired' ie, when receivers do n,ot insert bridging inferences, 
the information becomes inconsistent. Incompleteness causes inconsistency. 
Grice's second and third norms are consistency crheria ie, manner and 
r·elatioR (G-ri.ce, 1.975), There are two kinds of consistency violations: 
First, there are violations occurring when propositions explicated at one 
point in testimony contradict with those delivered at another point. The 
two sets of information are mutually exclusive. Second, there are conflicts 
between the information explicated in testimony and the information inferred 
from schema used in processing. The latter type are termed reconciliation 
errors (Spiro, 1980). The three types of violations have the same final 
effect on process1ng ie, they inhibit the development of a single causal 
chain connecting the propositions comprising testimony. The schema used 
at any point in processing are differentiated according to their level in 
the hierat'chical memory representation. The first level is the micro-
schema of primitive action concepts; the second, is the causal chain 
macro-schema level; the third is the scripta! macro-schema level; the 
fourth is the intentional macro-schema level; and the last, is the thematic 
macro-schema level. Violations may disrupt the formation of receivers' 
memory representation at any of these schematic levels. 
The higher the level of the violation, the more serious 1s the disruption 
of comprehension (Black and Bower, 1980). High level schematic violations 
ie, themes and goals/plans, inhibit the formation of the critical causal 
chain that connects the lowest level, successful state change to the highest 
level, desired state change (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
Consider the following three segments: 
(i) Joe asked Irving if he knew where Joe could get some honey; 
(ii) Irving said that he did not know; 
(iii) Joe ate the ho~ey. 
Receivers activate the intentional schema that subsumes segment (i) ~e, 
the plan box ASK that is connected to the goals of 
D-CONT and D-PROX .. Receivers predict that the failure of the plan box 
ASK in segment (ii) will cause the substitution of another plan to achieve 
the D-CONT goal 1n segment (iii). However, no alternate plan is 
explicated. This is a violation of completeness. It causes an 
inconsistency between segments (ii) and (iii), because the pre-conditions 
for the success of D-CONT in segment (iii) have not been provided ie, 
the pre-condition of Joe finding an alternate source of honey. To 
'repair' this violation receivers would infer that Joe did find such a 
source. 
Testimony that violates the norms of c.onsistency and completeness increases 
the use of reparitive inferencing. Inferencing requires receivers to 
expend cognitive effort. This increases the time taken to comprehend 
(Kintsch et a.Z, 1977). The result is that receivers assign fewer 
processing resources to the storage of detailed information. At recall, 
receivers do not distinguish between information that was explicated ~n 
testimony and that which was inferred by the receivers themselves 
(Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Pratt et aZ, 1982). The meaning interpreted 
differs greatly from the meaning intended: 
A'listener may misunderstand what a speaker means 
because the message failed to identify uniquely 
whatever the speaker had in mind. 
(Robinson and Robinson, 1982: 268) 
In addition, as the number of inferences increase their predictive 
accuracy decreases (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Recievers are more likely 
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to make reconciliation errors (Spiro, 1980). The consequence is that the '' ;:-r '"· 
intended differs from the meaning interpreted. This ~s 
because poorly structured testimony does not cue the schema information 
intended by witnesses, in an unambiguous fashion. Therefore, it is the 
cognitive strategies of receivers that determine the meaning interpreted. 
Bennett and Feldman (1981) have termed this structural ambiguity. They 
fqund tha.t structurally ambiguous testimonies are perceived as 
implausible (Bennett and. Feldman, 1981). In contrast, well-formed 
(comprehensible) testimonies are understood with ease. This enhances 
persuasive efficacy (Eagly and Warren, 1976). 
6. 4. C.red,ibil ity 
The question remains as to why structural violations lower the credibility 
of testimony? Violations of schematic expectations are atypical or novel 
occurrences. Von Restorf's effect states that atypical occurrences are 
well encoded and recalled (Spiro and Sherif, 1975). This effect has been 
well demonstrated in the recall of stories (Black et al, 1979; Graesser 
eta~, 1979; Schank, 1975; Thorndvke and Yekovich, 1979). Testimony has 
a narrative structure. A magistrate's task is to assess the credibility 
of testimony. Thus, it is logical that magistrates encode structural 
violations as atypical phenomena and that they perceive these as cues 
that signal deception on the part of witnesses: 
This suggests a listenerS maiim in situations such as 
adjudications that require empirical judgements to be 
made about accounts: Descriptions are taken literally. 
Terms that would have to be changed in order to produce 
a sensible version of an incident are regarded as 
problematic. They become possible indicators of 'made 
up' versions of reality. 
(Bennett and Feldman, 1981: 12) 
This should not imply that witnesses have to produce perfectly-formed 
testimony to achieve credibility. Well-formedness is continuous rather 
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than. categorical. Recei'.(ers d.a to~.erate some degree of ill-formedness in 
testimony before perceiving it to be incredible. However, the exact 
'quantity' has yet to be measured. 
6.5. Questioning 
In chapter two it was emphasized that questioning shapes the structure 
of testimony significantly. The prosecutor and magistrate are the receivers 
1n a criminal trial. They monitor their levels of comprehension continually 
(Freedle and Carroll, 1972). When a violation occurs, these receivers 
attempt to clarify the problem.. Clarification, is sought by 
questi.oning witnesses. Should witnesses provide causal explanations in 
response to questioning, violations are clarified (Danet, 1980). If 
witnesses fail to provide causal explanations after recursive questioning, 
These violations are 'tagged' in receivers' 
memories as indicators of deception. It is important to note that: 
Explanations cannot be divorced from the context in which 
they occur, the listener's perspective is all important 
in terms of initiating questioning, seeking an answer and 
feeling satisfied with an explanation. 
(Kidd and Amabile, 1981: 313) 
The prosecutor's function is to lower the credibility of witnesses for 
the defence. pe}she questions defence witnesses to achieve this aim, 
because recursive questioning emphasizes the prosecutor's dissatisfaction 
with witnesses clarifications. This process causes violations to remain 
as deception cues. At worst, the persistent use of questioning may create 
violations when witnesses become over anx1ous (Bennett and Feldman, 
1981). Therefore, accused may occupy a disadvantaged role relative to 
complainants, in undefended cases. This hypothesis was tested in this 
study. 
7. ETHNICITY AND CREDIBILITY 
Obviously judicial decisions are not made uniformly. 
Decisions are made according to a host of extra-
legal factors, including the age of the offender, 
his/her race and social class. Perhaps the most 
obvious example of judicial discretion occurs in the 
handling of cases of minority groups. Negroes, in 
comparison to whites, are convicted with lesser 
evidence and sentenced to more severe punishments. 
(Quinney, 1977: 42) 
7.1. Introduction 
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Several aims of this study are interdependent. The first is to investigate 
whether comprehensible testimonies are perceived as being more credible than 
incomprehensible. The second aim. is contigent on this finding ie, to assess 
whether receivers of a majority group status are more likely to perce1ve 
testimonies as incomprehensible when witnesses are of a minority group status. 
The deduction could then be made that minority-status witnesses are 
disadvantaged, because they run a higher risk of being judged incredible. 
This would mean that minority-status complainants are more likely to 
'loose' cases and accused are more likely to be convicted. The grave 
claim would then be that the administration of justice is not impartial 
ie, that discriminatory practices exist in the application of law to 
different ethnic groups. 
It is not known whether minority-status persons commit more offences than 
majority-status persons. Minority-status persons are over represented 1n 
the official, crime statistics of most countries. This is rejected as a 
'statistical mirage' resulting from the underreporting.of majority group 
offences (McNeely and Pope, 1981). One contemporary trend is to assume 
that all groups are equally likely to break the law (Chambliss and Siedman, 
1971) but that sanctions are more likely to be imposed on people 
occupying lower social positions. Sanctions are imposed from arrest 
through to the pass1.ng of sentence. In addition, those in lower 
social positions experience more severe sanctions when these are 
imposed (Hagan, 1974). 
7.2. Disparities in sentencing 
The study of discriminatory practices 1.n the legal system has been 
dominated. by investigations of disparities in the sentencing of 
accused from. different ethnic and socio-economic groups. Hagan 
(1974) conducted a comprehensive review of 20 of the most frequently 
cited·, North American studies. He maintained that~ 
For the moment, we can only conclude that this version 
of the 'racial hypothesis' remains open to some doubt. 
(Hagan, 1974: 368) 
The research has been criticized for a number of fundamental short-
comings, making this disappointing conclusion necessary: Research has 
utilized unrepresentative samples. There has been an over inclusion 
of capi.tal offences tried before juries, in the Southern states of 
America. The result has been the neglect of non-capital offences, 
tried before judges and magistrates, in racially 'more neutral' regions. 
The majority of the work is methodologically unsound. Few studies have 
taken account of the confounding effects of prior convictions and types 
of of'fences. A large percentage of sentencing disparity 'disappears' 
when these effects are controlled (Hogarth, 1971; Hagan, 1974). However, 
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more recent work that is methodologically sound, demonstrates discrimination 
in sentencing practices (Liz.otte, 1978). 
A survey of South African studies emphasized the paucity of research at 
all points iJ:l the crimina.l, justice s:ysteJ:!,l.. South African research into 
sentencing disparities demonstrates similar shortcomings to those. that 
have been problematic in North American work. The South African field 
has been dominated by studies of the higher courts ie, the Supreme 
Courts and capital offences (Olmesaahl and Steytler, 1983). One 
particularly significant finding is that minority-status witnesses are 
most disadvantaged in inter-racial cases. In fact, when the offence is 
intra-racial, •black' accused may receive more lenient sentences than 
'white' accused (Rhadamanthus, 1970). The explanation is that 'white' 
decision-makers accept 'black criminality' as being 'expected of a lower 
class', as long as 'they keep it among themselves' (Lizotte, 1978). 
The al-J:!lOSt exclusive focus on disparities in sentencing has had the 
negative effect of removing attention from the actual outcomes of tri.ils. 
The outcome i.s of primary relevance to the subsequent lives of accused. 
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The pressing issue of whether and how certain processes operate to the 
systematic oisadvantage of certain social groups, by affecting verdicts,remains 
a controversy unelucidated by empirical findings (Bennett and Feldman, 1981). 
This study was designed to ov:ercotne the shortcomings of previous research. 
The focus is on verdicts delivered in non-capital cases, heard by magistrates 
in the Cape Town Regional Magistrates' courts. 
7.3. Ethnicity and socio-economic status 
Ethnic 'labels' may be assigned to people who perceive themselves, and who 
are treated by the wider society as belonging to a particular ethnic group 
(Hagan and Albonetti, 1982). Traditionally, people have been classified 
as belonging to a particular social class 1n a graded hierarchy of socio-
economic status. The criteria used have been fathers' occupation and 
educational standards, subjects' occupations and educational standards, 
speech markers, are~s o! reside~ce aRd so on (Riggi:ps, 1976). The 
alternative is the Neo-Marxi.an, relational criteria of the subjects' 
relations to the means of produc~ion, to the ownership of the means of 
production and to labour power (Hagan and Albonetti, 1982). This 
latter approach assumes that social classes are not internally homogenous 
nor clearly separable. 
The historical trend is one of ineptitude in understanding the relationship 
between ethnicity and socio-economic status (McNeely and Pope, 1981). It 
is unfortunate that this study falls prey to this criticism. The 
insurmountable obstacle preventing the classification of witnesses into 
social classes, was the lack of information available. Court records 
were the soLe data source. These did not contain consistent indicators 
facilitating a traditional or Neo-Marxi.an social class categorization. 
No difficulty was experienced in assigning ethnic group 'labels' to 
witnesses. South African citizens are classified officially as members 
of one of f'Qur race groups ie, 'white', 'coloured', 'indian' and 'black'. 
The term. eth:pic group has been s.ubstituted for race group. The former 
empha.siz.es the socio-cultural instead of· the biological differences 
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between groups. Court records emphasiz.e the official ethnic classifications 
of witnesses. Additionally, there is no doubt that witnesses perceive 
themselves and are treated by others, as members of their officially 
classifi.ed ethnic groups. Socio-political and geographic divisions 
have been created among ethn.ic groups. These have promoted distinguishable, 
informal relations between ntembers of different ethnic groups. 
The following assumption was necessary, although not ideal: 'White' 
South Africans are socially, politically a:nd economically more advantaged 
than 'nan-white' South Africans. 'Whites' were classified as members of 
a higher socio..-.economic class than 'nop_-whites', lien.ce, 'white' 
witnesses were assumed to be of a relatively higher socio..-.economic 
status than 'coloured' witnesses. 
7.4. Rationale South Africa 
7. 4 .1. Soci.etal leve 1 
The relevant question is why disparities in verdicts are expected in 
the South African legal context? Research has demonstrated ethnic 
discrimination in sentencing ~n countries, regions and periods in 
which inter-ethric hostility has been significant eg, ~n the Southern 
States of America during the fifties. South Africa as a whole, has 
an inte:rnationally recognised history of interracial conflict at the 
social, poli.tical and economi.c levels. In particular, 1983 and 1984 
have been yea:rs itt which interracial conflict has reached significant 
proportions. Noteworthy events mark these years eg, the boycotts of 
educational institutions by 'non-whites' in efforts to demonstrate 
their rejection of inferior standards of education; and the election 
of 'coloureds' and 'indians' to a tripartite parliament which initiated 
demonstrations to oppose the exclusion of 'blacks' from this share in 
the political power in South Africa. A comprehensive list of events 
would constitute a substantial book. Suffice it to say that since 
this study was conducted during a· period of inter-ethnic 'unrest', it 
was expected to illustrate ethnic discrimination. Additionally, 
academic authors continue to emphasize the prejudiced, ethnocentric 
attitudes and behaviours of 'white' toward 'non-white' South Africans 
(Foster, 1984). Thus, it is postulated that 'coloured' witnesses may be 
disadvantaged in South African trials conducted by 'white' authority 
figures. 
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7.4.2. Trial. level 
Although of·fi_cial crime stati.stics should be regarded with the necessary 
degree of scepticism, these are useful indicators of possible sources 
of disadvantaging (Van Zyl Smi_t, 1983). During the official statistical 
year from June 1981 to June 1982, 75~37% of those convicted in South 
AfrLcan courts w:er-e front the lowest educational strata (Official Statistics 
of OHe~ces, 1981/82). Since educational standard is an indicator of 
social class, this suggests that South Africans of low socio-economic 
status ~•Y be disadvantaged in the legal system (Higgins, 1976). ·since 
statistics are not available, it is not possible to calculate the 
proportions of lowly educated, convicted accused 1n each ethnic group. 
lfowever, s1nce the majority of 'non-white' South Africans are 'poorly 
educated'rel.ative to 'white' South Africans, one may deduce that the 
majority of the poorly educate&, convicted accused are 'non-white'. 
Disadvantaging may also result from the lack of legal representation 1n 
1non-wh.ite' cases. In general, 1non-·.ffiites 1 are economically less 
advantaged than 'whites'. This explains the lower use of legal 
representation by 'non-whites'. Although legal aid is offered by the 
State, the psychological obstacles of fear, hopelessness and a lack 
of information, often prevent the use of these resources by minority 
group members (Zemans, 1979). A study of South African accused showed 
that 83% of undefended accused had very little knowledge of court 
proceedings, 66% were unaware of State legal aid, and 63% did not believe 
that they would improve their lot in court by using State legal aid: 
There can be no doubt that the unrepresented defendant 
often suffers from severe disadvantages. He is scared, 
inarticulate, unfamiliar with the procedure and commonly 
unable to understand what is going on. 
(Samuel, 1971: 15) 
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A survey of the Cape Town Regional Magistrates' court records showed 
that only 21% of 'coloured' accused were represented. In contrast, 58% 
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of 'white' accused were represented. This is a ratio of 1 : 2.76 (Slabbert, 
1981). More significantly, it was found that undefended accused run a 
higher risk of being convicted than defended accused (Slabbert, 1981), 
North American research provides similar findings (Lizotte, 1978). 
Therefore, 'coloured' undefended accused are relatively disadvantaged 1n 
criminal trials. To conclude, persons of minority group status appear 
to be disadvantaged in accusitorial South African trials. This may not 
be the case in inquisitorial proceedings where witnesses present their 
testimony in an open narrative style with little 'prompting' by prosecutors 
or magistrates (Danet, 1980). 
7.4.3. Language performance level 
The South African political structure has been criticized as undemocratic. 
It is said to promote the distribution of political, economic and social 
power according to ethnic membership per se. This criticism has increased 
significantly over the past decade. It has been the dynamo of many 
liberal changes. Hence, should ethnic disadvantaging occur in the legal 
system it may be of a less visible and more subtle kind than overt, 
'racial prejudice' (Peterson and Friday, 1975). The subtle form of 
disadvantaging proposed in this study is that produced by perceived 
differences in language performance. The efficacy of performance was 
measured by the comprehensibility of testimony. The legal ideal that 
the content dominates the form of testimony, is challenged (Roch, 1977). 
'Coloured' witnesses are expected to deliver testimonies that are 
perceived to be less comprehensible to 'white' receivers, than the 
testimonies of 'white' witnesses. There are two complementary explanations 
for this hypothesis: 
First explanation 
•.. trials often bring in contact defendants and jurors who 
live in substantially different worlds. This not only will 
affect the degree to which defendants and jurors share a 
common language, norms and inferences about the world, but 
also may affect the ways in which they structure and evaluate 
stories about social actions. Differences in norms and 
understandings among different social groups can make it 
diff'icult to understand the meaning of actions, and can cause 
juries to draw incorrect inferences. When this happens, judges 
and jurors will reject correct interpretations because of a 
few d.eviant story. elements that wi11 be seen as irrelevant or, 
worse yet, as evidence of fabrication. 
(Loftus and Greene, 1983: 324) 
Ethnic groups do not differ in their ability to perceive and recall events 
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aac:urate~y. Instead, they perceive, remember and interpret events differently 
Allport and. Postman, 1965; Secord et al, 1956). People use schema to 
organize their general knowledge. The schema are used to produce 
and interpret the meaning of language. People from different ethnic groups 
have different social experiences and hence different general·knowledge. 
In addition, any one ethnic group shares a consensus regarding the 'best 
way' to communicate. The norms of production and interpretation differ 
across groups (Mandler and Johnson, 1977). Therefore, the meaning intended 
by the sender of a message from one ethnic group, is expected to differ 
from the meaning interpreted by a receiver from another etlm.ic group 
(Newcomb, 1953; Thayer, 1967; Triandis, 1960 ). 
Some communication always takes place when two persons 
interact, but the effectiveness of their communication 
is greater when they share common norms. 
(Triandis, 1960 181) 
It is proposed that 'white' receivers possess a different general knowledge 
of social events and different norms of interpretation from those of 
'coloured' witnesses. 'White~ receivers are expected to perce1ve more 
norm violatiap,s in understanding 'coloureds'' testimonies, than· 'white' 
testimonies. Thus, 'coloureds'' testimonies may be perceived as less well-
formed and less comprehensible than 'whites'' testimonies. Norm 
violations cause reparitive inferencing from general knowledge. This may 
cause. 'white' receivers to interpret a different meaning from that 
intended by 'coloured' witnesses. Receivers do not believe poorly 
structured testimony. Therefore, 'white' receivers are less likely to 
believe 'coloured' testimonies. 'Coloured' witnesses are disadvantaged 
in this way, particularly in'.interracial cases. When a 'coloured' 
ac.cused:' s testimony is disbelieved by a 'white' magistrate and a 'white' 
complainant's testimony· is believed, a conviction results. Alternatively, 
when a 'coloured' complainant's testimony is disbelieved and a 'white' 
accused's testimony is believed, the complainant 'looses' the case. 
This is a highly co~ert process of disadvantaging. 
It must be emphasiz.ed that it is socio-culturaUy learned differences in 
cognitive processing that cause ethnic differences in language performance. 
~o one ethnic group is Z.ess competent linguistically than another at 
applying universally accepted norms of production and interpretation. 
Communication has been improved between two ethnic groups by training 
either group in the communication norms of the other group (Thayer, 1967). 
Second explanation 
This account derives from attribution theory. People are hypothesis 
testers (Dewey, 1933; Kelly, 1955; Mead, 1938). They formulate 
hypotheses about their social world and then gather information to test 
them. However, information is not collected in a random fashion. 
People procure data that confirms their hypotheses. This preferential 
gathering strategy results in people creating the accuracy of their own 
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predictiqn.s (Snyd:er aQ.d. G~.ngeatfi.cl., ~.98U. This rea.lit:y cq~_struc.ting 
consequence of hypqth_esis tes.ti~s, is tnost operative 1.n situ~_tions 
where the hypothesis tester's. behaviour tni3-Y provoke responses in the 
subject of the hypotheses. f:iypothesi.s testers may then behave in 
ways th,at cause people to confirm their hypotheses. 
Prosecutors a.nd. magistrates belong to the 'white', higher socio-economic 
class in. South Africa. They are the hypothesis testers in the courtroom. 
They may· possess negative attitud.es toward witnesses from the 'coloured', 
lower socio-economic group. It is the prosecutor.'s function to prove 
the guilt of the ac.cused. To dO this he/she utilizes questioning during 
cross examination. Thus, the most likely hypothesis formulated by a 
prosecutor is that an accused.. is guilty and that the defence testimonies 
are an attempt to deceive the c.ourt. Should a prosecutor hold 
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ethnically prejudiced attitudes toward~ defence witnesses, this hypothesis 
would be strengthened. To confirm the hypothesis a prosecutor may utilize 
skillful questioning to create schematic violations in the testimonies of 
'coloured' d.efence witnesses. Th.is would decrease a magistrate's 
perceptions of their wel.l-::-fon!ledness, comprehensibility and credibility. 
In an undefended case the prosecutor and the untrained accused question the 
prosecution witnesses. The prosecutor's hypothesis would be that the 
prosecution witnesses are 'truthful'. Their testimonies would not 'suffer' 
the debilitating effects of the prosecutor's questioning. The testimonies 
of the prosecution witnesses would remain well-formed relative to the poorly 
structured defence testimonies. The prosecutor's hypothesis would become a 
self-fulling prophecy! The magistrate would not believe the poorly structured 
case for the defence, but would believe the relatively well-formed case 
for the prosecution. A 'white' prosecutor would not hold ethnically prejudiced 
attitud,es toward ~white' prosecution witnesses. Therefore, when there 
is a 'white~ complainant and a 'coloured' accused the relati-ve 
disadvantage of the accused is increased. The probability of a conviction 
rises. This proposal challenges the administration of justice 1n 
ut;ld.efendec;l cases, in accusitorial proceedings. 
What is ~ost regrettable is that many people - partly 
from exaggeration of a few facts, partly from a readiness 
to believe - strongly associate the two factors of colour 
and crime. In so doing, they not only make more difficult 
the plight of the Negro offender, they also begin to see 
colour as sufficient reason for suspecting crime. The 
effects of this mental association go far beyond a seize-
and-search police policy. 
(Wolfgang and Cohen, 1970: 3) 
8. METHOD 
8.1. Pilot phase 
8.1.1. Rationale 
This research is novel. It is necessarily exploratory in nature. A 
review of the field showed little work done in the South African context. 
A pilot study was deemed essential to assess the validity of applying 
overseas findings to the South African criminal justice system. This 
study enabled the isolation and definition of the specific criteria 
'ordinary' receivers use when making credibility judgements. These were 
to be investigated further Juring the experimental phase. 
The general aim was to 'analyse' testimonial discourse in a rigorous, 
empirical manner. Verbatim transcripts were chosen instead of the 
participant observation of proceedings, because transcripts facilitate 
more detailed and replicable analyses. Inter-rater reliability levels 
are expected to be higher (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978). Additionally, when 
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the concern. is one of sem._an.ti.c.s, parti.cipant obsen:ers frequently fail 
to note important aspects of testimonies, because the relevance of these 
aspects only becomes apparent long after they have occurred (Atkinson and 
Drew, 1979). Since the aim of the study was to investigate the structural 
aspects of testimony that influence its comprehensibility, transcripts 
were applicable. Confounding variables such as para-linguistic features, 
.body language factors and other observable, witness characteristics, were 
eliminated. To conclude, the use of data from a 'real' speech situation 
~nan experimental context is advantageous. The data is 'natural'. It 
is not 'artificial' as is the case in most simulation type studies. In 
addition, it is manipulated rigorously in an experimental situation. This 
enables the.control of many confounding variables. The study becomes both 
anatural e~eriment and a laboratory experiment (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978). 
There are two disadvantages: First, the data constraints may be greater, 
because information required to match subjects may not be available eg, 
in this study indicators of socio-economic status were not available. 
Second, th.e external validity of the findings is lower than that of results 
from natural experiments. 
Four premises of interac.tionism shaped the topic, a~s and procedures used 
(seep 17). Deriving from the interactionist approach is the ethnomethodo-
logical perspective. A major procedural counterpart of ethnomethodology 
is the common users' analysis (Garfinkel, 1967). This form of analysis 
was adopted in~the pilot study. It stands in opposition to the pivotal 
soci~logical assumption that social scientific explanations of phenomena 
are by definition superior, 'more true' accounts, than are common sense 
accounts (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). The rejection of this claim implies 
that ordinary, practical methods of human reasoning need not be replaced 
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with social. s.cientific inter.p~tations. It t:ollows that common users 
and receivers of ordinary language are the primary sources of information 
regarding linguistic interactions. In this research, language users from 
a non~legal context were chosen to provide information regarding the criteria 
used in jud.ging the credibility of testimony. It is accepted that such 
persons do r;.ot assess credibility in exactly the same manner as magistrates 
do. However, an analysis of normative credibility criteria must necessarily 
preceed any direct investigation of magisterial decision-making. This 
facilitates the clear separation of the legal criteria from the everyday, 
socio-cognitive factors that affect credibility judgements. 
8.1.2. Procedure 
Three, fully bilingual, 'white', middle-class university students participated 
in the pilot phase. Bilingualism was a prerequisite because the transcripts 
were either in. English or Afrikaans. It was deemed preferable to use as 
little transl.;1tion as possible to avoid distortions of the original semantic 
structure and. thus the comprehensibility. Since none of the three had 
legal training of any kind or training in linguistic analysis, they were 
co~on users. The common users were of a similar socio-economic class 
and of the same ethnicity as the magistrates who had heard the cases. 
Since both groups shared social group characteristics, it was assumed that 
they would use similar normative criteria when juding credibility (Mandler 
and Johnson., 1977). (See Appendix X.) 
Four complete court cases were chosen from the records section of the Cape 
Town Regional Magistrates' courts. The cases comprised 16 testimonies: four 
delivered by complainants, four by accused, four by prosecution witnesses, 




j udg·ed the c.omp la.inant s' and. p:ros.ecut io~ witnesses' testimonies to be 
credible;: and: in the other two cases the judgement was incredible ie, 
the accused were convicted. In two of the cases the magistrate had 
judged the accuseds' and defence witnesses' testimonies to be credible 
aDd in the other two cases the judgement was incredible ie, the accused 
we~e acquitted (see Table 8-1. below). The two conviction and the two 
acquittal cases were chosen at random. The common users 'analysed' the 
cases in a random order 1e, a conviction, an acquittal, another acquittal 
and then a conviction. 
Table 8-1. Pilot Phase Sample 
Court Role 
Totals 
Magistrate's Complainant Prosecution Accused Defence 
judgements witness witness 
"Credible 2 2 2 2 8 
Inc.redible 2 2 2 2 8 
Totals 4 4 4 4 16 
8.1.3. Conclusions 
After the four cases had been 'analysed', a meeting was held to discuss 
the findings and to draw out the conclusions of the pilot phase. Due to 
the small sample siz.e no statistical tests were conducted. The conclusions 
were as follows: 
(i) The common users maintained that one factor affected their 
credibility judgements ie, the incidence of problems that 
they experienced in comprehending the testimonies. These 
comprehension problems occurred when they attempted to 
integrate the many 'pieces' of information presented, into 
an overall understanding of each of the testimonies. Rephrased, 
testimonies that were perceived to be more difficult to 
comprehend, due to a higher incidence of comprehension problems, 
were also evaluated as a relatively less credible ie, low 
comprehensibility lowered common users' credibility ratings. 
The common users reported these 'in'comprehensibilities' to 
be cues of deception. Hence, the central dependent variable 
chosen for the experimental phase was the incidence of 
comprehension problems perceived by common users ie, a 
measure of comprehensibility. 
(ii) To illustrate incomprehensible sections of testimonies, the 
common users cited very specific sets of information elements 
as well as relationships among these elements. To develop an 
operational measure of comprehensibility for the experimental 
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phase, each element of information in testimonies had to be a 
standardized unit. Thus, lists of story elements were constructed.-
These story elements were formed by dividing each sentence in 
original testimonies into standardized units (see Appendices Xla and 
b). Propositions were the units chosen, because they are units of 
both language and thought. A proposition consists of a subject 
phrase and a predicate phrase (Atkinson, Atkinson and Hilgard, 
1983). For example consider the sentence: Susan likes motor 
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cycles. • Susan' is the subject phrase and 1 likes m.otor 
cycles• is the predicate phrase. Numbering was used to 
indicate the original ord.er in which the elements had been 
presented in testimonies. 
(iii) The common users labelled each set of incomprehensible 
story elements, an encoding problem. They had provided a 
reason for finding each set of story elements incomprehensible. 
The common users grouped the reasons that were similar. Nine 
groups resulted. The common users identified the characteristics 
distinguishing each of the nine groups. The researcher used 
these characteristics to form definitions (see pp 162). 
Ten types of encoding problems were derived: 
1. Irrelevant information. 
2. Delayed information. 
3. Empirical contradictions. 
4. Expectation conflicts. 
5. Ambiguous wording. 
6. Inadequate justifications. 
7. Justifications missing. 
8. Direct contradictions. 
9. Other problems. 
10. Nan categorized problems. 
Each encoding problem could consist of any number of 
incomprehensible story elements. A sophisticated weighting 
system would have to have been developed in order to use the 
number of encoding problems as an. operational measure of 
comprehensibility. Therefore, the more standardized 
incomprehensible story elements were chosen for the 
operationalized measurement of comprehe-p.sibility. 
An analysis of the common users' reasons for experiencing 
incomprehensibility showed that encoding problems ie, sets of 
incomprehensible story elements, were 'caused' by structural 
'defects' in sections of testimonies. The structural 'defects' 
were violations of the structural norms prescribed by macro-
schema in memory ie, schematic violations. Therefore, the 
encoding problems were indicaters of the iZZ-formedness of 
testimonies. Each of the first eight types of problems was 
a different kind of schematic violation (see pp 162). The 
last two types were res.idual categories. Research has shown 
that the higher the level of a schematic violation the greater 
is the incomprehensibility it produces (Black, 1978) - (see 
pp 89) 0 The first four types ie, irrelevant information, 
delayed information, empirical contradictions and expectation 
conflicts; were classified as violations of the highest two 
levels of the macro-schema proposed by Schank and Abelson (1977). 
The second four types ie, ambiguous wording, inadequate 
justifications, justifications missing and direct contradictions; 
were classified as violations of the lowest two levels of the 
macro-schema. Therefor.e, it was proposed that incomprehensible 
testimonies would contain higher proportions of the former high 
level encoding problems; and comprehensible testimonies would 
contain lower proportions. The corollary is that comprehensible 
testimonies would contain higher proportions of the latter low 
level encoding problems than incomprehensible testimonies. An 
operationalized measure of the proportions of each of these two 
levels of problems in testimonies had to be developed. Frequencies 
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c:ould. not be used because ea.ch problem could consist of a different 
number of story ele~ents (as was ~entioned above). Therefore, the 
operationalized measure chosen was the relative percentage of each type of 
encoding problem. in each testimony,that were classified in each 
category (see pp 116 D.V. 's3a to Jj). 
(iv) The common users reported assessing the credibility of each of the 
testimonies constituting the case for the prosecution and the case 
for the defence, separately. Only subsequently did they combine 
these individual assessments to form an overall conclusion as to 
the credibility of the entire case for the prosecution relative 
to the entire case for the defence. It was agreed that complainants' 
and accuseds' testimonies were of central concern to .the common 
users in making their final decisions of the credibility of the 
entire prosecution-case,as compared to the entire defence-case. 
Other testimonies delivered by witnesses for the prosecution and 
for the defence did not play as central a role in determining 
perceived credibility. Finally, there appeared to be two sections 
constituting each testimony. These were the section of testimonies 
presented during cross examination and the section presented prior 
to, and in some cases following, cross examination. 
Hereafter, these two sections are referred to as the cross examination 
section (CES) and the participant initiated section (PIS). The 
common users agreed that the CES's and PIS's of testimonies differed 
in their comprehensibility. It was decided that dependent variable 
measures would be collected for each of the parts constituting an 
entire court case~ 
The case for the prosecution and the case for the defence. 
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Complainants' and ?.ccused.s' testim<;>~ies. 
The CES 's and the PIS's of incH vidual testimonies. 
Figure 8-2. summarizes the 'causal' relationships proposed by the coiiiiDon 
users in the pilot phase. 
Figure 8-2. 'Causal' Relationships 
Poor semantic Many encoding Low Low 
structure problems comprehensibility credibility 
(low well (especially ---i 
fQrmedness) high level 
problems) 
This causal relationship between structural well-formedness an_d 
comprehensibility is empirically well established (Thorndyke, 1977). 
Hereafter, readers should understand that although structural well-formedness 
and. comprehensibility are conceptually distinguishable variables, in 
this study they are pragmatically interchangeable. 
8.2. Experimental phase 
8. 2.1. Aims 
Comprehensibility and credibility 
The first aim was to investigate whether the comprehensibility and therefore 
the well-formedness of testimony is associated with its perceived credibility. 
The term comprehensibility refers to the 'white' coiiiiDOn users perceptions 
of the ccomprehensibility of testimonies. It does not imply that there is a 
single set of universally accepted criteria for evaluating the 
comprehensibility of discourse. Every social group possesses different criteria. 
An additional aim was to examine the relative proportions of each 
-112 
type of en.coding proble~ in credible ?S cq~pared to in.cred.ible testimonies. 
The gqa,l here w.as to cle~elop a. hierarchy reflecting th.e r·elative contributions 
of each type of encoding problem to credibility. 
Comprehensibility and ethnicity 
The second aim was to assess whether 'coloured' and 'white' witnesses present 
testimonies that differ systematically in their comprehensibility and 
therefore their well-formedness. An additional aim was to consider whether 
social group differences in the comprehensibility (well-formedness) of 
testimonies operate to the systematic disadvantage of 'coloured' witnesses. 
Lastly there was the aim of examining the differential proportions of the first 
eight types of encoding problems in the testimonies of 'coloured' as compared 
to 'white' witnesses. The goal here was to identify the types of encoding 
problems that distinguish 'coloured' from 'white' testimonies. 
Comprehensibility and court role 
The third aim was to ascertain whether there are differences in the 
comprehensibility and therefore the well-formedness of testimonies presented 
by complainants and accused, and to consider whether such differences operate 
to the systematic disadvantage of undefended accused. Lastly, there was the 
aim of examining the differential proportion of the eight types of encoding 
problems in the testimonies of complainants as compared to accused. The 
goal here was to identify the types of encoding problems that distinguish 
accuseds' testimonies from those of complainants. 
8.2.2. Design 
First design 
A 2x2x2 factorial design was used to facilitate the between-group comparisons 
of the D.V. measures D.V. 1 to 3h, (See pp 115.) The three 
LV. 's were:. Credibility (LV.A), Eth~.icity (I.V.B) iind Court Role (I.V.C) 
Figure 8-3. Experimental Phase~Design One 
c. 
A. 

























The Credibility factor refers to magistrates' -perceptions of the credibility 
of complainants' and accuseds' testimonies. In their judgements magistrates 
stated whether they found the·complainants' testimony to be credible or 
incredible relative to the accuseds' testimony. When magistrates' found the 
complainants' testimony more credible than the accuseds' testimony, they 
judged the complainants' testimony to be credible and the accuseds' testimony 
to be incredible. Consequently, the verdict was-one of guilty for the 
accused. When magistrates found the accuseds' testimony to be more credible. 
than the complainants', they judged the accuseds' testimony to be credible 
and the complainants' to be incredible. The verdict was then one of not 
guilty for the accused. Therefore, Credible Complainants (A1c1) are those 
who had 'won' their cases; Credible Accused (AlCz) are those who had been 
acquitted; Incredible Complainants (AzCl) are those who had 'lost' their 
cases;- a.nd Incredible Accused (AzCz) are those who had been convicted. The 
terms credible ~nd. incredible ~ere c.P,osen. i1;1.stead. of guilty and. not guilty, 
because it is confusing for read,ers to conceptualize guilty complainants. 
Design two 
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A single factor design was used. to compare the D.V. 1 measures (see pp 115) 1.e, 
comprehensibility of sides of cases. The two groups compared were the 
Credible and Incredible groups i.e, I.V.Al ~nd I.V.Az· The Credible group 
(I. v·. Al), comprised cases in which magistrates had perceived the entire 
defence or prosecution case to be credible. The Incredible group (I.V.Az), 
cOlllprised cases iri which 'Qlagistr:ates had perceived the enti.re defence or 
prosecution case to be incredible. 11agistrates stated their perceptions of 
credibility in their judgements. When magistrates judged the prosecution 
case to be more credible than the defence case, the verdict was one of 
guilty and the accused was convicted. When magistrates judged the defence 
case to be more credible than the prosecution case, the verdict was one of 
not guilty and the accused was acquitted. 
The Ethnicity factor (I.V.B) was not included in the design because cases 
were not matched on the ethnicity of the prosecution and defence witnesses 
involved. Reliable informatio1;1 regarding the ethnicity of defence and 
prosecution witnesses is not available in aU cases. The Court Role 
factor (LV.c) was not included because cases were not matched on the 
number of prosecution and defence witnesses involved. 
8.2.3. Dependent variables 
Comprehensibility was the central dependent variable. Four measures of 
comprehensibility were used, one for each of the sections comprising court 
cases ie, D.V.
1 
-the entire side of cases (defence or prosecution); D.V. 2a 
-individual testimonies; D.V. 2b- cross examination sections, and D.V. 2
c 





Description of the 
variables. 
The extent to which the 
testimonies comprising 
an en.tire side of a 
court case were 
incomprehensible. 
The extent to which 
each testimony was 
incomprehensible, 
The extent to which 
the cross examination 




of each variable 
The number of story 
elements in an entire 
side of a court case 





The total number of 
story elements 
comprising an entire 
side of a court case. 
The number of story 
elements in each 
testimony that were 









The number of story 
elements in the CES's 
of each testimony that 





The total number of 
story elements 
comprising~the CES's 




Pescription. of the 
variables 
The extent to which the 
participant initiated 




of the variables 
The number of story 
elements in the PI.S 's 
of each testimony that 




The total number of story 
elements comprising the 
PIS's of each testimony. 
A second set of dependent "l,!aria.bles were used as indicators of the 
relative oc.cu:rrence of each of the eight t:rpes of epcoding problems 1.n 
testimonies i.e, D.V.. 's3a to 3h. D.V.. 3 i was a measure of the relative 
occurrence of encoding problems that 'analysts' did not place in the other 
eight categories i.e, other problems. When none of the three 'analysts' 
agreed on tt~e classification of an encoding problem during the content 
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analysis, it was counted as a non-categorized problem. D.v.
3
j 1.s the measure 




Description of the 
variables 
The percentage of the 
encoding problems in 




of the variables 
The number of irrelevant 




The total number of 




n~v. 3 .c 
l)esc:ripti.QJ;l of the 
'{ariables 
The percentage of the 
encqding probletp.s in 
each testimony that 
were delayed 
informa.tion problems. 
The percentage of the 
encoding problems in 
each testimony that 
were empirical 
contradiction problems. 
The percentage of the 
encoding problems in 
each testimony that 
were expectation 
conflict problems. 
The percentage of the 
encoding problems in 
each testimony that 
were ambiguous wording 
problems. 
Operationaliz.ed forms 
of the variables 
The number of delayed 
information problems 
in each testimony. 
100 x--
1 
The total number of 
encoding problems 1n 
each testimony. 
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The number of empirical 
contradiction problems 
in each testimony. 
100 x--
1 
The total number of 
e1;1coding problems 1n 
each testimony. 
The number of expectation 




The total number of 
encoding problems 1n 
ea.ch testimony. 
The number of ambiguous 




The total number of 




D. V. 3g 
Pescription of the 
v:aria.bles 
The percentage of the 
encoding proble~ in. 
each testimony that 
were inadequate 
justification problems. 
The percentage of the 
encoding proble~ i~ 
each testi~ony that 
were justification 
missing problems. 
The percentage of the 
encoding problems in 
each testimony that 
wer.e dir·ect 
contradiction problems. 
The percentage of the 
encoding problems in 
each testimony that 
were classified as 
'other problems'. 
Operationalized forms 
of the variables 
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The number of inadequate 
justification problems 
in each testimony. 
100 x--
1 
The total number of 
encoding problems ~n 
each testimony. 
The number of 
justification missing 




The total number of 
encoding problems ~n 
each testi~ny. 
The number of direct 
contradiction problems 
in each testimony. 
The total number of 
encoding problems in 
each testimony. 
The number of 'other 
problems' in each 
testimony. 
The total number of 









Description of the 
variabies 
The perc.entage of the 
encoding problems in 
each. tes.ti~ony th.a.t 
were ~ot assigned to 




of the variables 
The number of 'non-
categorized' problems 
in each testimony. 
100 x--
1 
The total number of 
encoding problems in 
e?ch testimony. 
Aim one: Hypotheses (comprehensibility and crediblity) 
1. The side of court cases that are judged by magistrates to be credible 
will be perceiv:ed by aomrn.on users as being more comprehensible (more 
well-fo~ed), than the side of court cases that are judged by 
r.nagistrqtes to be inc.redibl.e. 
2. TestimoT;lies that are judged by 'f!IClgistrates to be credible will be 
perceived by aommon users as being more comprehensible (more well-
formed), thaT) testimonies that a.re judged by magistrates to be 
incredible. 
3. The aommon users will perceive the comprehensibility (well-formedness) 
of the cross examination sections of testimonies judged to be 
incredible by magistrates, as differing from the comprehensibility 
(well-formedness) of the CES's of testimonies judged to be credible 
by magistrates. 
4. The aommon users will perce~ve the comprehensibility (well-formedness) 
of the participant initiated sections of testimonies judged to be 
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incredible by 7!1(1gistr-ates. a,s differing from the c<;>mpreh.ensibility 
(well-fo~~Qt;t~ss) Qf tl'\e PIS~s of testimonies judged to be credible 
by T!l(lgi.str-ates.. 
5. Common user-s will perceive higher proportions of the high level 
encoding problems ie, irrelevant information, delayed information, 
empirical contradictions a.n4. expectation conflicts; in testimonies that 
are judged to be incredible by magis.tT'Cltes, them in testimonies judged 
to be credible by magistrates. This implies that those testimonies 
jUI~_ged by magistrates to be incredible are more inco_mprehensible to 
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common users than those judged to be credible. Therefore, this hypothesis 
is dependent upon the t:i.nding regarding hypothesis two. 
6. COITUTIOn user-s will perceive higher proportions of the low level encoding 
problems ie, ambiguous wording, inadequate justifications, justifications 
missing and direct contradictions, in testimonies that are judged to be 
credible by ma.gistrates, than in testimonies judged to be incredible 
by magistrates. This hypothesis is dependent upon the finding regarding 
hypothesis two. 
Aim two:. Hypotheses (comprehensibility and ethnicity) 
1. Testimonies d.elivered by 'coloured' wi tn.esses wi 11 be perceived by 
'white' common user-s as being less comprehensible (less well-formed), 
than testimonies delivered by 'white' witnesses. 
2. 'White' co~on users will perceive the cross examination sections of 
testimonies delivered by 'coloured' witnesses to be less comprehensible 
(less well-formed), than the CES's of testimonies delivered by 'white' 
witnesses. 
3. 'White' common users will perceive the participant initiated sections 
of testimonies delivered by 'coloured' witnesses to be less comprehensible 
(less well-form~d), than the !>IS's of testimonies deli:'{ered by '-vhite' 
witnesses, 
4. 'White' common users will perceive higher proportions of the high level 
epcoding problems ie, i:rrelev~nt i1;1.formation, delayed information, 
empirical con.tradictions and expectation conflicts;- in testimonies 
delivered by 'coloured' witnesses. than those delivered by 'white' 
witnesses. This implies that 'coloured' testimonies are less 
comprehensible and is thus dependent upon the finding regarding 
hypothesis one above. 
5. 'White' COTrfl!/On users W.ill perceive higher proportions of low level 
encoding problems ie, ambiguous wording, inadequate justifications, 
justifications missing and direct contradictions, in testimonies 
delivered by 'white' witnesses than in those delivered by 'coloured' 
witnesses. This hypothesis is dependent upon the finding regarding 
hypothesis one above. 
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6. This hypothesis will not be tested directly. However, should hypothesis 
two from aim one (see prev.:ious page), and hypothesis one from aun two 
(above) be accepted following statistical analysis; the following 
deduction may be made:. Magistrates perceive 'coloured' witnesses' 
testimonies to be less comprehensible (less well-formed) and therefore, 
less credible than 'white' witnesses testimonies. Thus, 'coloured' 
witnesses are disadvantaged relative to 'white' witnesses in court. 
Aim three~ Hypotheses (comprehensibility and court role) 
1. Common users will perceive complainants' testimonies to be more 
comprehensible (more well-formed), than accuseds' testimonies. 
2. Common users will perceive the cross examination sections of complainants' 
testimonies to be more CQI!lprell,ei;J.sib~e (more ~eU-tortned), than the 
CES~s of a.ccuse4s~ testimoni.es. 
3. Common users will perceive the participant initiated sections of 
complainants' testi~ponies to be more comprehensible (more well-formed), 
than the PIS's of accuseds' testimoni.es, 
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4. Corrunon users will perc.eiv:e higher proportions of the high level encoding 
problems ie, irrelevant information, delayed information, empirical 
contradictioi;J.s and expectation conflicts~ in accuseds' testimonies 
than in complainants' testimonies. This implies that accuseds' 
testimonies are less comprehensible than complainants' and 1s thus 
dependent on the finding regarding hypothesis one above. 
5. Common users will perceive higher proportions of low level encoding 
problems ie, ambiguous wording, inadequate justifications, justifications 
missing and direct contradictions, in eomplainants' testimonies than in 
accuseds' testimonies. This hypothesis is dependent upon the finding 
regarding hypothesis one above. 
6. This hypothesis will not be tested directly. However, should hypothesis 
two frow aim one (see previous page), and hypothesis one from a1m three 
(above) be accepted following statistical analysisi the folloWing deduction 
may be wa.de:. Mc:z.gistra.tes perceive aecuseds' testimonies to be less 
comprehensible (less well-formed) and therefore less credible than 
complainants' testimonies. Thus, accused are disadvantaged relative 
to complainants in unrepresented court cases. 
8.2.5. Sample 
The use of a formal stratified and/or completely randomized sampling strategy 
was deemed impractical. Statistics of the number of magistrates' court 
acquittals and convictions fo.r ea.ch of the official ethnic groups are 
not available (South Africa, 1984). The first thirty-two court cases 
that met the selection criteria were included in the experimental sample. 
No significant, systematic bias was expected to result from this data 
selection technique (cases are stored in the records section of the 
Cape Town Regional magistrates' courts according to their chronological 
order and trial outcomes.) The selection criteria facilitated the plan·ned 
within and between-group comparisons necessary to test the hypotheses: 
1. Only cases in which accused were unrepresented were included in the 
sample, firstly because the majority of accused in magistrates' court 
cases are unrepresented. This is especially true of 'black', 'indian' 
and 'coloured' accused. Secondly, this criterion facilitated tests 
of the hypotheses under a~m three (see pp 121). 
2. Only those case transcripts consid.ered by the transcribers to be 
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accurate transcriptions of the actual recorded cases were used. The 
transcribers provided a certificate of the accuracy of each transcription. 
3. Only cases in which a plea of not guilty was entered by the accused 
were included. This was necessary as testimony is seldom delivered 
when a plea of guilty is entered. Second, when accused plead not 
guilty their motivations to attain credibility are more similar to 
complainants' motivations, than when accused admit guilt from the 
outset. 
4. Only cases in which both complainants a.nd accused delivered testimony 
were chosen. 
5. The first 16 cases that met the selection criteria and had verdicts 
of guilty were selected ~e, convictions. This meant 16 credible 





C/ ~\ B2c1 ~.:Pd ~B1 C/ A2B2c2 :respectively.) The first 16 cases 
that met the selection criteria and had ver<;licts of not guilty were 
selected ~e, acquittals. This meant 16 credible accused and 16 









6. Equal numbers of 'coloured·' and 'white' complainants and accused were 
selected. 
Figure 8-4. Experimental Sample 
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Sixteen testimonies delivered by 
'white' witnesses and judged by 
magistrates to be credible. 
Sixteen testimonies delivered by 
'coloured' witnesses and judged by 
magistrates to be credible. 
AlBlCl AlBlC2 AlB2Cl AlB2C2 
Eight Eight Eight Eight 
testimonies testimonies testimonies testimonies 
delivered by delivered by delivered by delivered by 









Sixteen testimonies delivered by Sixteen testimonies delivered by 
'white' witnesses .;u;l.d judged by 1 coloured·' witnesses and judged by 
magistrates to be incredible. magistrates to be incredible. 
A2B1Cl A2BlC2 ~B2Cl A2B2C2 
Eight Eight Eight Eight 
testimonies testimonies testimonies testimonies 
delivered by delivered by delivered by delivered by 
complainants. accused. complainants. accused. 
Figure 8-5. Total Sample .. ~~her of Testi~onies 
Complainant .Accused Total Prosecution Defence Total Row 
witnesses witnesses Totals 
4 4 8 4 4 8 16 
32 32 64 20 5 25 89 
36 36 72 24 9 33 105 
In all, 89 testimonies were analysed 1n the experimental phase. Twenty-
five were delivered by witnesses for the prosecution and defence. These 
were only included in the calculatiQn of D,v. 1 . The cases were not matched 
on the number and race of the witnesses for the prosecution and defence. 
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This wottld _haV.e reduced the get;1er:aliz.1;1.bi.Hty qf the t:indiJ:1gs.. The witnesses 
were not matched on their a.ge a,nd sex beca_use these variables have neglible 
ef'fects on the verdict (Hagan, 1974). The experimental sample included a 
range of the magistrates who h.ear cases and_ the prosecutors who participate 
in cases, as well as a range of the kinds of offences brought before the 
Cape Town magistrates' courts. The possible confounding effects of these 
three variables were controlle" by in_cluding a representative qmge in the 
sample (see Appendices XIIa to XIId). Robbery cases are overrepresented 1n 
the 'coloured' sample. The effects of this type of offence on comprehensibility 
are not known. The data selection technique made this ov.:errepresentation 
unavoidable. Interracial cases comprised 18.75% of the sample ie, s1.x 
cases and 12 testimonies (see Appendix XIIe). This factor was not expected 
to bias the findings systematically. 
8.2.6. Procedure 
Phase one 
Three different, fully bilingual 'white', ~iddle class, university students 
were selected as common users. They were requested to read each testimony 
constituting each court case carefully and to note down the story elements 
that they perceived as being difficult to comprehend ie, incomprehensible. 
They were asked to provide detailed reasoning as to why they found these 
elements incomprehensible (see Appendix XIII). Two of the cormnon users 
had not participated in the pilot phase of the study. The third was the 
researcher herself. New cormnon users were chosen to avoid any carryover 
effects arising from a knowledge of the I. V. 's discussed in the pilot phase. 
They had r-eceived no legal training or training in linguistic analysis. The 
new cormnon users were not informed of the hypotheses to be tested or the 
aims of the study. None of the three were aware of the race of the court 
-127 
pa.rticipa~ts nor of the I.Da.&istrates! c.:redi.bility jud.gements for each case. 
Each. case w:as distinguished by a code and the cases were 'analysed' in a 
ra,ndom or4er. The only modffication made to the original transcripts was 
the alteration of all information that could have led to the identification 
of the people involved. Such information was replaced with information 
of a similar nature. The testimonies were presented in both English and 
Afrikaans. To prevent confounding from this source, bilingual common users 
were ei.Dployed. However, the testimonies of 'coloured' witnesses were 
deliv.ered in a particular dialect of Afrikaans ie, 'gamtal'. The common 
users were familiar with the dialect. In addition, they were given story 
elei.Dent lists translated into English. The translation was conducted by 
the researcher and a person well-versed in this dialect. The common users 
:reported no difficulties ~n understanding due to dialec.t. The common users 
were debriefed following the completed procedure. 
Rather than striving for complete agree~J~ent among the three comtnQn users, 
allowance was made for the operation of chance factors such as fatigue and 
carelessness. Each .set of story elements that was perc~ived to be 
incomprehensible for the sc;zme rea.son by at least two out of the three 
common users was included in the D.V. measures ie, D.V. 's 1 and 2a to 2c. 
They noted 620 sets of problematic story elements. In.only·l21 of these 
problems was th~ less than full agreement among the three 'analysts'. 
Therefore, all three analysts agreed on 80.5% of the sets of incomprehensible 
story elements. 
Phase two 
The method used was content analysis: 
Content analysis is a research technique for the objectiv.e, 
systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication. 
(Berelson, 1971: 18). 
Three differe~t 'an~lysts' ~:re r.equi;re<i tQ read thr·ough ea.ch of the 
rea.sons that had been p:ro~idec;l, by the P.Pase I-connnon users as to why 
they had found story elements incomprehensible. Then they were asked 
to plac.e each of these reason.s into one of nine possible encoding problem 
categories. These categories had been deri~ed. from the pilot phase 
data. Once again to avoid carry-over effects three new, white middle 
class, university students were selected. They were not informed of 
the va:riables, the aims or hypotheses of the research. 
Initially the Phase II 'analysts' were provided with a pilot sample of 
the reasoning f·rom twenty-two testimonies. This is 25% of· the sample which 
is considered to be representative (Cozby, 1981). An initial test sample 
was used to test the definitions for each of the encoding problem 
categories as these were required to be mutually exclusive. Each reason 
had to fit onl~·one category and had to meet aU the criteria defining 
that category. All of the reasons had to be placed 1n the nine categories 
to avoid bias. The definition of each category had to be clear and 
differentiable from those c;lefining other categories (Berelson, 1971). 
These guidelines were followed. A meeting of the three 'analysts' was 
held at the completion of this test sample, where problems were discussed 
and clarified. The 'analysts' were then provided with the remainder of 
the sample for analysis. The analyses were conducted in random order. 
They 1were also instructed to reassess the reasons from the test sample-
testimonies in the light of the subsequent clarifications that had been 
made (see Appendix XIV). The 'analysts' were debriefed following the 
completed procedure. 
Only those reasons placed in the same category by at least two'of the 
three ·~nalysts' were included in the D.V. measures ie, D.v.•s 33 to li" 
(See pp 116.) 
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The 'an~lysts' c~.tegorized 620 rea.S9\l.s. There was less than total 
agreement amon,g th.e three in the cl.assification of 177 reasons. 
Agreement was reached. in the categoriz.ation of 71.5% of the reasons. 
There was no agreement among the three in classifying 3.5% or 22 of the 
620 reasons. This latter I)leasure constituted D.v.
3
j. (See pp 119.) 
8. 2. ·7 Analyses 
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I. V. A (credibility) and D. v. 1 (comprehensibility of sides of cases) were 
analysed usin,g at-test. I.V.A (credibility), I.V.B (ethnicity), I.V.C 
(court role) and the other eleven D.V. 's were analysed using simple three-
way Anovas (see pp 116). D.V. 3i (other problems) was not statistically 
analysed because 'there were no measures for this D.V. D.v. 3j (non-
categorized problems) was not statistically anlysed because there were too 
few measures for this D.V. ie, 22. The data were checked for correspondence 
with the three assumptions of the Anova test. The first assumption is 
that the treatment populations from whi.ch the sample is drawn are normally 
distributed. The scores. in each of the three conditions were assumed to 
take the shape of the normal distribution curve. The second assumption is 
that the variances of the treatment populations be equivalent. The 
probability of making a type I error increases when data is extremely 
heterogenous (Rogan and Kesselman, 1977). The method used to test the 
da.ta was to compare the ratio of the largest within-group variance to 
that of the smallest, for the significant findings (Keppel, 1982). The 
data did not reflect great heterogeneity of variance. It was ascertained 
that the thirq assumption of the independence of error components had 
not been violated. 
9. RESULTS 
9.1. Gomprehensibility 
9.1.1. Side of case 
In the tables of means and standard deviations for D.V. 's 1 to 2c' higher 
mean values indicate higher 'ratings' of incomprehensibility (lower levels 
of well-formedness), by common users. Lower mean values indicate higher 
'ratings' of comprehensibility (higher levels of well-formedness), by 
common ~sers. (The raw data are presented in Appendix XV.) 












df = 63 
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There was a significant difference (t= -11.29; p~ 0.0001) between the levels 
of incomprehensibility in credible sid.es of cases as compared with incredible 
sides of cases. It is evident from Table 9-1. that incredible sides of 





















































































Ta.ble 9-.3. O.v. 2a:. .(>.nov..a S\.mlllli3:r:y Ta.ble 
.Source. ss DF ~s F 
**** 
A (Credibility) 2776.551 1 2776.551 17.681 
** 
B (Ethnicity) 1726.274 1 1726.274 10.993 
c (Court Role) 48.832 1 48.832 0. 311 
AB 268.523 1 268.523 1. 710 
AC 50.924 1 50.924 0.324 
~c 2.549 1 2.549 0.016 
ABC 53.498 1 53.498 0.341 
Error 8794.247 56 157.040 
**** p<O.OOOl 
The analysis of the ma1n effects indicated two significant differences: 
First, a difference between the levels of incomprehensibility in credible 
testimonies as compared to incredible testimonies (F= 17.681; p= 0.0001). 
From Table 9-2. it is evident that incredible testimonies were more 
incomprehensible. Second, a difference between the levels of 
incomprehensibility in 'white' as compared to 'coloured' testimonies 
(F= 10.993; p= 0.002). It is evident from Table 9-2. that 'coloured' 
testimonies were more incomprehensible. 
9.1. 3. Cross Exami~ation Sections 
Table 9-4. D.V.
2
b (CES's) :Means and Standard Deviations 
B 'White' 
1 
c1 Complainant c2 Accused Row Totals 
A
1 
Credible 12.588 11.425 12.007 
(23. 340) (14.618) (18.979) 
8 8 16 
A2 Incredible 17.538 21.438 19.488 
(34. 351) (21. 621) (27.986) 
8 8 16 
15.063 16.432 15.747 
Column (28. 846) (18.12) (23.661) 
16 16 32 
Totals 
B2 'Coloured' 
c1 Complainant c2 Accused 
10.362 10.888 
(14. 295) (9.224) 
.8 8 
44.7 30.4 
(31. 059) (21.591) 
8 8 
27.531 20.64 




























Table 9-5. ~· ~. 2b :. Anov.a S~,;lt,Y Ta.ble 
Source ss DF MS F 
A (Credibility) 83520.195 1 83520.195 2.733 
B (Ethnicity) 597.957 1 597.957 0.020 
c (Court Role) 47000.820 1 47000.820 1.538 
AB 543.480 1 543.480 0.018 
AC 46428.082 1 46428.082 1.519 
BC 2.462 1 2.462 0.000 
ABC 26.085 1 26.085 0.001 
Error 1711439.031 56 30561.411 
The factors do not have any significant effect on the incomprehensibility 
of the CES's. 
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9.1.4. Participant Initiated Sections 
Table 9-6. D.v.
2




























































































Table 9-7. D.V_. 2c_ A.nov~. Sunnn~ry Table 
Source ss DF MS F 
**** 
A (Credibility) 3495.508 1 3495.508 15.522 
*** 
B (Et hnici ty) 2613.944 1 2613.944 11.607. 
c (Court Role) 0.117 1 0.117 0.001 
AB 315.631 1 315.631 1.402 
AC 138.861 1 138.861 0.617 
BC 17.631 1 17.631 0.078 
ABC 61.360 1 61.360 0.272 
Error 12611.113 56 225.198 
**** p<0.0001 *** ~ 0.001 
The analysis of the main effects indicates two significant differences: 
First, a difference between the levels of incomprehensibility in credible 
PIS's as compared to incredible PIS's (F= 15.522; p= 0.0001). From Table 
9-6. it is evident that incredible PIS's were more incomprehensible. 
Second, there was a difference between the levels of incomprehensibility 
in 'coloured' PIS's as compared to 'white' PIS's (F= 11.607; p= 0.001). 
It is evident from Table 9-6. that 'coloured' PIS's were more 
incomprehensible. 
9.2. Encoding problems 
In the tables of means and sta.ndard <;l_ev:iat ions for D. V. 's 3a to 3
j, higher 
means indicates higher relative percentages of each type of encoding problem 
in testimonies. 
9.2.1. Irrelevant information 























































































Table 9-9. n.v. 3a· ~ Anova S~ary Table 
Source ss DF MS F 
A (Credibil:ity) 47.783 1 47.783 0.478 
B (Ethnicity) 4.463 1 4.463 0.045 
c (Court Role) 257.201 1 257.201 2.573 
AB 0.345 1 0.345 0.003 
AC 178.556 1 178.556 1.786 
BC 12.691 1 12.691 0.127 
ABC 29.295 1 29.295 0.293 
Error 5597.768 56 99.960 
The factors do not have any significant effect on the relative percentages 
of irrelevant information problems. 
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9.2.2 Delayed Information 
Table 9-10. D.V. 
3
























































































Table 9-11. :P •. v. 3b :. Anova S~ary T~ble 
Source ss DF MS F 
A (Credibility) 55.876 1 55.876 2.186 
B (Ethnicity) 76.126 1 76.126 2.979 
c (Court Role) 92.160 1 92.160 3.606 
~ 78.323 1 78.323 3.065 
AC 0.076 1 0.076 0.003 
BC 0.951 1 0.951 0.037 
~c 2. 722 1 2.722 0.107 
Error 1431.137 56 25.556 
The factors do not have any significant effect on the relative percentages 
of delayed information problems. 
9.2.3. Empirical contradictions 








































Table 9-13. D.Y. 3c A~ov.a Sutptilary T9.ble 
Source ss DF MS F 
A (Credibility) 311.964 1 311.964 0.089 
B (Ethnicity) 0.744 1 0.744 0.933 
C ·(Court Role) 46.410 1 46.410 0.446 
AB 6.566 1 6.566 0.063 
AC 0.013 1 0.013 0.991 
* 
BC 636.931 1 636.931 6.127 
ABC 11.306 1 11.306 0.109 
Error 5821.530 56 103.956 
* p(0.05 
The F r,atio for the interaction between the ethnicity and court role factors 
is significant at the 5% 1ev.el. There was no effect due to the credibility 
factor. The interaction was investigated with an analysis of simple main 
effects. 
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'Coloured' Row Means 
cl Complainant 2.294 7.569 5.556 
(5.277) (10.011) (10.290) 
c2 Accused 10.306 4.213 7.259 
(13.17) {6.415) (10.636) 
Column 6.300 6.516 
Means (10.661) (10.335) 
Table 9-15. Empirical Contradictions Analysis of Simple Main Effects 
Source ss DF MS F 
B at cl 5.89 1 5.89 0.057 
B at c2 12.202 .1 12.202 0.117 
c at B1 11.453 1 11.453 0.110 
c at B2 6. 726 1 6. 726 0.065 
Error 5821.53 56 103.956 
The analysis of the simple ma~n effects showed that the differences between 
the 'coloured' and 'white' conditions of the complainant group and of the 
accused group were not statistically significant. 
9.2.4. Expectation conflicts 
Table 9-16. D.V.
3







































































































Table 9-18. D.v. 3d Anova Summary Table 
Source ss DF MS 
A (Credibility) 60.840 1 60.840 
B (Ethnicity) 221.266 1 221.266 
c (Court Role) 1626.105 1 1626.105 
AB 17.431 1 17.431 
AC 147.016 1 147.016 
BC 64.802 1 64.802 
ABC 331.240 1 331.240 
Error 19929.657 56 355.887 











The analysis of the main effects indicated a significant difference between 
the relative frequency of expectation conflict problems in complainants' 
as compared to accuseds' testimonies (F= 4.569; p= 0.037). From Table 
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9-17. it is evident that accuseds' testimonies contained higher percentages 
of expectation conflicts. 
9 0 2 0 50 Ambiguous wor~.ing 
Table 9-l9o OoVo 3 (Ambiguous Wording) : Means and Standard Peviations 
e 
B 'White' 1 
B2 'Coloured' 
c1 Complainant c2 Accused Row c1 Complainant Totals 
A1 Credible 28o6 
l3ol38 20o869 10o987 
(36ol26) (25o425) (30 0 776) (14o063) 
8 8 16 8 
A2 Incredible 26o212 
6o025 l6oll9 20ol50 
(l7o857) (8o336) (l3o 097) (10o527) 
8 8 16 8 
Combined Column 27o406 9o582 l8o494 l5o569 
Totals 
(26o992) (16o881) (24o852) (12o295) 
16 16 32 16 
c2 Accused Row Totals 


























Table 9 ... 20. D. V.. 3e ~ Anova. ~ar:y Table 
Source ss DF MS F 
A (Credibility) 0.951 1 0.951 0.002 
B (Ethnicity) 163.840 1 163.840 0.415 
c (Court Role) 1350.563 1 1350.563 3.419 
AB 324.901 1 324.901 0.823 
AC 210.975 1 210.975 0.534 
BC 1193.703 1 1193.703 3.022 
ABC 25.756 1 25.756 0.065 
Error 22120.726 56 395.013 
These factors do not have any significant effect on the relative percentages 
of ambiguous wording problems. 
9.2.6. Inadequate justifications 
Table 9-21. D.v. 3


























































































Ta.ble 9-22. P. V. 3f Ano~a S.urptp$i.r¥ Table 
Source S.S. PF MS F 
A (Credibility) 0.010 1 0.010 0.000 
B (Ethnicity) 260.016 1 260.016 1.015 
c (Court Role) 616.281 1 616.281 2.406 
AB 296.701 1 296.701 1.158 
AC 216.826 1 216.826 0.846 
BC 106.090 1 106.090 0.414 
ABC 129.960 1 129.960 0.507 
Error 14345.552 56 256.171 
The factors do not have any significant effect on the relative percentages 
of inadequate justification problems. 
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9.2.7. Justifications missing 






















































































Table 9-24. D. v. 3g : A.nov:a SUl;!U!lary Tabl.e 
Source ss DF MS F 
A (Credibility) 14.726 1 14.726 0.053 
B (Ethnicity) 56.063 1 56.063 0.203 
c (Court Role) 903.754 1 903.754 3.273 
AB 350.158 1 350.158 1.268 
AC 115.294 1 115.294 0.418 
BC 295.410 1 295.410 1.070 
ABC 101.254 1 101.254 0.367 
Error 15460.862 56 276.087 
The factors do not have any significant effect on the relative precentages 
of justification missing problems. 
9.2.8. Direct contradiction 






































Table 9-26. p.v. 3~ Ano~a S~ry Tab~e 
Source ss PF. MS F 
A (Credibility) 19.914 1 19.914 1.436 
* B (Ethnicity) 2010.401 1 2010.401 4.215 
c (Court Role) 24.133 1 24.133 0.051 
* AB 3276.130 1 3276.130 6.868 
AC 32.348 1 32.348 0.068 
BC 882.832 1 882.832 1.851 
ABC 69.931 1 69.931 0.147 
Error 26711.012 56 476.982 
* p~ 0.05 
The F ratio for the interaction between the credibility and ethnicity 
factors is significant at the .5% level. There is no effect due to the 
court role factor. The interaction was investigated with an analysis 
of simple main effects. 
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Table 9-28. Direct Contradictions Analysis of Simple Main Effects 
Source ss DF MS F 
A at Bl 79.592 1 79.592 0.167 
A at B2 187.79 1 187.79 0.394 
B at Al 429.35 1 429.35 0.337 
B at A2 294.401 1 294.401 
0.231 
Error 261711.012 56 476.982 
The analysis of the simple ma1n effects showed that differences between the 
credible and incredible conditions of the 'white' group and of the 'coloured' 
group were not statistically significant. 
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9.2.9. Other problems (D.V.3 i) 
None of the phase II 'analysts' classified encoding problems 1n this 
category (see pp 118 for definition). 
9.2.10. Non-categorized problems (D.V.
3
.) . J 
There were only 22 non-categorized problems, therefore no statistical 
analysis was conducted (see pp 118 for definition). Nevertheless, for 




• (Non-Categorized) : Means and Standard Deviations 
B 'White' 
1 B2 'Coloured' 
c
1 
Complainant c2 Accused Row c 1 Complainant Totals 
A1 Credible 2.5 1.038 1. 769 00 
(7. 071) (2.034) (5.003) 000 
8 8 16 8 
A2 Incredible 0.963 5.088 3.026 9.0 
(2. 722) (11. 690) (7. 206) (6.881) 
8 8 16 8 
Combined column 1.732 3.063 2.398 4.6 
totals (4.897) (7. 316) (6.104) (3. 43) 
16 16 32 16 
c 2 Accused Row Totals 
1.138 0.6 























10. DISCUSSION - PART I 
10.1. Introduction 
In the design of this study the direction of causality proposed between 
the D.V. 's and I.V.A in the theoretical prelude, has been reversed. Take 
for example I.V.A (the magistrates' assessments of crediblity) and D.v.
2
a 
(the common users' ratings of the comprehensibility of testimonies). It 
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was proposed that when magistrates perceive testimonies as highly 
comprehensible they judge the testimonies to be highly credible. In order 
to make this causal inference one must assume that magistrates' perceptions 
of comprehensibility are at least similar to common users' perceptions. 
Given this assumption, the causal relationship between I.V.A and D.V. 2a 
1s that D.v. 2a (perceived comprehensibility) determines I.V.A (judged 
credibility). Thus, it 1s proposed that D.V. 2a operates as an I.V. and 
that LV.A functions as a D.V. ie, that magistrates' credibility judgements 
are dependent upon their perceptions of comprehensibility. The causal 
relationships between all of the D.V. 's and I.V.A have been reversed 1n 
this manner ie, D.V.
1 
(comprehensibility of sides of cases), D.V. 2a 
(comprehensibility of testimonies), D.V. 2b (comprehensibility of CES's), 
D.v.
2
c (comprehensibility of PIS's) and; D.V.'s3a to )h (the relative 
percentage of each of the eight types of encoding problems). Therefore~ 
to expand a little further it is proposed that when testimonies exhibit 
high proportions of irrelevant information, delayed information, empirical 
contradictions and expectation conflicts ie, high level encoding problems; 
magistrates judge them to be incredible. When testimonies contain high 
proportions of ambiguous wording, inadequate justifications, justifications 
missing and direct contradictions ie, low level encoding problems; 
magistrates judge them to be credible. Therefore,the assumption is 
that high proportions of high le~el encoding problems cause magistrates 
to judge testimonies as'being incre(iible. l'he D.V.'s and I.V.A were 
reversed 1n the design, because the D.V. had to be intervai data 
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in order to use the Anova for the analy·ses. I. v. A (credibility) is not 
interval data, it is categorical data, whereas the D.V. 's (comprehensibility 
ratings and relative percentages of encoding problems) are interval data. 
To conclude, readers should take careful note of two issues! First, the 
D.V. measures were taken from common users and the I.V.A measures from 
magistrates. Therefore, the validity of the inferences made regarding 
causal relationships between comprehensibility and credibility,, depend 
upon the 'truth' of the assumption that magistrates function similarly 
to common users. In each section to follow the validity of this 
assumption has been evaluated. 
Second, although the direction of causality has been reversed in the design, 
the original direction proposed in the theoretical prelude has been 
reassumed throughout the interpretation of the findings ie, that perceptions 
of comprehensibility determine credibility judgements. This reversal is 
permissible without altering the validity of the findings. It improves 
readers comprehension! 
10.2. Aim one (see pp 119) 
10.2.1 Findings 
Hypotheses one, two and four were supported in this study. The Anovas 
investigating the main effects of the credibility factor provided 
significant results with three of the D.V.'s ie, the comprehensibility of 
sides of cases (D.V.
1
), testimonies (D.v. 2a), and PIS's (D.V. 2c). Cases 
for the prosecution and cases for tne defe~ce~ as wel1 ~s indi~i~u~1 
testimonies and th_ei.r PIS's that magistrates judged to be incredible, 
were also judged by aommon users to be more incomprehensible (less well-
formed) than cases, testimonies and PIS's that magistrates judged to 
be credible. 
Hypothesis three was not supported ie, the comprehensibility of CES's 
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of testimonies (D.v. 2b), was not significantly affected by the credibility 
factor. Common users did not find· the CES's of testimonies that magistrates 
judged to be incredible, any more incomprehensible than the CES's of 
testimonies that magistrates judged to be credible. 
Hypotheses five and six were not supported ie, the relative percentages of 
each of the eight types of encoding problems were not significantly affected 




h). Testimonies that magistrates 
judged to be incredible did not exhibit higher relative percentages of 
irrelevant information, delayed information, empirical contradictions 
or expectation conflicts; than testimonies that magistrates judged to be 
credible ie, they did not contain higher proportions of high level encoding 
problems. Testimonies that magistrates judged to be credible did not 
exhibit higher relative percentages of ambiguous wording, inadequate 
justifications, justifications missing and direct contradictions; than 
testimonies that magistrates judged to be incredible ie, they did not 
contain higher proportions of low level encoding problems. 
10.2.2. ~nterpretation 
Structural well-formedness and comprehensibility 
It has been demonstrated empirically that well-formed discourse is highly 
comprehensible (Bower, 1976; Pratt et al, 1982). In this study the strength 
of the association between structural well-formedness and comprehensibility 
-159 
was not tested statistically, bec~.us.e well-fonnedness was nqt '~pea.sured' 
directly. Comprehensibility wa.s 1Ipeasured' by the percentages qf 
incomprehensible story elements in the various sections of court cases. 
The procedure followed was such that common users gave reasons for 
perceiving sets of story elements to be incomprehensible. These reasons 
were categorized into ten types of encoding problems ie, each set of 
incomprehensible.story elements constituted an encoding problem of a 
particular type. Well-formedness could have been 'measured' using encoding 
~ 
problems as indicators. However, it was hypothesized that because encoding 
problems, even those of the same type, consisted of different numbers of 
incomprehensible story elements they would influence comprehensibility 
to differing degrees. Therefore, a sophisticated weighting system would 
have been necessary to form a valid measure of well-formedness. Due to 
the exploratory nature of this study the development of such a weighting 
system was not viable. Thus, a direct 'measure' of well-formedness was 
not made. 
Had each incomprehensible story element constituted a single encoding 
problem there would have been a perfect positive correlation between 
comprehensibility and well-formedness ie, r = +1. However, a single 
encoding problem could consist of any number of incomprehensible story 
elements. Therefore, an imperfect positive correlation was expected 1e, 
r< 1. Although the correlation expected was less than perfect, the 
procedure foilowed retained the positive relationship between well-formedness 
and comprehensibility. Hence for the purposes of this discussion, the 
inference has been made that common users perceived the well-formedness of 
testimony as 'determining' its comprehensibility. 
Structur:a1. w~ll-Jonn.edness an-Q.. en.c..Qdillg problem.s 
The pilot phase common users identified nine types of structural 'defects' 
(encoding problems). The first two paragraphs of each of the following 
eight sections comprise the common users' definitions and examples of 
each of the encoding problems. Since none of the experimental phase II 
'analysts' used the category 'other problems', this type of problem will 
receive no further comment. The tenth category of 'non-categorized 
problems• is discussed subsequently. The researcher conducted a further 
qualitative analysis~ The researcher considered each of the reasons 
that experimental phase I common users had given for finding each set 
of story elements incomprehensible. She then examined the definitions· 
of the encoding problem catego~y to which the experimental phase II 
'analysts' had assigned each reason (and set of story elements). Finally, 
the researcher constructed a further definition of each encoding problem 
based on Schank and Abelson's macro-schematic model (Schank and Abelson, 
1977). These definitions are presented following the examples given in 
the next eight sections. 
The experimental phase I common users' reasonin& showed that the encoding 
problems they experienced were 'caused' by 'defects' in the semantic 
structure of testimonies. 
When these structural 'defects' are defined according to the parameters 
of the Schank and Abelson-model, each structural 'defect' is a violation 
of receivers' expectations ie, their norms of interpretation. Receivers' 
expectations are organized by their macro-schema that they use 1n 
comprehension. The macro-schema have four hierarchically organized levels 
ie, causal chain, scriptal, goals and plans, and thematic levels (from 
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lowest to highest). Each e~coding problet,n has been cl.assified according 
to the level at which the violation occurs. This ~s important because 
the higher the level of the violation the greater is the expected 
incomprehensibility (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Hereafter the terms 
structural 'defect ',structural violation and encoding problem are 
used interchangeably. 
In procedural guideline five it was merely suggested that the experimental 
phase I common users note how they would correct the encoding problems. 
This was proposed as one possible strategy for improving the clarity of 
reasoning. They reported this strategy to be most useful. In fact they 
provided corrections for every encoding problem they experienced. The 
common users attempted to reconcile inconsistent information and to 
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provide missing data by constructing bridging inferences. These corrections 
clearly demonstrate receivers' reparative tendencies during comprehension 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977; Spiro, 1977). 
Irrelevant information probZer.rts occu~r.ed. when a witness presented· 
information that did not add to.conunon users' understanding of the rest 
of the information presented ~n testimony. Each irrelevant information 
problem consisted of any number of story elements presented consecutively. 
For example:. 
An accused stated that, (i) his friend lived near to the place where the 
robbery occurred. However, the accused did not say whether, (ii) this 
friend had any part in the robbery or whether, (iii) the accused was on 
his way to ij~s friend's house at the time of the robbery. He did not 
attempt to incorporate the first piece of information with any of the 
later information. 
Irrelevant information problems are violations of intentional schema 
expectations. These occur at the two highest levels of the macro~schema 
ie, goals and plans, and themes. They should cause serious disruptions 
to processing ie, high incomprehensibility (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
They occurred when testimonies cued certain goals and plans, but the rest 
of the data presented in testimony did not aid common users in assessing 
whether or not the inferred goals and plans were appZicabZe. Common users 
used thematic schema to infer the goals and plans ie, role themes. In 
segment (i) of the example, the role theme of friendship was cued. To 
enhance coherency common users created causal connections between this 
information and the rest of the data in the testimony. They used the role 
theme to make a number of plausible inferences, such as those appearing 
in segments (ii) and (iii). These predicted later information in the 
testimony. However, common users could not assess the accuracy of their 
predictions, because information for this assessment was not provided in 
the testimony. They reported great difficulty repa~r~ng these kinds of 
violations, because they had little confidence in their inferences. Bower 
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(1976) produced similar findings. (See Appendix IX.) 
Delayed information problems occurred when information that would have 
added to the common users' understanding of the relevance of story 
elements in testimony, was not presented until long after the information 
it elucidated. Each delayed information problem consisted of any number 
of story elements presented consecutively. For example: 
In the first part of a complainant's testimony he said that, (i) the 
accused grabbed him from behind and held him tightly so that he could not 
move. The common users knew that this was a robbery case. It was only 
much later on in the testimony that the complainant added that, (ii) the 
accused held him because he was trying to stop the accused's friend from 
robbing the complainant's friend. 
Delayed information problems are violations of intentional schema 
expectations. These occur at the highest two levels of the macro-schema 
ie, plans and goals, and themes. They should cause serious disruptions 
to processing ie, high incomprehensibility (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
They occurred when common users inferred goals that conflicted with the 
goals explicated by a witness later in testimony. Common users used 
thematic schema to infer the goals. In this example the role theme of 
victim, cued 1n segment (i), allowed receivers to predict the complainant's 
P-Goal to be the preservation of his life, health and property. The role 
theme of robber, signalled by segment (i), allowed common users to 
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predict the accused's A-Goal to be the ~cquisition of the complainant's 
property. The D-CONT goal was also cued, with its planbox of OVERPOWER. 
Common users made these inferences following segment (i). However, at a 
much later point after segment (ii), common users predicted different goals. 
For the complainant, the interpersonal th.e~e of frien.dship wa.s cued 
following segment (ii), and the associated expectancy rule of the 
protection of a friend from threat by engaging in counterthreat ie, 
the D-Goal plan of OVERPOWER. This conflicted with the former goal 
of self preservation that common users inferred following segment (i). 
Additionally, the second segment signalled the role theme of the accused 
to be robber's accompZice rather than robber. Common users predicted 
the D-Goal from segment (ii) to be D-AGENCY rather than D-CONT. The 
common users repaired this inconsistency with a bridging inference ~e, 
the co-existence of the two r~le themes and their respective goals 
for each character. The characters were imputed to have aspired to the 
conflicting goals at different points in time. Thorndyke (1977) reported 
findings of a similar nature. (See Appendices VI, VII, VIII, IX and pp 79.) 
EmpiricaZ contradiction probZems occurred when witnesses presented a 
sequence of events that could not have ZogicaZZy occurred without the 
addition of information. Each empirical contradiction problem consisted 
of at least two opposing story elements. For example: 
A complainant claimed that, (i) he was on the first floor of a shop 
and that, (ii) he saw the accused come into the shop on the ground floor 
How could this have been possible? 
Empirical contradictions are violations of intentional schema. These 
occur at the two highest levels of the ~aero-schema ie, goals and plans, 
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and themes. They should cause serious disruptions to processing ie, high 
incomprehensibility (Schank and Abelson, 1977). They occurred when witnesses 
did not expZicate the controZZabZe preconditions for goal attainment. In 
this example the primitive act performed by the complainant in segment (ii) 
is ATTEt'{P to the accuse<;!. TP,e P-Goal se.f'Zed. by th,is ~ct iq~ i.s, D..-KNQW 
the location of the accused. The intention~,! scnema provides the 
inference that the controllable pr·econdition of D-KNOW is that the 
person one wishes to know about is in close proximity ie, that the 
accused was visible to the complainant. However, given the position 
of the complainant in segment (i) and the accused in segment (ii), this 
precondition was apparently not met. The rules characterizing the 
intentional schema state that for the achievement of the D-KNOW goal 
another D-Goal must be pursued to create the missing precondition. The 
common users inferred the D-Goal of D-PROX to facilitate the logic of 
the success of D-KNOW in segment (ii). Without this inference common. 
users reported segments (i) and (ii) to be inconsistent and they could 
not connect them into a causal chain. Bennett and Feldman (1981) support 
this finding. (See Appendices I and VII. and pp 79.) 
Expectation aonflict problems occurred when the information presented in 
testimony led common users to expect certain states and/or events and 
yet other states and/or events were said to have occurred. This made ·the 
information unexpected to common users, because witnesses did not provide 
an explanation for the unexpected state and/or event. Each expectation 
conflict problem consisted of at least two opposing story elements. For 
example: 
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An accused stated that, (i) he was looking for the complainant to buy wine 
from her and that, (ii) when he found her he walked straight past her and (iii) 
went to buy wine from another seller. The accused did not explain why he 
had changed his stated plans. 
Expectation conflicts are violations of intentional schema expectations. 
These occur at the highest 1e~els Qf th,e l!l-~q:o-schem.a le? pl,at\S and gods. 
and themes. They should cause ser:ious disruptions to processing ie, high 
incomprehensibility (Schank and Abelson, 1977). They occurred when 
witnesses did not explicate the uncontrollable preconditions that caused 
a change of goals. In this example segment (i) triggered the inference 
that the main goal of the accused was the E-Goal of enjoying wine ie. 
the primitive act of INGEST wine. The D-Goals were D-KNOW the location 
of the source of wine ie, the complainant/seller; D-PROX ie, that the 
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accused and complainant were in close proximity; and D-CONT ie, that the 
accused gained control of the wine. The intentional schema rules predicted 
that if the controllable preconditions for the desired primitive act were 
created by the attainment of D-Goals, the desired primitive act would 
occur and the main goal would be achieved (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
In this case the controllable preconditions for achieving the D-CONT 
goal were attained by the accused ie, D-KNOW and D-PROX. Common users 
expected the D-CONT goal. Instead, the goal chain from D-KNOW in segment (ii) 
was restarted~ · Common users corrected this inconsistency by accepting 
the intentional schema rule that the planbox was discontinued, because 
the uncontrollable preconditions for the attainment of the D-Goal were 
missing ie, that there was some insurmountable obstacle preventing the 
attainment of the D-Goal. Therefore, another D-Goal had to be substituted. 
In this example, the common users inferred that one of the uncontrollable 
preconditions for achieving the D-CONT was missing eg, that the complainant 
did not have wine to sell or that she was too busy to sell the accused 
wine. This caused the accused to change his plans to that of D-KNOW the 
whereabouts of another wineseller 1n segment (iii). Bennett and Feldman 
(1981) support this finding. (See Appendices I, V, VI and VII.) 
The term expectation confli.ct ~s. all. ~biguQus one~ because (J.Zl of the 
encoding problems were caused by e.xpectati.on conflicts ie, conflicts 
between the information provided in testimonies and the information 
predicted from schema (Robinson and Robinson, 1982). 
Ambiguous wording problems occurred when witnesses used personal pronouns 
like them, their, he, she; prepositions like in, under, out; and the 
definite article; without specifying the person, place, object or state 
to which the terms applied. This confused common users as to what 
specific place, person, article and/or state was being referred to. 
Generally common users responded by asking when, where, what and/or 
who? Each ambiguous wording problem consisted of one or more story 
elements presented consecutively. For example: 
An accused stated that, (i) they were talking in the street and that, (ii) 
they went in. He did not state where they went in to, nor whom they were. 
Ambiguous wording problems are violations of script schema expectations. 
This is the second level of the macro-schema therefore these problems 
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should not cause serious disruptions to processing (Schank and Abelson, 1977). 
These occurred when a witness assumed that common users were using the 
script chosen by the witness to understand testimony. Scripts provide 
information as to the props, roles, behaviours, people and locations that 
characterize familiar events. Witnesses generated ambiguous wording 
problems when recounting events which they considered stereotypical. The 
use of a script in producing testimony allowed witnesses to use the 
ambiguous pronouns, prepositions and the definite article as summary cues 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977). In this example, the stereotypical event was 
that of the accused talking to familiar people, in a street that was familiar 
to him and then going into a place that was well known to him. If 
corrvnon use:rs \lad used the sat.ne sq;ipt ~s the witpess, these cues would: 
have signalled .the more detailed infot1Ilation regarding who the people 
were an'd where they went to. However, the witnesses' assumption that 
receivers would be familiar with this event was erroneous. Common users 
reported that the correction of these structural ambiguities was difficult. 
They did not generate the detailed inferences necessary to understand the 
event. They resorted to forming inadequate, general inferences from their 
general knowledge about conversations in streets. There is added support 
for this kind of disruption (Cirilo, 1981; Pratt et al, 1982; Robinson 
and Robinson, 1982). (See pp Z3.) 
Inadequate justification problems occurred when witnesses claimed that 
certain events and/or states occurred or existed, but they provided 
exp~ations for the existence or occurrence of the phenomena that common 
users perceived as inadequate or unsound. Each inadequate justification 
problem consisted of any number of story elements presented consecutively. 
For example: 
A complainant maintained that, (i) the accused was drunk at the time of 
the alleged robbery and that, (ii) he knew that the accused was drunk, 
because he saw the accused walking out of a bar. This reason is not 
adequate. Merely because someone walked out of a bar did not mean that 
he/she was necessarily drunk. 
Inad.equate justifications are violations of script schema expectations. 
This is the second level of the macro-schema therefore these problems 
should not cause severe disruptions to processing (Schank and Abelson, 
1977). These problems came about when a witness claimed that one of the 
results of a script had occurred. However, the testimony did not provide 
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sufficient cues for conunon users. t<;> L-p.st~)\l.tiaJe the sq::ipt fi:S a ~on­
fleeting sc:r>ipt in comprehension. In segment (i) the result of being 
drunk was explicated. This is a result of the ~ BAR. Additionally the 
tocale header for the ~BAR was presented in segment (ii). This information 
signalled common users to use the $ BAR as a fleeting script for inferring 
the missing primitive act that was a precondition for the state change 
from being sober to being drunk 1e, INGEST large quantities of alcohol. 
INGEST is the maincon in scene three of the $ BAR. Common users inferred 
the m1ss1ng primitive act from the fleeting $ BAR. They had little 
confidence in their inferences,because the script was fleeting instead 
of non~fleeting (Schank and Abelson, 1977). The witness should have 
provided another script header eg, a maincon, central precondition, role 
or prop. Then the common users would have been confident in their 
inferences because they could have used the ~ BAR as a non-fleeting script. 
(See Appendix IV and pp 73.) 
Justification missing problems occurred when witnesses claimed that certain 
states existed, but they did not explain how they knew these states existed 
nor why the states existed. This often left common users asking, how 
did they know that, and why did that occur? Each justification missing 
problem consisted of any number of story elements presented consecutively. 
For example: 
A complainant maintained that, (i) the accused was drunk at the time of 
alleged robbery. He did not state how he knew the accused was drunk nor 
why the accused was drunk. 
Justification missing problems are violations of causal chain schema 
expectations. This is the lowest level of the macro-schema, therefore 
these problems should not cause serious disruptions to processing (Schank 
and Abelson, 1977). They occurred when witnesses did not explicate the 
primiti\1_e acts that caused state cha-p,ges ir:rrpZie~ in testitno:n.ies. Such 
om1ss1ons produced contradictions of the causal syntax rules. In this 
example there was a violation of the first causal syntax rule (see 
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Appendix II) ie, that an action is prerequisite for a state change (Schank 
and Abelson, 1977). The state change implied in segment (i) was that the 
accused changed from a state of being sober to one of being drunk. However, 
the primitive act that is a precondition for this state change was not 
presented ie, INGEST alcohol. In order to correct this problem the common 
users inferred the missing primitive act from the causal semantic. It is 
noteworthy that justification missing problems are particular to language 
interactions 1n court. It is probable that in everyday interactions 
receivers do not consider this type of omission to be a schematic violation. 
It is generally accepted that producers do not validate every implied 
state change with the prerequisite primitive actions. This facilitates 
economy in communication. In court claims that are not supported 
explicitly are deemed problematic. These are not perceived as evidence 
but as mere opinion. 
Direct contradiction problems occurred when two states that were mutually 
exclusive were said to have both occurred. This often left common users 
asking, which was it? Each direct contradiction consisted of at least two 
opposing story elements. For example: 
An accused maintained that, (i) there were three people at the scene of a 
robbery, and then he claimed that, (ii) there were five people present. 
Direct contradictions are violations of causal chain schema expectations. 
This is the lowest level of the macro-schema therefore they should not 
cause serious disruptions to I?t'OCessiJ;lg (Schank and Abelsqi;J., 1917). 
They occurred when witnesses c/.id not e;,x:pZiwte the primi tiv.e acts that 
caused state changes explicated 1n testimonies. These are contradictions 
of the causal syntax rules. In this example there was a violation of 
the first rule ie, that an action is prerequisite for a state change 
(see Appendix II) (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Segment (i) was the first 
state of there being three people present and segment (ii) was the 
second state of there being five people present. There was no action 
provided to enable this change of states. The common users repaired 
this inconsistency by inferring a primitive act to connect the two 
states 1e, the PTRANS of two more people to the location of the first 
three. The inference was derived from the causal semantic. 
To conclude~ 
The less identifiable and the more implicit are the temporal, 
causal and intentional relations among actions and states in 
discourse, the less comprehensible and memorable the discourse 
will prove to be. 
(Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980: 108) 
Credibility and comprehensibility : Common users as compared to magistrates 
In all simulation-type research there are difficulties in extrapolating 
extra-court findings to predict in-court processes (Lloyd-Bostock, 1981). 
The pilot phase common users reported that their credibility judgements 
were influenced by the comprehensibility and by implication, the well-
formedness of testimonies ie, they found that they judged less 
comprehensible (less well-formed) testimonies to be less credible. They 
reported that they perceived 'incomprehensibilities' (encoding problems) 
to be cues of deception. The experimental phase I common users rated 
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testimonies that magistrates judged to be incredible as less comprehensible 
(less well-formed), th.an test4nQn~es th?.t \ll~gistrates ju4.ged tQ be 
credible. This finding was infeq:ed as supporting the pilot phase 
finding (above). These ar.e extra-court findings. The question is 
whether magistrates' credibility judgements are shaped by the 
comprehensibility and structural well-formedness of testimonies? In 
this study it has been argued that because the magistrates and the 
common users were language processors of the s~e social class and 
eth.ni.city, they employed similar cognitive strategies in comprehending 
and assessing testimonies. However, they differed regarding their goals 
an4 the gravity of their comprehension tasks, their prior experience 
at comprehending testimonies and the range of variables that affected 
their final judgements. 
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The co1'J11}1on users accomplished a recognition-type task during the first phase of 
theexperime:p.tal procedure ie, the recognition of incomprehensible story 
elements (encoding problems). An informal analysis of magistrates' 
judgements~ showed that magistPates also performed this recognition task 
during the comprehension of testimonies. However, they not only had to 
recognise the incomprehensible sections of testimonies during comprehension, 
they also had to recall these 'incomprehensiblities' during their judgements. 
In addition they had to recall the gist of each testimony in a court case 
(see Appendix XVI). Their judgements consisted of summaries of the gist of 
each testimony and statements regarding the 'incomprehensibilities' they 
perceived in each testimony. This served as the rationale for their 
cre4ibility judgements and by implication their verdicts. 
This difference between the tasks performed by the magistrates as compared 
with the common users was not expected to invalidate the postulate that 
comprehensibility 'determines' credibility. Although the magistrates 
performed a more complex, p-roble~ sol~ing task tha,t was rel.i~n.t O'tl lQr;g 
tePf!l· memory processes~ it h.tii.S been shown that macro-schema are used to an 
even greater extent in comprehending and recalling lengthy discourse to 
solve complex problems (Cirilo, 1981). Therefore it is theoretically 
sound to hypothesiz.e that magistrates do process testimony similarly to 
common users ie, using macro-schema, and that because they rely more 
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heavily upon their macro-schema to organize information, schematic 
violations ('incomprehensibilities' or encoding problems) are likely to 
disrupt their comprehension to an even greater extent than that experienced 
by common users. This means that they may experience higher levels of 
incomprehensibility due to encoding problems, when testimonies are less 
well-formed. Since theirs 1s the more grave task of assessing credibility, 
such schematic violations are more likely to be perceived as cues of 
deception and therefore to be well-encoded for recall during their 
judgements ie, Von Restorf's effect will operate. To conclude, it is 
plausible that the comprehensibility (well-formedness) of testimony 
influences a magistrate's perception of its credibility. 
Should the abovementioned p~ocess operate in court: The magistrate would 
assess tp~ well-£ormedness (comprehensibility) of each of the testimonies 
fC)r the prosecution. He/she would then form an overall impression of the 
comprehensibility of the case for the prosecution. This would enable him/ 
her to decide the overall credibility of the prosecution and defence cases 
in the same manner. The two credibility assessments, one for the entire 
prosecution case and one for the entire defence case, would finally be 
compared. If the prosecution case was judged more credible, the verdic.t 
would be guilty and the accused would be convicted. If the defence case 
was judged more credible, the verdict would· be not guilty and the accused 
would be acquitted. Therefore comprehensibility would be one central 
factor influe~cing ~agistr;:ttes' 'ter4icts. (See pp 9.) 
There are many other eXtra-linguistic and para-linguistic variables that 
J]lay contribute to the final verdict eg, appearance, gestures, accent, 
prior cqnvictions etc. The source credibility of witnesses may improve 
or d:etract from the credibility of their messages. It has been found 
that when receivers perceive low source credibility they also perceive 
low message credibility (Kerr and Bray, 1982). The implication for this 
study is th;:t.t magistrates may pre-judge the credibility of witnesses 
using extra-linguistic indicators eg, appearance, social class, ethnicity 
etc.. They may then begin to assess the credibility of testimonies using 
para-linguistic and linguistic indicators. These latter assessments of 
message credibility would be influenced by magistrates' former perceptions 
of witnesses' source. credibility ie, tn:agistrates who judge a witness to 
be implausible would be more likely to perceive their testimony to be 
incredible. However, more conclusive statements of the interrelations 
between source and message credibility in court, await further research. 
I 
Comprehensibility of PIS's and CES's, and credibility 
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This study showed that it was the PIS's of testimonies that magistrates had 
judged to be incredible; that common users perceived to be less comprehensible. 
CQmmon users did not perceive the CES's of testimonies that magistrates 
had judged to be incredible and those that magistrates had judged to be 
credible, as differing in their levels of comprehensibility. Given the 
inf·erence that magistrates function as common users (see above), it may be 
deduced that magistrates focus upon the comprehensibility of the PIS's of 
testimcmies when assessing the credibility of entire testimonies 1.n court. 
An informal analysis of testimonies provided theoretical support for this 
inference: A PIS is likely to play the central role in determining the 
the credibility of an entire testi'Q}Qp.y, because it is in. tll,e PIS that the 
witness provides the ba.sic in.fo~a.tion t-hat th.e wagistrate uses to fil'l. 
his /her macro-schema 'slots'. The data presented· in the CES 1s of a more 
peripheral nature. It serves to supplement the magistrate's existing 
macro-propositions ie,those formed from information delivered during the 
PIS. Additionally the information presented in the PIS is not shaped 
to any substantial extent by questioning. The PIS is the witness's 
endeavour. Therefore it way be deduced that it is magistrates' 
perceptions of the efficacy of witnesses' linguistic efforts that 
determines the credibility of testimonies. The notion that prosecutors' 
questioning during cross examination produces structural ill-formedness 
and incomprehensibility of entire testimonies, is not supported. Had this 
been the case common users would have perceived differences in the 
comprehensi_bility of the CES' s of testimonies judged by magistrates to be 
credible and incredible. However, the procedure followed in this study 
may have obscured the effects of cross examination on comprehensibility. 
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The common users were instructed not to note comprehension difficulties that 
were repetitious. Problems that first occurred in PIS's and re-occurred 
in CES's were not reported. The scores for D.v. 2b (comprehensibility of 
CES's) included those problems created by questioning. This prevented an 
analysis of the role played by questioning in emphasizing 'incomprehensibilities' 
(encoding problems) during cross examination. Repeated questioning may 
emphasize encoding problems making these more memorable to magistrates. 
This may increase Von Restorf' s effect in court. Hence, a conclusive 
comment of the effects of questioning on perceived comprehensibility and 
credibility awaits further investigation. No conclusion may be drawn 
regarding the relative 'contributions' of the PIS's as compared to the 
CES's, to the comprehensibility and credibility of entire testimonies. 
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Comparing types of e~~Qdi~g pr.oble~s 
Figure 10-1. illustrates different proportions of each type of encoding 
problem constituting the total complement of encoding problems in testimonies. 
In this study encoding problems are shown to be factors that may detract 
from the credibility of testimoni.es. Thus, readers may take issue with 
an unexplained om~ss~on of statistical tests of these apparently relevant 
differenc.es. Ho~ever, as yet there is no accurate weighting system to 
estimate the extent to which each type detracts from credibility and the 
possibility that each type may decrease credibility to a different degree, 
must be considered. Hypothesize that two direct contradictions decrease 
credibility to the same extent as a single justification missing. A mean 
percentage of 25 direct contradictions could then be said to decrease 
credibility to a similar degree as a mean percentage of 12 justifications 
missing. Therefore in this instance, establishing a statistically 
significant difference in the mean percentages of these two types of 
encoding problems would be of little practical relevance. 
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Figure 10-1. Graph of Mea~ Relative I,>erceJ;ttcii,ges of Each Encoding Problem 
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Encoding problem types 
Key: 1 Irrelevant information 5 Ambiguous wording 
2 Delayed information 6 Inadequate justifications 
3 Empirical contradictions 7 Justifications missing 
4 Expectation conflicts 8 Direct contradictions 
It is i~terestillg to note tll,a,t e~ectation conflicts, ~biguous wording 
and direct contradictions seemed to occur more frequently than the other 
five types of encoding problems ie, 18%, 17% and 25% respectively. 
Conclusions regarding the i~portance of varying frequencies of each type 
of encoding problem must await the development of a valid weighting system. 
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The common users noted both high and low level schematic violations 
(incomprehellsibilities}epcodillg problems) as indicators of 
incomprehensibility (ill ..... forq~edness). The combined mean relative percentage 
for the high level problems was 7.45% whereas for the low level it was 
15.73%. This seems to indicate that common users identified more low 
level problems than high level problems. However, for the reasons mentioned 
above this difference was not tested statistically (see Fig 10-2. p 181). 
In order to develop the hypotheses regarding the relative distribution of 
the eight types of encoding problems the assumption that the magistrates 
had functioned as common users, was taken as given. The expectation was that 
the magistrates had judged highly incomprehensible testimonies ie, those 
that had been less well-formed due to many encoding problems; to be 
incredible. Similarly, they had judged more well-formed (fewer encoding 
problems), ~ore comprehensible testimonies to be credible. Empirical 
findings have shown that high level schematic violations (incomprehensibilities/ 
encoding problems) cause greater disruptions to processing (higher 
incomprehensibility) than low level violations (Black, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977). 
Therefore it was hypothesized that the magistrates had judged testimonies 
to be incredible, because these testimonies had 'caused' the magistrates 
more high level encoding prqblems (schematic violations). Similarly they 
had judged testimonies to be credible, because these testimonies had 'caused' 
them fewer high level encoding problems. H,owever, the results showed no 
significant differences bet~eeJ;). the relative percentages of each of the 
four types of high level probletns i.e, irrelevant information, delayed 
information, empirical contradictions and expectation conflicts; across 
testimonies that the magistrates had judged to be credible as compared to 
those they had judged to be incredible. This is surprising and contrary 
to theoretical expectations. However, the finding may have been due to 
a procedural factor and}or differences in. the cognitive processing of the 
tnagistrates a.J;l.d the common users. It must be recalled that it was the 
C07J1!!10t:l users and not the magistrates who provided the measures for these 




SOtne of the encoding proble:Qts were nQt included in the statistical analyses. 
These were the problems that were not placed in the same category by at 
least two of the 'analysts' ie, the non-categorizable problems. Had these 
problems been categorized and included, significant differences may have 
been demonstrated. A higher mean relative percentage of the encoding problems 
in incredible testimonies were not categqriz.ed ie, 4,36 as compared to 1,17 
in credible testimonies. More significantly, 36.36 percent 
of the non-categorized problems were high level problems ie, irrelevant 
information, empirical contradictions and expectation conflicts. Testimonies 
judged by magistrates to be incredible exhibited higher mean relative 
percentages of empirical contradiction and delayed information problems 
than credible testimonies ie, 8,616 and 4,2; and 3,447 and 1,576 respectively. 
Although the differences did not reach statistical 
significance, had the non·categorized problems been categorized the 
differences may have reach significance. Additionally there were 
• 
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disagreeypents ov.er the categories i~.tQ ~hid~ so~pe of th.e problems were to 
be placed fe, when only two out of the tht:·ee 'analysts' agreed on the 
category. The highest level of disagreement occurred over the categorization 
of problems as direct as opposed to empirical contradictions ie, 25,4 
percen.t of the disagreements. The second highest level was between 
erppirical contradictions and expectation conflicts ie, 21 percent of the· 
disagreements. Since empirical contraditions and expectation conflicts 
are ·P,igh level problems, their reclassification may have altered the non 
sig~ificance of the statistical fi~dings. Total agreement among the 
'analysts' was not expected. The high levels of disagreement regarding 
erppirical and direct contradictions and between empirical contradictions 
an,d expectation conflicts, were due to the subtlety of the distinctions 
among these categories. Empirical contradictions and expectation conflicts 
both result from missing p:reconditions i.e, controllable preconditions 
and preconditions causing goal changes, respectively. Empirical and 
diTect contradictions are both caused by missing information regarding 
primitiv.e acts ie, controllable preconditions for primitive acts and 
primitive acts causing state changes, respectively (see pp 164 and 170). 
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Differences :. common users and IJ1<;igistr9tes 
Figure 10-2. Common Users' Encoding Problems 
Encoding problem Types of macro- Level of 
types (schematic schematic violation 
violation) violation 
Irrelevant Intentional schema 3/4 H 
Information (themes and goals I 
and plans) G 
H 
Delayed Intentional schema 3/4 
Information (themes and goals L and plans) 
E 
Empirical Intentional schema 3/4 v E Contradictions (themes and goals L and plans) 
Expectation Intentional schema 3/4 
Conflicts (themes and goals 
and plans) 
Ambiguous Wording Script schema 2 L 
0 
Inadequate Script schema 2 w 
Justifications 
L 
Justifications Causal chain 1 E 
Missing schema v 
E 
Direct Causal chain 1 L 
Contraditions schema 
An informal analysis of the magistrates' judgements showed that they 
concentrated solely upon high level violations ie, violations of intentional 
schema (see Appendix XVI). This difference between the common users and the 
magistrates may have been due to their different levels of familiarity/ 
experience in processing testimonial discourse. Schank and Abelson (1977) 
maintained that receivers who are familiar with processing a certain type 






common users been more experienced' Cit processing testimonial, ~;lis course, 
they may have identified more high level violations (encoding problems). 
Consequently, the differences between the relative percentages of each 
of the high level types of encoding problems may have reached 
significance. This should not be taken to imply that the magistrates 
did not perceive low level violations. It is more probable that although 
they perceived low level problems, the high information processing load 
and the restricted time available to them in verbalizing their judgements 
prevented them from verbalizing the low level problems. Rather, their 
focus was upon high level violations in delivering the rationale for their 
verdicts~ After completing this study, the researcher has decided that 
the measures for the high level problems should have been combined and 
compared to a combined measure for the low level problems. Further 
studies have been planned. 
Additionally, violations (encoding problems) differ regarding their 
relationships to critical causal chains in testimonies ie, they may be 
peripheral to, or may occur in critical causal chains (Black and Bower, 
1980). The magistrates' task was to determine whether or not a legal 
offence had been committed. Therefore it was the legal offence in any 
case that determined the critical causal chain of events. For example, 
in one of the robbery cases in this study the highest level state change 
was the change of the complainants' state from having control of his 
property, to not having control of his property. This was 'caused' by 
the highest level event ie, the primitive act of the PTRANS of his radio 
(property) to the accused. However, many other planboxes were followed 
to attain this state change. The lowest level, 'successful' planbox was 




accused. All the events and state changes (plap,bo?C·es a~d subgoals) that 
connected this lowest level, successful state change to the highest 
level state change, are termed the critical causal chain (see Appendix 
III). The common users were not required to assess whether a legal 
offence had been committed. Therefore, they noted violations both in 
and peripheral to critical causal chains (see Appendix XVI). 
Violations occurring in critical causal chains cause greater disruptions 
to processing (incomprehensibility) than those peripheral to critical 
causal chains (Black and Bower, 1980). Hence, low level problems that 
occurred in critical causal chains may have 'caused' both common users 
and magistrates greater incomprehensibility, than high level problems 
that were peripheral to critical causal chains. A weighting system 
should have been developed that incorporated both the hierarchical level 
and the relationship of violations to tpe critical causal chain. Had the 
D.V. 's
3
a to Jh been developed to reflect both of these factors, significant 
differences between the relative percentages of each of the eight types 
of encoding problems may have been demonstrated. Conclusions regarding 
the differential effects of each type and level of encoding problem upon 
magistrates' comprehensibility and credibility assessments, await further 
investigation. 
11. DISCUSSION - PART II 
11.1. Aim two (see pp 120) 
11.1.1. Findings 
Hypotheses one and three were supported in this study. The Anovas 
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investigating the main. eft:ects of: the ethn.icity factor provid:ed sigt;tificant 
results with two of the D.V. ~s 1e, the c<;>mprehensibility of testimonies and 
PIS's. Common users judged the testimonies and PIS's of 'coloured' 
witnesses to be more incomprehensible than those of 'white' witnesses. 
Hypotheses two and five wer·e not supported. The CES 's of testimonies and 
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the rela~ive percentages of each of the eight types of encoding problems were 
not significantly affected by the ethnicity factor. Common users did not 
find the CES's of 'coloured' witnesses' testimonies any more incomprehensible 
than the CES's of 'white' witnesses' testimonies. 'Coloured' witnesses' 
testimonies 4id not exhibit higher relative percentages of irrelevant 
informa~ion, delayed information, empirical contradictions and expectation 
conflicts; than 'white' witnesses' testimonies ie, they did not contain 
higher proportions of high level encoding problems. 'White' witnesses' 
testimonies did not exhibit higher relative percentages of ambiguous wording, 
inadequate justifications and justifications missing, than 'coloured' witnesses' 
testimonies ie, they did not contain higher proportions of low level encoding 
problems. 
Hypothesis s1x was not tested directly, but was dependent on the affirmation 
of h:ypothesis two from aun one and. hypothesis one from aim two (see pP 119 & 120). 
These hypotheses were affi~ed ie, common users found testimonies that 
magistrates had judged to be incredible and testimonies delivered by 
'coloured' witnesses, to be more incomprehensible. Therefore, shouLd 
magistrates function as the common users did, they would judge 'coloured' 
witnesses' testimonies to be less comprehensible and therefore less credible 
than 'white' witnesses' testimonies. This implies that 'coloured' witnesses 
who testify 'against' 'white' witnesses, would be relatively disadvantaged. 
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11. 1. 2. Interpretation 
Ethnicity and credibility Magistrates and common users 
The notion that magistrates function as common users has been supported 
theoretically throughout this thesis. When this postulate is accepted, 
the deduction is that the magistrates in this study judged testimonies 
to be incredible, because they perceived these to be less incomprehensible 
(less well-formed), than the testimonies they had judged to be credible. 
In this study, low comprehensibility was a reliable indicator of structural 
ill-formedness (see pp 111). The common users found 'coloureds'' testimonies 
to be less comprehensible (less well-formed) than 'whites'' testimonies. 
The inference is that the magistrates also perceived 'coloureds'' 
testimonies to be less comprehet;l.si.ble (less well-formed) than those 
of 'whites'. The corollary is that the magistrates judged 'coloureds'' 
testimonies to be less credible than. 'whites'', because they perceived 
'coloureds'' testimonies to be less comprehensible (less well-formed). 
In court cases magistrates' credibility assessments are PeZative. Therefore 
~n an interracial case, 'coloured~ witnesses would be likely to operate at 
a disadvantage relative to 'whites'. For example, a 'coloured' accused 
would be more likely to be perceived as less comprehensible and therefore 
less credible by a 'white' magistrate, than his/her 'white' complainant 
cou1;1terpart. This would increase the probability of a guilty verdict and 
con\l'iction. 
In this study it is most significant that 'white' common users judged the 
comprehensibility of 'coloureds'' testimonies to be lower and that 'white' 
I 
magistrates judge the comprehensibility and credibility of 'coloureds'' 
testimonies in eoul't. Once aga.in it has been accepted that magistrates 
• I • 
function as co1IliJlOn usex:s. The~efore the question 1s, why did ~white' 
magistrates and common users perc.eive 'coloureds'' testimonies to be less 
comprehensible than 'whites'' testimonies? 
Two exp 1 ana t ions have been proposed~-
First explanation 
The 1984 Human Sciences Research Council Multipurpose Survey showed that 
the majority of 'coloured' respondents had no day to day social 
interaction with 'white' respondents. This finding is no surpr1se 
since 'coloured' and 'white' South Africans are required by law, to live 
and socialize in geographically separate areas. It is because 'coloured' 
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and 'white' South Africans live and function in different social realities, 
that their world knowledge differs. The contents of their macro-schemas 
differ and therefore so do their no~s for the production and interpretation 
of 4.iscourse. Therefore, it has been inferred that the macro-schematic 
knowledge and norms of interpretation that were used by the 'white' common 
users/magistrates to understand the testimonies in this study, differed 
from the macro-schematic knowled:ge and nor:ms of production that were used 
by the 'coloured' witnesses to produce the testimonies in this study. 
This difference could have produced the 'white' common users'/m.agistrates' 
perceptions of lowered comprehensibility of 'coloureds'' testimonies. The 
use of different ma.cro-schematic knowledge and norms of interpretation by 
'white' COIDI:IlQn users/magistrates, could have 'caused' them to perceive 
mqre schem.a.tic violations (encoding problems/incomprehensibilities) 1n 
'coloureds'' testimonies. Should magistrates function as the pilot phase 
common users did, they would use the higher levels of schematic violations 
in 'coloureds'' testimonies to indicate higher levels of implausibility 
(deception). This would function to the disadvantage of 'coloured' witnesses 
in interracial criminal tf:ials. 
Of additional significance i.s.th.e notion that 'coloured' South Africans 
are unlikely to acquire 'white' norms of interpretation and production, 
because they receive a different quantity and quality of education. The 
median highest standard of education attained by 'coloured' respondents 
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was a standard six or seven school education, whereas for 'white' respondents 
it was a standard ten and above (Human Sciences Research Council Multi-
purpose Survey, 1984). To conclude, the separation of the social, 
residential and educational 'realities' of 'coloured' and 'white' South 
Africans serves to maintain the increased likelihood of inter-ethnic 
incomprehensibility. 
The first explanation has focused upon possible ethnic differences in the 
comprehensibility and credibility of testimony ie, message credibility. 
The process postulated i.s that 'white' magistrates percei":e 'coloureds'' 
testimonies to be less CQ'Qlpreh,el;l.sible and therefore less credible than 
'whites'' testimonies. This lowered perception of message credibility 
influences magistrates' judgel!lel;l.tS of the trustworthiness of 'coloured' 
wi.tnesses ie, their ?o.u:rce credibility. Therefore, it is proposed that 
magistrates' perceptio1;1s of message credibility influence their perceptions 
of source credibility. 
Secop.d explanation 
The Multipurpose Survey showed that the majority of 'white' respondents 
considered 'coloured' South Africans to be less good, just, honest, reliable and 
CQTTTPetent, than 'white' South African.s (Human Sciences Research Council 
Multipurpose Survey, 1984). These findings support the notion that 'white' 
South African.s are likely tQ foP!!. tl'l,e ge-p,et::~l hypothesis th?.t ! cq~,qureQ. ~ 
South African.s are more deceptiv.e (l.ess cr·edi.ble) tha.n 'whites' ie, they 
have lower source credibility. It has been found that when people expect 
to be deceived they overestimate the number of 'lies' that they perceive 
(~ller and Burgoon, 1982). These postulates have been extrapolated to 
explain courtroom interactions.. The pilot phase common users reported 
using schematic violations (encoding problems/incomprehensibilities) 
as indicators of deception. The experimental phase I common users 
perceived 'coloureds'' testimonies to contain higher percentages of these 
'deception indicators'. Should magistrates function as common users, it 
may be inferred that they also perceive higher incidences of 
incomprehensibilities ('deception indicators') in 'coloureds'' testimonies, 
because they overestimate the number of 'lies' (incomprehensibilities) 
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in 'coloureds'' testimonies. This explanation follows from the postulate 
tha.t 'white' magistrates operate with the hypothesis ·that 'coloured' 
witnesses have lower source credibility than 'whites'. Magistrates are 
expected to 1test' this hypothesis by consciously or unconsciously 
overestimating the incid.ence of incomprehensibilities that they perceive 
in 'coloureds'' testimonies. This serv.es to 'prove' their hypothesis 
regarding low source credibility by 'demonstrating' low message credibility. 
Magistrates may then reach. the con.clusion that 'coloured' witnesses are 
more deceptive and therefore less credible than 'whites'! This is a 
process of self-fulfilling hypothesis testing. 
Alteqt,atively, 'white' magistrates' perceptions of the lower source 
credibility of 'coloured' witnesses may not directly lower their perceptions 
of 'coloureds'' message credibility. Ma.gistrates may assess source 




the message credibility ot. 'cQloured.s'' testimonies is still expected to 
be lower than that of 'whites', due to the differences between 'white' 
magistrates' and 'coloured' witnesses' macro-schematic knowledge and norms 
of production and interpretation (as was discussed in the first explanation). 
Therefore, the combination of magistrates' perceptions of 'coloureds'' 
lower source credibility and message credibility would still produce 
an ove:raU decrease in the perceived plausibility of 'coloured' witnesses 
relative to 'white' witnesses in court. 
At first, this account may not appear to explain the behaviour of the 
common users in this study. The experimental phase I common users were 
apparently unaware of the ethnic identities of the witnesses. The 
procedure was designed to prevent tbi.s knowledge from influencing the 
common users' assessments. }{owever, certain speech markers may have 
identified the witnesses' ethnicity (Roberts, 1979). The dialect used 
by the majority of 'coloured' South Africans ie, 'gamtal', is an accurate 
marker of their ethnic identity. 'Coloured' witnesses who did not use 
this obvious dialect may also have been identified as 'coloured' by 
the common users. Certain aspects of endemic grammar, greetings and 
lexical preferences cha.racterize the language spoken by the 'coloured' 
ethnic group (McCormick, 1983). Since the original court transcripts 
were us.ed to avoid altering the se~a.n.tic structure of testimonies, the 
effects of these speech markers could not be controlled for. The common 
users ~ay have been consciously or unconsciously aware of the different 
ethni.c id.entities of the 'coloured' and ~white' witnesses. Therefore, 
the co~n users' as well as the magistrates' behaviour may be explained 
using this second account. 
To conclude, it is suggestec_l thc;t.t th,e beh.a:v:iour of 'wt'!.ite' ~q._gistr~tes 
is more succintly acc.ounted. for by the secon4 explanation. nowe\\er, 
the findings do not permit a final decision regarding the most applicable 
account. Additional research w:ould be necessary to assess the comparative 
validity of such competing explanations. 
But in the measure in which you belong to my own community, 
you hav.e been subjected to a linguistic and cultural 
training similar to my own and I have valid grounds for 
supposing that your propositions have a similar meaning for 
both of us. And the 'hypothesis' which I make when I hear 
you speak, and which you make speaking to me, is confirmed 
for both of us by your and my total behaviour. 
(Cicourel, 1973:. 53/4) 
Ethnicity, PIS's, CES's and credibility 
This study showed tha.t it was the PIS's of 'coloureds" testimonies that 
connnon users found to be I)lore incomprehensible than the PIS's of 'whites'' 
testimonies. The common. users did not perceive differences between the 
comprehensibility of the CES's of 'coloureds'' and 'whites'' testimonies. 
Once again let us assume that 'white' magistrates function as 'white' 
common users. It may be c_lec_luc.ed that magistrates focus upon the 
comprehel)sibility of the PIS's of testimonies when judging the credibility 
of entire testimonies in court ~e, the comprehensibility of the CES's do 
not hav.e substantial effects. Th.e ar·gUI)lent has already been made that 
the procedura.l instruction that common users were not to repeat 
'incomprehel)sibilities' that first occurred in the PIS's and reoccurred 
in the CES' s of testimonies, could have obs·cured the effects of the 
in.comprehensibility of CES' s on overall credibility. The same argument 
could explain the non. significant findings regarding the differences 






is referred back to p 17 5 ~-$- th.i.s a:rg\J.I!l~n.t h.as not been r-epea_ted.) The 
conclusion also remains constant ie, that the findings do not permit 
conclusions to be drawn regardi-ng the relative 'contributions' that are 
made to credibility by the PIS's and CES's of 'coloureds'' as compared 
to 'whites" testimonies. 
Interracial effects 
The possible effects of witnesses' ethnic identity upon magistrates'/ 
common users' perceptions of their credibility has been discussed in the 
previous section (seep 186). The question of how the lowered credibility 
of 'coloured' witnesses operates to their relative disadvantage in court, 
has received little syste~atic attention. Since only six of the 32 
sample cases were interracial, a separate statistical analysis was not 
applicable. However, a qualitative analysis was conducted to evaluate 
hypothesis six. Three of the cases comprised 'white' complainants and 
'coloured' accused, with two of the 'white' complainants being judged 
incredible and one credible, by magistrates. Three of the cases comprised 
'coloured' complainants and 'white' accused, with one of the 'white' 
accused being judged incredible and two credible, by magistrates (see 
Appendix XVII). Readers should noted that the assumption that magistrates 
function as common users ha_s been adopted throughout the following two 
section.s. 
'White' co~pla.inants 'versus' 'colour-ed' accused 
Th.e qualitative analysis showed that:. In order for 'white' magistrates 
to per-ceive 'coloured' ac.cuseds' testimonies as credible, the accused had to 







to their 'white' complai~.9~t couJ?.~e~p~rts ie ~ the mea~ per.ce~tages Qf 
incomprehensibility were 19.15% v.:ersus 45.4% for the entire testiJ;Ilonies, 
22.4% versus 47.65% for the CES's;: and 29.15% versus 44.5% for the PIS's, 
respectively. Therefore, the PIS's and CES's of 'coloured' accused 
who were judged by magistrates to be credible, appeared to be much more 
comprehensible (more well-formed) than the PIS's and CES's of their 
'white' complainant counterparts, whom magistrates judged to be incredible. 
However, when a ·'coloured accused' presented a PIS that was similarly 
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well-formed (comprehensible) to that of his 'white' complainant counterpart; 
the magistrate judged the 'coloured' accused to be incredible ie, 19.4% 
versus 23.5% incomprehensibility, respectively. It appeared that the 
magistrates~ perception of the ~coloured 1 accuseds' credibility was lowered 
by the hi.gher incomprehensibility (lower well-formedness) of his CES in 
relation to his 'white' counterpart ie, 26.2% versus 11.8% incomprehensibility, 
respectively. The higher incomprehensibility of the 'coloured' accuseds' 
CES seemed to be produced by the prosecutors' questioning. The validity 
of this explanation requires further testing. 
However, it seems that in. order for 'coloured' accused to attain credibility 
they must present PIS's that are substantially more well-formed (more 
comprehensible), than their 'white' complainant counterparts. In this 
case, there are so few schematic violations (incomprehensibilities) to 
begin with, that this seeJ;Ils to prevent prosecutors emphasizing schematic 
violations from PIS's during cross examination. However, when 'coloured' 
accused and. 'white' complainants deliver PIS's that are similarly well-
formed (comprehep.sible), prosecutors seem to decrease the comprehensibility 
and credibility of 'coloured' accuseds 1 testimonies in CES's,to below 
that of their 'white' complainant counterparts. Prosecutors seemed to 
I 
I 
emphasiz:e schematic ~iolatianp (incomprehensibilities) that occurred 
'in accuseds' PIS's during cross examination. Therefore, 'coloured' 
accused may run a higher ri.sk of being convicted due to their lower 
relative credibility in interracial cases. This speculative account 
provides support for the disadvantaging of 'coloured' accused relative 
to 'white' oomplainants in court. 
'Coloured' complainants '~ersus' 'white' accused 
The qualitative analysis showed that: In order for a 'white' magistrate 
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to perceive a 'coloured' complainant's testimony as credible, the complainant 
had to present a PIS that was substantially more well-formed (comprehensible) 
than hi.s 'white' accused counterpart ie, 7.2% versus 41.1% incomprehensibility, 
respectively. Prosecutors appeared to decrease the overall comprehensibility 
(credibility) of 'coloured' witnesses' testimonies during cross examination 
to a greater extent than 'whites'' ie, the mean percentages of 
incomprehensibility in CES's were 46.07% versus 23.2%, respectively. When 
a 'coloured' complainant began with a very well-formed (comprehensible) 
PIS, the prosecutors' effect (as w.as mentioned above) did not lower the 
o~erall comprehensibility (credibility) of his testimony to below that of 
pis 'white' accused counterpart. In consequence, the magistrate perceived 
the 'white' accused. as less credible than the 'coloured' complainant and 
he was con~icted. However, when 'coloured' complainants presented PIS's 
tha.t we:re substantially less well-foO!led (more incomprehensible) than 
their 'white' accused counterparts, the prosecutors effect was significant 
ie, the mean percentages of inc.omprehensibility ·of the PIS's were 44.5% 
and 29.15%; a.nd· the CES's were 47.65% and 22.4%i respectively. The 
prosecutors' questioning during cross examination appeared to emphasize 
the schematic violations (ipcolllPreh,e'(l.sibilities) front. the PIS's of 
'coloured'complainants' testimonies. This reduced the overall 
comprehensibility (credibility) of 'coloured' complainants' testimonies 
to well below that of their 'white' accused counterparts ie, the mean 
percentages of incomprehensibility in testimonies were 45.4% and 19.15%, 
respectively. Magistrates then judged the 'coloured' complainants to 
be incredible. The 'white' accused were acquitted and the 'coloured' 
complainants 'lost' their cases. This interpretation supports the 
disadvantaging of 'coloured' complainants relative to 'white' accused 
in court. 
To conclude, it is postulated.that 'white' magistrates are more likely 
to perceive 'coloured' witnesses' testimonies to be less well-formed, 
less comprehensible and therefore less credible than 'white' witnesses' 
testimonies. This disadvantages 'coloured' witnesses in court cases 
where thei+ crediblity is judged relative to 'white' witnesses 1e, 1n 
interracial cases. Since these conclusions were reached using a small 
sample and qualitative tec~niques, further investigations are necessary 
to cla.rify the significance of the effects. 
Ethnicity and types of encoding problems 
It was hypothesized that magistrates had judged testimonies to be 
incredible because they contained higher relative percentages of the 
four high level encoding problems, irrelevant information, delayed 
information, empirical contradictions and expectation conflicts. This 
hypothesis was not supported. (The reader is referred back to p 178 
for the details of the rationale.) A related hypothesis was formed 
regar<iing the ethnic differences expected ie, that magistrates would 
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find 'coloureds~' testimonies. J!lOre incomprehe-p.sible than ~whites'', 
because they contained higher relative percentages of the four high 
level encoding problems. This ~ypqthesis was not supported. The 
reasons for this lack of support are identical to those discussed in 
relation to the credibility factor ·and will not be discussed further 
(seep 178). 
11.2. Aim three (see p 121) 
11.2.1. Findings 
There was no statistical support for hypotheses one, two, three, four 
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and five. The Anovas investigating the effects of the court role factor 
provided non significant results for the following D.V.'s: the 
comprehensibility of testimonies (D.V. 2a), PIS's, (D.V. 2c) CES's, (D.v. 2b) 
and the relative percentages of all the encoding problems except expectation 
conflicts (D. V. 's 3a to 3h). 
Common users did not perce1ve accuseds' testimonies, CES's or PIS's to 
be any more btcomprehensible than complainants'. Accuseds' testimonies 
did not contain higher relative percentages of irrelevant information, 
delayed information or empirical contradictions; than complainants' 
testimonies ie, they did not contain higher proportions of three of the 
four high level encoding problems. Complainants' testimonies did not 
exhibit higher relative percentages of ambiguous wording, inadequate 
justifications, justifications missing or direct contradictions; than 
accuseds' testimonies ie, they did not contain higher proportions of 
any of the four low level encoding problems. 
Hypothesis six was not tested directly, but was dependent on the affirmation 
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of hypothesis two from a1.m one and hypothesis one from aun three (seep 119 & 121). 
The former hypothesis was affirmed ie, common user's found testimonies 
that magistrates had judged incredible to be more incomprehensible. 
However, the latter hypothesis was not affirmed ie, common users 
did not find accuseds' testimonies more incomprehensible. Therefore, 
no conclusion has been formed regarding the disadvantaging of undefended 
accused relative to complainants in court. 
Accuseds' testimonies exhibited higher relative percentages of 
the high level expectation conflicts than complainants' testimonies. 
11.2.2. I~terpretation 
Court role and credibility~ 'Magistrates and common users 
Once a.ga1.n let it be assumed that magistrates functioned as common users. 
The fi~dings showed that common users did not perceive accuseds' testimonies 
to be less comprehensible (less well-formed) than complainants'. It may 
be inferred that magistrates do not perceive complainants' arid accuseds' 
testimonies as differing in their comprehensibility. It has been deduced 
that magistrates judge highly incomprehensible testimonies to be incredible 
and highly comprehensible testimonies to be credible. Therefore, 
magistrates would not perceive accuseds' and complainants' testimonies 
as differing in their credibility. This would mean that the accusitorial 
system does not disadvantage undefended accused relative to complainants. 
However, there are two factors that invalidate this conclusion: 
First, the differential effects that prosecutors' questioning may have 
on the comprehensibility of accuseds! and complainants' CES's, may have 
been obscured by the procedure that was followed (seep 179). 
Second the common users read complainants' testimonies first and ' . . 
only later did they read accuseds' testimonies. It has been shown 
that when two narratives are read, the second is more comprehensible 
than the first. This is because the first narrative serves to instantiate 
the macro-schematic 'foundations' for comprehension. The second 
narrative is comprehended using this already instantiated macro-schema 
(Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980 ). Should this order-effect have operated, 
the common users would have perceived accuseds' testimonies as more 
comprehensible than complainants'. This was not demonstrated. However, 
it was also postulated that prosecutors may question undefended accused 
in a manner that decreases the comprehensibility of their testimonies. 
This was the postulate from which the hypotheses concerning the effects 
of court role em comprehensibility were derived ie, aim three-hypotheses. 
Had th.e prosecutors' debilitating effect operated in combination with 
the advantageous order . ...effects, the resulting differences in the overall 
comprehensibility of accused and complainants could have been counter-
bala.nced. This could have produced the non significant findings 
demonstrated in this study. :t'{agistrates hear complainants and accuseds 
testimonies in the same order as the common users. Therefore, it may 
be deduced that this explanation describes processes in court. However, 
due to the possible confounding of the order and prosecutors~ effects, 
without further investigation no conclusion may be made regarding the 
possible disadvantaging of undefended accused in accusitorial proceedings. 
·Encoding problem types · 
The hypothesis was fort!led that because undefended accused were expected 
to be relatively less credible than complainants, their testimonies would 
contain higher relative percentages of high level problems and lower 
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relative pe:rc.entages of low level problems. Statistical suppo~t w~s 
not provided for the relations.hip between court role and comprehensibility 
(credibility). Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported. Accuseds' 
testimonies did contain significantly higher relative percentages of 
high level expectation conflicts. This may be used to infer that 
common users/magistrates found accuseds' testimonies to be less 
comprehensible and therefore less credible than complainants'. There 
are two additional factors that reduce the clarity of this finding: 
First, no significant relationship was demonstrated between the different 
types of encoding problems and magistrates' credibility judgements. The 
deduction was that high level problems did not cause a significantly 
greater lowering of magistrates' perceptions of credibility than low 
level problems. However, given the procedural problems that have been 
discussed (see p 178) this finding may be erroneous. Second, there were 
higher mean percentages of 110n-categorized problems in 'white' accuseds' 
and 'coloured' complainants' testimonies~ Had these problems been 
classified, significant differences in the relative percentage of each: 
of the types of en-coding problems may have resulted. Ther~fore, more 
conclusive .statements awa·it further research. 
11.3. Limitations of the study 
The unavoidable confounding of socio-economic class and ethnicity is 
the major limitation to the internal validity of the findings. Had 
the witnesses been matched according to their socio-economic status 
the common users' comprehensibility ratings may have differed. 
However, whether social groups differ according to social class and/ 
or ethnic characteristics, as long as receivers belong to a social 
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group that differs :froJ;n th.a,t of sen,Q.ers, cot!lprenension. difficulties 
are likely to remain. In court, witnesses and magistrates a.re not 
always matched according to their socio-economic class and ethnicity. 
Thus, differences in magistrates' perceptions of well-formedness, 
comprehensibility and credibility, may serve to disadvantage certain 
social groups relative to others. The restricted sample of inter-
racial cases prevented further statistical tests of the disadvantaging 
effects of ethnic identity. 
Significant differences in the common users' perceptions of the 
comprehensibility of credible and incredible, and 'coloureds'' and 
'whites'' testimonies, were demonstrated. However, the associations 
between credibility and comprehensibility, and ethnicity and 
comprehensibility were not measured. The predictive efficacy of the 
comprehensibility factor must be evaluated in comparison with other 
non-linguistic and para-lingui.stic variables. 
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There was a failure to develop a weighting system for the encoding 
problems, in particular one that reflected critical.causal chain-effects. 
This prevented an adequate examination of the differential relationships 
between the eight types of encoding problems and credibility, 
ethnicity and court role. 
This study was not an adequate examination of justice delivered in 
accusitorial criminal trials, because the procedure and confounding 
order-effects may have obscured the effects of prosecutors' 
questioning on comprehensibility (credibility, ethnicity and court 
role). 
Three explanations have been provided for the relationship between 
ethnicity and comprehensibility (credibility). Thi.s study di.d: 
not facilitate a conclusion as to the most applicable. To reach 
conclusions,future investigations must exam~ne the interrelations 
between source and message credibility factors in court. 
Finally, the criticism may be levelled that these findings are 
generated in an extra-court context and may not be directly 
generalized to predicting intra-court processes (Lloyd-Bostock, 
1981). However, it has been argued that the differences between 
connnon users and magistrates are expected to increase the 
influence of the comprehensibility factor on magistrates' credibility 
assessments in court. 
The assessment of whether the processes postulated 1.n this study do 
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operate in criminal trials must remain the province of future investigations 
ie, the external validity has yet to be tested. 
11. 4. Future research 
Future investigations should attempt to overcome the limitations of this 
study that are mentioned above. This study has raised the issue that it 
is receivers' perceptions of the efficacy of speakers' language performance 
that may be fundamental to people's 'success' in the South African legal 
system. However, legal proceedings comprise only a·small proportion of 
legal activities (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). Therefore, future studies 
should examine the effects of differences in language performance 
thrQughout the legal process. Disadvanta.ging may be accumulative ~n 
n.ature (Lizotte, 1978). 
The second major issue to be explored systematically 1.s the role played 
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by prosecutors' questioning u,1 creatigg an9 eJ;D.phasizing sc·peJ;D.atic 
violations that may decrease und.ef'ended, 'non-white' accuseds' credibility. 
The investigation of this process would serve as a more adequate test of 
justice administered in the South African accusitorial system. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to include suggestions for legal 
reform that arise from these findings. The reader is referred to the 
more specific report compiled for the Human Sciences Research Council 
Juridical Committee (Hansson and Van Zyl Smit, 1984): 
The compilation of splendid reports may contribute to scholarship. 
Unless they are followed up with legislation, and beyond with the 
scrutiny of the operation of reformed laws, they will not generally 
improve society. 
(Slabbert, 1981: 1) 
11.5. Conclusions 
This study was the first attempt to explore the role played by the extra-
legal variable of the semantic structure of testimony in shaping magistrates' 
verdicts, in the South African criminal justice system. 
In the pilot phase the 'white' c~n users reported that their credibility 
judgements were 'determined' by the comprehensibility (the well-formedness 
of the semantic structure) of testimonies. They maintained that they used 
'incomprehensibilities' (schematic violations) as cues of deception in 
assessing the credibility of test-imonies. They showed that these 
'incomprehensibilities' were 'caused' by violations of their macro-schematic 
knowledge and norms of interp~etation (encoding problems). Eight types 
of encoding problems were identified and defined. The findings generated 
by the experimental phase I common users de~onstrated that they perceived 
the comprehensibility (well-formedness) of testimonies that magistrates 
had judged to be incredible, to be lower th~p that of testil1lonies that 
magistrates had judged to be credible. Additionally, the findings showed 
that the 'white' experimental phase I common users perceived 'coloured' 
witnesses' testimonies to be less 'comprehensible' (less well-formed) 
than those presented by 'white' witnesses. 
This study was conducted out of court. Therefore, the extrapolation of 
the findings to predict in:-court processes is fraught with criticism. 
However, it has been argued that the differences between 'white' 
magistrates and 'white' common users that could produce different 
effects in court; may actually be expected to increase the effects of 
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the comprehensibility (well-formed) of testimony on magistrates' credibility 
judgements and .verdicts. Therefore, magistrates' are expected to perceive 
'coloured' witnesses' testimonies as relatively less comprehensible (less 
well-formed) and therefore less credible than 'white' witnesses. This 
process could disadvantage 'coloured' witnesses relative to 'white' 
witnesses in interracial cases. This is deductive and theoretical support 
for the disadvantaging of 'coloured' witnesses ih South African magistrates' 
court cases. 
Due to procedural and design factors, the study did not facilitate an 
adequate examination of disadvantaging caused by accusitorial proceedings, 
the relative importance of the comprehensibility of the PIS's and CES's 
of testimonies in shaping magistrates' credibility judgements; and the 
relative 'contributions' of each of the eight types of encoding problems 
to incomprehensibility and to magistrates' assessments of credibility. 
Future research into these processes has already been planned. 
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APPE~IX. I 
PRIMITIVE ACTIONS ANP THEIR CORRESPONDING ACTION ELEMENTS 












defining the acts 
The possession, ownership 
ie, control of some object. 
Transfer of physical 
location. 
The application of 
physical force to an object. 
The movement of a body 
part of an animate object 
by that animate object. 
The grasping of an object 
by an actor. 
The taking of an object to 
the inside of an animate 
object. 
The expulsion of an object 
·from the body of an animate 
object into the physical 
world. 
The transfer of mental 
information between 
animate objects and/or 
within an animate object. 
The construction of new 
from old information by 




the primitive action 
conceptuali~ations 
in the English 
language 
give, take, buy 
go, put, come, 
push, pull, throw, 
kick, break 
kiss, scratch, walk 















defining the acts 
The production of sound 
by an animate object. 
The focusing of attention 
of some sense organ of an 





the primitive action 
conceptualizations 
in the English 
language 
play music, speak, 
purr, scream 
listen, see, smell 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977~ 12/13) 
N'PE@l~. II 
CAUSAL SYNTAX RutES 
Rules 
C.S.l. -Action can result ~n 
state changes. 
C.S.2. - States can enable 
·actions. 
C.S.3. - States can disable 
actions. 
C.S.4. - States or actions can 
initiate mental states. 
C.S.S. - Mental states can be 
reasons for actions 












lr or lr 




(Schank and Abelson, 1977) 
AN EXCERPT FR.Gl-1 A C(!JMPLAINANT' S TESTIMONY 
1. C was on his way home. 
2. C had his radio -with him. 
3. C had it under his jacket. 
4. C went up the alleyway. 
5. A ducked out into the alleyway. 
6. A asked C if the radio could play. 
7. C told A that it was broken. 
8. A said that if C did not give him the radio, 
9. A would stab C. 
10. B came up to A and C. 
11. B hit C twice. 
12. A took C's radio from C. 
ICEY: 
In this example the discourse cues are not represented at the scripta! 
level ie, level three. 






The two accused who filled the role theme of robber. 
The complainant who filled the role theme of victim. 
Signifies the direction of occurrence. 
Signifies interrelationships among knowledge represented 
at each level in the hierarchy. 
Level 4 ~ Thematic Schema 
lu_ 
~ C has C's radio 
Level 3 - Intentional Schem~ 
~ 
~ D-PROX (A, B and C) 
Level 1 - Causal Chain Schema 
~ 
1.4.5.10 
A & B PTRANS 
to C 
THE DERIVED HIERARCHICAL MEMORY REPRESENTATION 
A & B possess C's 
radio 
ATRAN.S lll_ 
(of C 1 s radic 
frOm C to A 






































8.9 ~ 11~ 12 Appendix I) 
~ MTRAN~ ~ 
- -A MTRANS B PROPEL A GRASP 
A will stab B's hand, to C's radio, 




1. Precondition. Headers (P.H.) : are linguistic cues that present the 
central precondition or the goal to be achieved by a scripted 
activity. P.H.'s generally take the form of an inferred goal eg, the 
linguistic cue of John was hungry, may act as a P.H. for the ~ 
Restaurant. 
2. Instrumental Headers (L H.) : are linguistic cues that function as 
script headers for a particular fleeting script and thence as a 
script header to a second non-fleeting script. The first fleeting 
script operates as the instrument by which the Maincon of scene 
I of the non-fleeting script is achieved eg, consider the linguistic 
cue of; (i) John took a taxi, (ii) to the restaurant. Segment (i) 
of the cue is the script header for the ~ Taxi Ride and would thus 
instantiate this script temporarily. (i) and (ii) serve as the Maincon 
of scene I of the ~ Restaurant ie, the Maincon of PTRANS of a customer 
to the location of the restaurant. Thus, the temporary activation 
of the first ~ Taxi Ride, is instrumental in instantiating the more 
permanent use of the ~ Restaurant. 
3. Locale Headers (L.H.) : are linguistic cues that refer to peoples' 
presence 1.n places where scripted activities generally take place 
eg, the linguistic cues of, John was at the art gallery,would act as 
a L.H. that activate~ the ~ Art Gallery Visit. 
4. Intern.al C0nceptualiz.ati.~m Hea,der.s. (I.C.H.) ~ are lii;lguistic c.ues. 
that refer to one of the roles or props in a script eg, the linguistic 
cue of, the waiter arrived at the tabZe, would operate as a I.C.H. 
thus activating the $ Restaurant. 
It should be noted that the accuracy of the script predictions 
facilitated by these four script headers .increases progressively 
from number one to four. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977) 
~PE:Nl:)lX .. V 
GENERAL ~JILES. fQR PI.AJSS ~p GOALS 
1. Since the ~ctions constituting a plan have preconditions and consequences, 
if the preconditions Qf an action are absent a subgoal must be 
established to create them. 
2. If the preconditions of a planned action are create~ that action will 
be performed to satisfy the goal. This gQal may be the central goal, 
or it may be a subgoal that is another precondition for the attainment 
of a higher-order .goal. 
3. If the preconditions of a planned action cannot be created, then that 
planned action will be dropped from the plan. Another planned action 
to achieve the desired goal will then be substituted. 
4. Should any plan involve a very large number of subgoals, then that 
plan will be dropped as it will be an inefficient means of attaining 
the desired goal ie, it will be too costly and/or too time consuming. 
5. If any goal can be achieved by means of a number of different plans, 
the least time consuming and costly plan will be followed. 
(Black and Bower, 1980) 
A?PEN!)I;K VI 
MAIN GOALS AND PLANS 
A definition of 
each tnaingoal 
l. Satisfaction Goals 
(S-Goals) 
These. are goals to 
achieve the satisfaction 
of strong, biological 
needs in order to main-
tain life. The goals 
are cyclical in nature. 
2. Enjoyment Goals 
(E-Goals) 
These are goals to 
participate 





3. Achievement Goals 
(A-Goals) 






To sleep, to 
be fed and to 
have sex etc. 




To possess, to 
gain power-
ful positions, 
to acquire a 
skill. 
The constituents of the 
main plans for each 
maingoal 
Involves the use of some 
object/person which requires 
the user to know the where-
abouts of the object; to be 
in close proximity to the 
object; to have 'control' 
of the object; and to 
prepare the object in some 
manner to make it ready 
for use, as is desired. 
Involves the gaining of some 
experience which requires the 
gainer to know the location 
of the source of the experience, 
to. be in the location, and to 
gain social control of the 
right to the reception of 
that experience. 
Involves the gathering of 
resources, dealing with 
appropriate people, developing 
appropriate behaviours and 
passing critical tests. 




These are goals aimed 
at preserving and/or 
improving one's health, 
safety, position, 
property and/or well 
being. 
~a.mples 
To have an 
operation, to 
go on a diet, 
to fight off a 
burgler. 
The con.stituents of the 
1,11a,in plans for each 
maingoal 
Involves the formation of a 
plan to counter that which 
threatens. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977) 
£!PEND IX. , VI I 
PERSUADE PLANBO:XES 
1. ASK 
ACT P MTRANS (.NEW?) to T 
CP Those for MTRANS (in a simple world, PROX (P,T)) 
UP Those for DO. (For example, if DO is T ATRANS X to P,* 
then the preconditions are T CONT (X), PROX (T,X), and 
PROX (T~P)) 
MP T want to DO 
RES T DO, causing NEW 
2. INVOKE THEME 
ACTs a P MTRANS (NEW?) to T 
b P MTRANS (THEME (P,T)) to T 
CPs a Those for MTRANS (PROX (P,T)) 
b Theme (P,T) is true 
note: The second precondition 1s controllable only if we 
recognize further plans which can result in theme changes 
such as a change in T's liking for P. Otherwise this 
precondition is uncontrollable. 
UPs Those for DO* 
MP THEME (P,T) would cause DO 
RES T DO, causing NEW 
3. INFORM REASON 
ACT P MTRANS (T not DO would cause NEGATIVE STATE for P; or 
T DO would cause POSITIVE STATE for T) to T (in other 
words, P tells T that P will suffer in some way if T. 
does not do what P asks, or that T will feel good by 
doing it.) 
CPs a those for MTRANS (PROX (P,T)) 
b T believes the NEGATIVE (POSITIVE) STATE is potentially 
true. (This second precondition says that P's story is 
credible to T. This is controllable only up to a point.) 
UP those for DO* 
MP PQtential ~G.(\TIVE (POSIT;LVE) STATE would cause P.o. 
RES T P.O, causing ~ 
4. BARGAIN OBJECT 
ACT P MTRANS (T DO would cause P ATRANS OBJECT to T) to T 
CPs a Those for MTRANS (PROX (P, T)) 
b Those for P ATRANS OBJECT to T 
(in particular, T POSS OBJECT) 
UP Those for DO* 
MP T want OBJECT 
RES a T DO, causing NEW 
b P ATRANS OBJECT toT, causing T POSS OBJECT 
(Note: There is a trick (TR) option available for BARGAIN 
OBJECT, in which the persuader does not deliver the OBJECT 
he promised. In its choice and effect, BARGAIN OBJECT (TR) 
thus is similar to STEAL, but in its execution is similar 
to BARGAIN OBJECT. 
5. BARGAIN fAVOR 
ACT P MTRANS (T DO would cause P DO (+)) to T 
DO (+) abbreviates 'do an ACT intended to lead to a POSITIVE 
STATE'; DO (-) abbreviates 'do an ACT intended to lead to 
a NEGATIVE STATE'. 
CP a those for MTRANS (PROX (P,T)) 
b those for DO (+) 
UP those for DO* 
MP DO (+) would case DO 
Note that BARGAIN FAVOR has a trick option, too, in which P 
does not carry out the favor, DO(+) 
RES a T DO, causing NEW 
b P DO (+) 
6. THR,EATE:N 
ACT P MTRANS (T not DO woul.d cause P PQ ( -)) to T 
CP a those for MT~~S (PROX (P,T)) 
b those f·or DO (-) 
UP those for DO* 
MP DO (-) would cause DO 
(That is, the threatened ,_;b.ehaviour is sufficiently 
feared by T to initiate DO) 
RES a T DO, causing NEW 
b P not DO (-) 
(Unlike other planboxes, THREATEN has a result attaching 
to failure as well as to success, namely that if T does not 
DO what was asked, P will carry out his treat. But there 
is a trick option here, too- 'bluffing', wherein P knows 




ACT P PROPEL (object or part of body) to T (causing T to DO) 
CP a those for PROPEL (close PROX (P,T)) 
b P has means to OVERPOWER T 
UP Those for DO* 
MP PROPEL (P to T) would cause DO 
RES T DO, causing NEW 
STEAL 
ACT P GRASP (object) from T 
CP a those for GRASP (T has object) 
b PROX (P,T) 
UP Those for DO* 
MP GRASP (obj ec.t) would cause PO 








is the prl.m;Ltl\re actiop that tmrst be accomplished for the plan 
to be successful. 
are the controllable preconditions that must be present for the 
primitive act to be accomp.lished. If these are not present then 
a D-GQal must be established to create the missing preconditions. 
a:r:e the uncontrollable preconditions that must be present for the 
primitive act to be accomplished. If these are not present then 
the D-Goal must be ~rapped and replaced with another. This is 
due to the fact that the U.P. cannot be created by utilizing 
other planboxes for that D-Goal. 
are the mediating preconditions that must be present for the 
p:r:imitive act to be accomplished. If these are not present 
then the planbox must be dropped and another planbox must be 
used that will accomplish the D-Goal. 
This is the outcome of the successful use of a planbox in 
accomplishing a D-Goal. 
refers to the new state that is desired by the planner. 
refers to the old state that the planner wishes to change. 
refers to the primitive act which must be performed to consumate 
the successful achievement of the D-Goal. 
(Schank and Abelson, .1977: 95-97) 
N'PEm> I~ VIII 
EXPECT.A.NCY RULES 
ERl If a. person's state becomes NEGATIVE on either the PHYSICAL or 
EMOTIONAL scale, then that person will do one or any number of a 
set of actions to improve the NEGATIVE state. eg, John is going 
to take some asprin for his cold. 
ER2 If a person believes that an action will cause that person's state 
to NOT go to a particular NEGATIVE value on the PHYSICAL,.MENTAL 
aad}or EMOTIONAL scales and that person believes that his state 
MAY go to that value -if an action is not performed, then that 
pe:rson will do that action. eg, When he saw the grizzly bear, 
John climbed up the nearest tree. 
ER3 If a person does an action which causes a negative change in 
another person's state on any level, then the second person may 
do another to cause a negative change in the first person's state. 
This is simply revenge. 
ER4 If qne person does an action which causes a positive change in 
another's state on some level then that person may do another 
action to cause a positive change in the first person. Thi~ is 
mutual back-scratching or flattery. 
ER5 If a person believes that an action will cause another person's 
physical state not to go to a particular NEGATIVE PHYSICAL STATE 
that is otherwise imminent if that action is not performed; and 
the two people are positively emotionally related, then the first 
person will do something to get that action performed. eg, Joey's 
mother demanded that he get flu shots. 
ER6 If two people are positively emotionally related, then a negative 
change in one person's state will cause the other person to 
develop the goal of causing a positive change in the other's state. 
eg, When Mary cried over the loss of her ring, John sent her flowers. 
ER7 If two people are positively emotionally related then the recognition 
of a potential negative change in one person's state will cause 
the other to develop the goal of preventing the negative change 
in the first person's state. eg, When the Little League coach 
said he might bench John's son, John tried to get the coach fired. 
ER8 If a person is in a positive emotional relationship to another person 
th.en if he can help the oth.er person by assuming the responsibility 
of achieving a goal of the other person, he will. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977: 122/144) 
N>PE~I~ IX 
CONTENTS OF ROLE THEMES 
1. A role-~ember and one ~r more role-goals. 
2. A set of conditions that trigger the goals. 
3. A list of risks and benefits resulting from the actions 
performed within the role. 
4. A set of plans to realize role-goals. 
5. A set of behaviours that may be expected from characters relating 
to a role member. 
6. A set of situational scripts that integrate the behaviours of 
role-members and the behaviours of others. 
7. A set of deviations from the expected behaviours. 
8. A set of conditions for entering and· .. el!(it:ing from the role. 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977) 
PROCEPURAL GUIDELINES FOR Tf:iE . PILOT PHASE COMMON USERS' ANALYSIS 
Tpe aim of the analysis 
The aim of this phase of the study is to understand what it is about these 
court testimonies that makes you find them more or less credible or not 
credible. 
You have been provided with a number of sets of dialogue that constitute 
a court case. Each set of dialogue is termed a court testimony. Each 
court case consists of a case for the prosecution and a case for the 
defenc.e. The case for the prosecution will always contain a testimony 
delivered by the complainant and in some instances one or more testimonies 
delivered by witness(es) for the prosecution. The case for the defence 
will always contain a testimony delivered by the accused and in some 
instances c;me or more testimonies delivered by witness (es) for the defence. 
The procedure to be followed 
1. Read the entire court case caPefully. 
2. Read the case for the prosecution carefully. 
3. Read the case for the defence caPefully. 
4. Then note down which of these two is r:nost credible to you. and which 
is least CPedible to you. You must choose. You cannot say that you 
find both to be equally as incredible or credible. 
5. Then. take the case for the prosecution and write down 1n as much 
d.eta.il as possible your reasons ~or fipc;ling it more or less credible. 
You a.re free to note any aspec:t of the case that you found influenced 
your assessment of its credibility. 
6. Then take t'\l,e case for: the c}:efence apd do the sa,nte •. 
Z. Bring all this inforv:~atiop to the final meeting, as well as any 
problems that you may have experienced or any comments you would 





AN EXCERPT FROM A CASE DIALOGUE 
i C you are the o'Wtler of the Red Dot Clothing Company, in Fifth Avenue, Kenilworth, is that correct? 
• 
That 1s correct. 
On the 20th of January 1981 you left the premises, is that correct? 
That 1s correct. 
~re or less at four o'clock 1n the afternoon? 
At four in the afternoon. 
Now, can you tell the court in what condition you left the premises? 
I locked. the premises and I set the alarm. 
You set the alarm? 
Yes 
Do you J!lean that you locked all the doors and windows? 
I locked all the doors, I locked all the windows, I do it every night 
before I leave the factory. 
N'PEtiDI!X XIb 
THE DERIVEP STORY· ELEMENT LIST 
1. C 1s the owner, 
2. Of the Red Dot Clothing Co~pany, 
3. In Fifth A~enue, Kenilworth. 
4. On. the 20th of January 1981, 
5. C left the premises. 
6. ~t four in the afternoon. 
7. C locked the premises, 
8. ~dC set the ala.rm. 
c set the alarm. (rep 8). 
9. c locked all the doors, 
10. c locked all the windo~s, 
u. c does it every nigh.t, 
12. Before c leaves the factory. 
KEY 
(rep 8) = story elements that were repetitions of earlier story elements. 
These were not numbered separately because the common users required only 
one number to denote each different story element. 
APPE@IX eiia 
THE pER.GENT~GES OF SA!1PLE CASES l'IEARD BY EACH MAGISTRATE 
Magistrate Cr·edible .Incredible Credible Incredible 
Codes 'whites' 'whites' 'coloureds' 'coloureds' 
1 6.3 6.3 
2 6.3 6.3 
3 18.7 18.7 
4 18.7 12.5 12.5 18.7 
5 ' 18.7 18.7 
6 12.5 37.5 37.5 12.5 
7 12.5 6.3 6.3 12.5 
8 6.3 6.3 
9 6.3 6.3 
10 6.3 6.3 
11 12.5 12.5 
12 6.3 6.3 
13 6.3 6.3 
14 6.3 6.3 
NUmber of 
different 9 8 8 9 
magistrates 
THE PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE CASES INVOLVING EACH PROSECUTOR 
Prosecutor Credible Incredible Credible Incredible 
codes 'whites' 'whites' 'coloureds~ 'coloureds' 
A 6.3 6.3 
B 6.3 6.3 
c 12.5 12.5 
D 12.5 12.5 
E 25 18.7 
F 18.7 18.7 25 25 
G 6.3 12,5 
H 12.5 6.3 
I 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 
J 6.3 6.3 
K 6.3 6.3 
L 6.3 6.3 
M 6.3 6.3 
N 6.3 6.3 
0 
p 6.3 6.3 
Q 6.3 6.3 
R 6.3 6.3 
s 6.3 6.3 
T 6.3 6.3 
Number of 
different 11 11 10 10 
prosecutors 
.M>PENl)IX XIIG 
THE PER.CE:NTAGES I:JF SAMPLE CASES INVOLVING EACH OFFENCE 
Offence Credible Incredible Credible Incredible 
Type 'whites' 'whites' 'coloureds' •coloureds' 
* * Robbery 38.8 38.8 
.(\ssault 
G.B .. H. 11.1 11.1 
Theft 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 
Crimen 




Property 5.6 5.6 11.1 
Common 
Assault 5.6 5.6 
Trespassing 
on private · 
property 5.6 5.6 
Attempted 
House-





steal 5.6 5.6 
House-
breaking 5.6 5.6 11.1 
Attempted 
Robbery 5.6 5.6 
Fraud 5.6 5.6 
Offence Credible Incredible Credible Incredible 
type 'whites' 'whites' 'coloureds' 'coloureds 
Disobeying 
red robot 5.6 5.6 
Bilking 5.6 5.6 
Making a 
False 
State~ent 11.1 11.1 
Possession 
of 
:t:1andrax 5.6 5.6 
Escaping 




types 13 13 7 7 
I'J'PENPIX. Xlld 
THE PERCENTAGE OF ENGLISH AND AFRIKAANS TESTIMONIES IN THE EXPERIMENTAL 
SAMPLE 
Afrikaans English 
Gredible 66% 34% 
Incredible 66% 34% 
'Coloureds' 100% 0% 




Intra-racial 6 7 
-
Interracial 2 1 
Totals 8 8 
APPEt'PIX f{Ile 
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\ .· • .
• !'• 
Incredible 'whites' Totals Incredible 'coloureds~ Totals Row 
Totals 
Accused Complainants Accused Complainants 
Intra-racial 7 6 13 7 6 13 26 
Interracial 1 2 3 1 2 3 6 
Totals 8 8 16 8 8 16 32 
PROCEDURAL GUIDELI:NES FOR PHASE I 
The aim of this analysis 
The ahn of this phase of the investigation is for you to identify aU the 
parts of each of the testimonies, that you experience as being 
in,aomp:rehe"Qsible/diffieuU/probler:natia to understand. 
You have been provided with a number of sets of court dialogue that 
con.stitute a court case. Each set of dialogue is termed a court testimony. 
Each court case consists of at least two testimonies: One delivered by 
the complainant and one delivered by the accused. In some cases there 
will also be one or more testimonies delivered by witness(es) for the 
prosecution and/or for the defence. 
The procedure to be followed 
1. Read tpe -fi:rst testimony in the court case aa:refuUy. 
Th.is will alw{!ys be the co:tnplainants' testimony. 
2. Read the corresponding story element list marked with the same 
case cod.e in the top left hand corner of the sheet. 
3. Make a note of the nur:nbe:rs of gll the story elements that you find 
to be incomprehensible/problematic/difficult to understand. You 
may find that it is easier for you to mark parts of the original 
dialogues that you find problematic, first. Then go to the story 
element list and find the corresponding story elel!lent(s). 
4. Then, provide a detai1er;1 :reason as to why you found each of the 
story elements to be problematic to understand. Often it is useful 
when providing a reason, to think of how you would correct the 
testimony in order to make it easier to understand/comprehend. 
5. Repeat this procedu{e ft,Qt:n. l tq 5, fQr e~ch of the testi~;pop,ies ~n 
th.e ca_se. 
6. You must carry out this part of the procedure for each of the 
testit:nonies, in the or9er in which they occur in the court case 
~e, the complainants' testimony first, then the witness(es) for 
the prosecution, then the accuseds' testimony, and finally any 
witness(es) for the defence. However, you must assess each 
testimony independently of the other testimonies. 
7. Please use a separate sheet of paper for each analysis of each 
testimony. Write the correct case code in the top left hand 
corner of each page that you write on. 
8. Place all the sheets that you use and the original information 
th~t yqu were provided with, in the green envelope and return 
it to t:ne. 
9. If you have any problems and/or questions and/or comments do not 
hesitate to contact t:ne. 
THANK YQU. 
N'PE@.IX !lHIIb 
AN EXAMPLE (1F ~ ANALYSIS SHEET 
The Dumber of the 
problematic story 
elements: 




The reasons why these story elements 
were problematic 
Where did C's child come out from? 
:No information is provided here to 
explain this statement and therefore 
i± ~oes not ~ake sense. 
If C supposedly asked A to come inside 
the house and talk with C then why was 
it necessary for C to go and wake C's 
husband up to come and talk with A? 
One does not expect this to happen and 
~o reason is given for this apparent 
change of plan. 
N'PE~IX. !l\IV~ 
PROCEDURAL GUIDELI~ES FOR PHASE II 
The aim of this analysis 
The aim of this phase of the study is for you to classify each one of a 
set of reasons into one of nine possible encoding problem categories. 
You have been provided with a set of numbered reasons and a set of n~ne 
defined encoding problem categories. Each of these reasons was furnished 
by a previous group of people as a justification for finding certain parts 
of court testimo.nies to be problematic to comprehend. The numbers in the 
fir·st column on the left hand side of the pages are the numbers of the 
story elements that were identified as constituting a problem within 
testimonies. Should the numbers be written with a dash (-) separating 
th.em, this i:p.oicates that these story elements were perceived as 
conflicting or opposing elements of information. The slashes (/'s) 
between the numbers have merely been used to separate the numbers. 
Th.e procedure to be followed 
1. Read through each of the nine encoding problem category definitions 
carefully. 
2. Rea.d through each of the reasons separately ie, each reason should 
be read in complete isolation and should not be integrated with any 
of the other reasons. 
3. Then match each reason against the n~ne encoding problem category 
definitions. Write down the name of the encoding problem category 
into which each reason fits in the fourth right hand column of each 
sheet. Y'bu may only place each reason into a single category. 
4. Should you feel that an:y rea.so~. c;l:oes pot fit in.to a~y one Qf the 
first eight categories, y<;>u I)lay place it in category nine, which 1s 
an open category. However, do not use this category unless you are 
certain that the reason does not fit into any of the first eight 
categories. 
5. You are not required to judge whether or not you agree with the 
reasoning provided or whether in fact it does constitute a 
comprehension problem. You are only required to categorize the 
reasons in the form that these have been presented. 











17 - 33/35 
16 ... 33}35 
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Reasoning 
1. C is say1ng that B asked 
A "Were you with?" 
However, C does not state 
who A was supposed to have 
been with. 
2. The reason why B suddenly 
hit C with a fanbelt 1s 
not provided. 
3. C claims that A could see 
that C's radio-tape was 
broken. However, C was 
carrying the radio tape 
under C's arm and under 
C's jacket, so how was it 
possible for A to have seen 
that the radio-tape was 
broken? 
4. C claims that A just 
'popped up' in the 
empty a.lleyway and 
immediately asked C if 
C's radio-tape could 
play. However, seeing 
that C had the r-adio-tape 
unQer C's jacket, how 
could A. have known that C 
was carrying a radio-tape 
in tne first place? 
5. C claims that B hit C "at 
the same time", but C does 

















PERCENTAGES OF I~Otfi'~HENSIBILITY 
ss ABC D.V.. 1. o.v. 2a D.V. 2b D.V. 2c 
1 000 8.7 7.4 0.0 7.4 
2 101 8.2 8.2 0.0 11.0 
3 100 58.4 58.4 66.7 49.2 
4 001 35.5 32.3 39.6 51.3 
5 100 9.0 9.9 0.0 10.9 
6 001 23.2 23.2 21.4 29.0 
7 010 15.2 10.5 42.9 7.2 
8 111 29.7 29.7 24.8 41.1 
9 000 3.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 
10 101 13.7 13.7 13.6 13.9 
11 uo 40.8 48.6 55.0 47.2 
12 011 21.8 21.8 15.8 32.6 
13 100 18.8 20.5 0.0 20.5 
14 001 10.8 10.8 21.8 2.2 
15 000 20.9 20.9 11.6 23.5 
16 111 23.9 23.9 26.2 19.4 
17 110 26.6 26.6 7.7 39.5 
18 011 11.1 11.1 0.0 14.0 
19 110 58.4 58.4 66.7 49.2 
20 001 35.5 32.3 39.6 51.3 
21 010 5.3 5.3 4.0 6.0 
22 111 39.0 37.7 33.3 50.0 
23 010 15.2 10.5 42.9 7.2 
24 101 29.7 29.7 24.8 41.1 
25 100 14.6 16.9 3.4 19.7 
26 001 5.1 5.7 0.0 10.3 
27 no 37.9 3I.9 100.0 32,1 
28 011 12.3 12.3 0.0 21.2 
29 110 27.4 32.4 28.6 34.8 
30 001 6.0 6.0 5.2 7.0 
ss ~ B C o.v. l D.V. 2a D.V. 2b D.V.2c 
31 010 11.6 11.6 0.0 12.2 
32 111 26.8 26.8 19.4 66.7 
33 010 19.9 20.6 16.7 23.9 
34 111 32.2 32.2 25.7 45.6 
35 010 5.3 5.3 4.0 6.0 
36 111 32.6 39.1 36.7 45.2 
37 000 34.2 34.2 66.7 24.1 
38 101 28.3 28.3 30.6 23.5 
39 110 27.8 24.6 18.8 31.7 
40 011 9.3 12.0 6.3 10.2 
41 000 0.0 0.0- 0.0 0.0 
42 101 8.4 8.4 6.7 22.4 
43 100 30.7 30.7 14.7 42.1 
44 011 9.8 9.8 6.5 12.7 
45 000 8.3 8.3 0.0 8.3 
46 101 19.0 19.0 26.7 8.8 
47 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
48 001 4.7 3.7 3.4 5.3 
49 010 16.0 21.5 10.9 29.1 
50 111 9.9 9.9 7.9 19.2 
51 000 2.2 2.2 0.0 2.2 
52 101 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.8 
53 000 8.2 8.2 22.2 6.6 
54 101 35.1 35.1 66.7 25.0 
55 100 32.5 33.3 100.0 25.6 
56 Oll 13.1 13.7 12.8 17.1 
57 100 35.7 35.7 22.2 39.4 
58 001 14.7 14.7 0.0 18.0 
59 110 31.6 31.6 60.0 30.0 
60 011 34.1 34.1 21.4 57.1 
61 010 25.6 25.6 4.3 32.8 
62 ll1 70.8 70.8 78.6 60.0 
63 110 27.7 30.1 20.8 33.3 
64 011 20.2 20.2 24.3 0.0 
M'PE~IX X'{b 
RE~riVE PERCENT~GES OF E~CQDI~G PROBLEMS 
ss ABC D.V.3a D. V. 3b D.V.3c D. V. 3d D. V. 3~ D.V.3f D.v.3g o.v.;3h o.v.3j 
1 000 000 000 000 000 50.0 50.0 000 000 000 
2 000 000 000 000 33.3 33.3 000 000 33.3 000 
3 100 5.1 12.8 43.6 7.7 10.3 2.6 5.1 000 12.8 
4 001 000 5.9 29.4 11.8 35.3 5.9 5.9 5.9 000 
5 100 000 33.4 22.2 000 11.1 22.2 11.1 000 000 
6 001 5.5 27.8 16.7 5.5 000 27.8 16.7 000 000 
7 010 000 000 25.0 000 25.0 50.0 000 000 000 
8 111 000 14.8 29.6 11.1 18.5 11.1 7.4 000 7.4 
9 000 000 000 000 000 000 100 000 000 000 
10 101 000 000 25.0 000 50.0 000 25.0 000 000 
11 110 9.5 19.0 23.8 14.3 14.3 4.8 000 000 14.3 
12 011 000 20.0 30.0 10.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 000 000 
13 100 000 38.5 15.4 15.4 7.7 15.4 000 000 7.7 
14 001 000 000 41.7 000 25.0 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
15 000 000 45.5 18.2 000 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 000 
16 111 5.9 23.5 23.5 5.9 11.8 17.6 11.8 000 000 
17 110 6.7 33.3 6.7 20.0 000 13.3 13.3 6.7 000 
18 011 000 000 50.0 000 000 000 000 50.0 000 
19 110 5.1 12.8 43.6 7.7 10.3 2.6 5.1 000 12.8 
20 001 000 5.9 29.4 11.8 35. 3' 5.9 5.9 5.9 000 
1- -
T 
ss A B C D.V.3a D. V .3b D.V.3c D. V .3d D. V .3e D.V.3f D. V .3g D. v.3h D.V.3j 
21 010 000 000 100 000 000 000 000 000 000 
22 111 000 5.0 50.9 5.0 25.0 10.0 000 000 5.0 
23 010 000 000 25.0 000 25.0 50.0 000 000 000 
24 101 000 14.8 29.6 11.1 18.5 11.1 7.4 000 I.4 
25 100 000 45.5 36.4 000 9.1 9.1 000 000 000 
26 001 000 000 000 33.3 66.7 000 000 000 000 
27 110 7.7 23.1 15.4 000 000 30.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 
28 011 000 000 33.3 000 000 000 66.7 000 000 
29 110 10.5 31.6 21.1 5.3 000 21.1 000 10.5 000 
30 001 000 71.4 000 000 14.3 14.3 000 000 000 
31 I 010 25.0 25.0 25.0 000 25.0 000 000 000 000 
32 111 9.1 36.4 9.1 000 9.1 18.2 9.1 9.1 000 
33 010 000 8.3 41.7 8.3 25.0 8.3 8.3 000 000 
34 111 9.7 6.5 9.7 12.9 29.0 16.1 12.9 3.2 000 
35 010 000 000 100 000 000 000 000 000 000 
36 111 000 000 68.2 22.7 4.5 000 4.5 000 000 
37 000 20.0 000 20.0 000 20.0 000 20.0 000 20.0 
38 101 000 16.7 16.7 33.2 16.7 16.7 000 000 000 
39 110 000 20.0 40.0 000 20.0 000 10.0 000 10.0 
40 011 000 28.6 28.6 000 14.3 14.3 14.3 000 000 
41 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 
42 101 000 16.7 50.0 16.7 16.7 000 000 000 000 
43 100 000 18.8 43.7 6.3 25.0 6.3 000 000 000 
J 
ss A B C D.V.3a D.V.3b D.V.3c D.V.3d D. V. 3e D.V.3f D. V. 3g D.V.3h D. V. 3j 
44 011 000 40.0 000 000 60.0 000 000 000 000 
45 000 000 50.0 25.0 000 000 000 25.0 000 000 
46 101 000 000 000 000 000 25.0 75.0 000 000 
47 100 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 
48 001 000 000 50.0 000 000 000 000 50.0 000 
49 010 000 36.4 13.6 9.1 13.6 18.2 9.1 000 000 
50 111 11.8 41.2 000 5.9 11.8 17.6 11.8 000 000 
51 000 000 100 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 
52 101 000 000 50.0 000 50.0 000 000 000 000 
53 000 000 33.3 000 000 33.3 33.3 000 000 000 
54 101 000 000 66.7 000 000 000 000 000 33.3 
55 100 10.0 35.0 10.0 15.0 000 5.0 15.0 10.0 000 
56 011 000 000 37.5 000 000 25.0 37.5 000 000 
57 100 10.0 000 000 000 40.0 40.0 10.0 000 000 
58 001 000 000 000 20.0 80.0 000 000 000 000 
59 110 000 000 20.0 40.0 000 20.0 000 000 20.0 
60 011 000 9.1 36.4 000 36.4 9.1 000 000 9.1 
61 010 000 18.2 18.2 36.4 18.2 9.0 000 000 000 
62 111 000 5.0 10.0 5.0 50.0 10.0 20.0 000 000 
63 110 14.3 21.4 21.4 000 14.3 21.4 000 000 7.2 
64 011 000 25.0 50.0 000 000 000 12.5 12.5 000 
A "QUN;.ITATIVE ANALYSIS OF A JUDGEMENT 
Excerpt from a j ud:gement 
The court must say immediately that the complainant made a reasonably 
good impression on the court. She explained how on the night in question, 
she had been walking, that the accused came towards her and called to her. 
S.he had win.e with her, she had food in bags with her and also clothes, 
wh_ich she put down on the ground. Whilst she was standing there, the 
accusec;l came and grabbed her around the neck and hit her in the eye causing 
her to fall over, and then he put his hand into the front of her dress and 
took out Rl2,00 cash. He then took the other goods that were there and 
walked away. That was her testimony. 
Ttte accused told how he took the money. The money fell onto the ground 
after he hi.t the complainant. He could not actually say why he had hit 
her. He a~itted that he took the money for himself. At one stage the 
a.ccused said that a friend of his and two others were present, but at a 
later stage he said that there were only three people there ie, himself 
a.nd two others ,were present. 
No fault can be found with the complainant's' testimony, and in fact the 
accused supports her testimony in part. The accused's story is so 
implausible tha.t this court cannot accept his testimony. Especially 1n 
light of the fact that the complainant explained how the robbery took 
place so well, and that the ac.cused maintained that he picked up the 
money and' was going to call her back, but that he also wanted the money 
I 
• 
for himself. The court ca;n;n~t ?Ccept this. The courts rejects the accused's 
testimony on the issue of h.ow he got hold of the money. The court believes 
that he must have taken the money from the complainant as she has described. 
The court must accept the complainant's testimony. 
Magistrate's encoding problems :_ Critical causal chain violations 
1. The accused does not justify why he hit the complainant - justification 
missing (low level). 
2. He admits that he took the money for himself, but is pleading not 
guilty to the charge of robbery- direct contradiction (low level). 
3. He claims that there were four people present and then that there were 
only three people present- direct contradiction (low level). 
Coromo~ users' encoding problems : Critical causal chain violations 
1. The accused does not explain why he hit the complainant - justification 
missing (low level). 
He claims that he does not know how he shook her and that he shook her 
with one hand by the shoulder, twice- direct contradiction (low level). 
He says that he cannot remember what happened,1but that he never pushed 
her to the ground- direct contradiction (low level). 
He maintains that he cannot remember what happened,,~but that he did not 
hit her- direct contradiction (low level). 
2. The a.ccused says that he took the money and did not give it back, but 
is pleading not guilty to the charge of robbery - direct contradiction 
(low level). 
He claims that he was go1ng to give her purse back, but that she walked 
away. This is unexpected since she wanted her purse back. He does 
not give a reason. for tpe c.o'QlPlainan.t' s un~xpected benav.i.ou:r, - e~pectation 
c~nflict (high leve 1). 
He says that he had no intenti.on of stealing the money, and then that 
he did intend to steal it- direct contradiction (low level). 
He maintains that he intended to steal the purse, but that he wanted 
to give it back to the complainant- direct contradiciton (low level). 
3, The accused maintains that there were four people present when he found 
the co~plainant and yet later he says that there were only three people 
prese'f:lt- direct contradiction (low level). 
Co~on. users' encoding problems ~ Peripheral violations 
1. Although the accused found the complainant from whom he wanted to 
buy wine, he did not buy wine. Instead he went straight to another 
wine seller. 'No reason i.s provided for the accused's change of plans 
-expectation conflict (high level). 
2. The accused states that B had already left, but does not explain where 
B had left from- ~biguous wording (low level). 
3. When the accused arrived back from the wine seller B had already left 
the complainant, and yet the accused knew where to find B. The accused 
does not say how he knew where to find B - empirical contradiction (high 
level). 
4. Seeing that the accused. had been unsuccessful at finding w1ne to buy, 
it see~s unusual that he d.id not ask B where B had managed to get wine 
from- expectation conflict (high level). 
5. The accused said that C was lying under a lorry and then later he says 
that she was lying a little way away from a lorry- direct contradiction 
(low le'<el). 
6. The accused says that the c~plainant was not on the ground and yet 
he maint~dns that she was lying on the ground - direct contradiction 
(low level). 
7. The accused says that the complainant's money fell out of the front 
of her dress and yet he also says that it was her purse that fell 
out- direct contradiction (low level). 
APPENDIX XVII 
RAW DATA FOR INTERRACIAL CASES 
Percentages of incomprehensibility 
PIS CES Total 
c w c I C A c w c I C A c w c I C A 
'White' 
complainants 23.5 19.4 11.8 26.2 20.9 23.9 
and 'coloured' 
accused. 
I W C C C A I W C C C A I W C C C A 
25.6 17.1 100 12.8 33.3 13.7 
42.1 12.7 14.7 6.5 30.7. 9.8 
-
PIS CES Total 




c:: complainants 7.2 41.1 42.9 24.8 10.5 29.7 
\ 




I C C C W A I C C CWA I C C C W A 
49.2 51.3 66.7 39.6 58.4 32.3 
34.8 7.0 28.6 5.2 32.4 6.0 
